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In Search of a Bright Line: Determining
When an Employer's Financial Hardship
Becomes "Undue" Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act
Steven B. Epstein 48 Vand. L. Rev. 391 (1995)
The employment provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act
have been fully effective since July 26, 1994. These provisions require all em-
ployers with fifteen or more employees to reasonably accommodate the dis-
abilities of job applicants and employees. Reasonable accommodation can be
very expensive: one in every twenty accommodations now being made costs
more than $5,000. Although the ADA permits employers to refuse to make ac-
commodations that would cause an "undue hardship," neither the statute nor
its implementing regulations provide meaningful guidance regarding how
great an accommodation expense must be before the point of "undue hardship"
is attained. Consequently, neither employers nor employees can be sure what
level of accommodation the ADA requires.
This Article argues that for the ADA to achieve its central objective of
integrating millions of Americans with disabilities into the labor force, a very
precise definition of "undue hardship" must be developed. The Article there-
fore constructs a quantitative methodology for mdking undue hardship deter-
minations; the methodology utilizes a private employer's net working capital,
net profit, and the size of its labor force to establish the precise point of undue
hardship for any proposed accommodation. This methodology is designed to
ensure that private employers maintain the ability to maximize profit, and
that lower-paid employees are entitled to reasonable accommodation expendi-
tures equal to those of higher-paid employees. By enabling employers and em-
ployees to determine their financial obligations and entitlements without re-
sorting to litigation, the proposed methodology would truly facilitate the inte-
gration of millions of Americans with disabilities into the workforce.
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"[Tihe bill is a swamp of imprecise language; it will mostly benefit lawyers who
will cash in on the litigation' that will force judges to, in effect, write the real
law."
Statement of Representative Norman D. Shumway
prior to House passage of the ADA.1
"The ADA is a legislative Rorschach test, an inkblot whose meaning and sig-
nificance will be determined through years of costly litigation."
Statement of Senator William Armstrong upon
the ADA's passage in Congress.2
'Tears that the ADA is too vague or too costly and will lead to an explosion of
litigation are misplaced."
Statement of President George Bush upon signing
the Americans with Disabilities Act into law.3
I. INTRODUCTION
Acme Products has an opening in its sales division. It adver-
tises for the $40,000/year position and begins to interview applicants.
On paper, one applicant's credentials shine over all the rest. At her
interviews, this applicant's enthusiasm, energy, and commitment
impress everyone with whom she would work. As her prospective
sales manager begins to make an offer, the applicant mentions that
she has a disability-she has very poor vision and is, in fact, legally
blind. Her disability prevents her from driving, reading documents,
and using ordinary computers. To accommodate her disability, she
reveals, she will need an assistant to drive her to sales calls and read
documents; she also will need a specialized computer to allow her to
perform word processing and formulate spreadsheets. These accom-
modations will cost $5,000 annually. The sales manager postpones
1. 135 Cong. Rec. E3064 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1989) (quoting The Lawyers' Employment
Act, Wall St. J. A18 (Sept. 11, 1989) (editorial)).
2. 136 Cong. Rec. 89694 (daily ed. July 13, 1990).
3. 26 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1165 (July 26, 1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 601.
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making the offer and calls Acme's legal department to determine the
scope of Acme's obligations in this situation. Much to the sales man-
ager's surprise and chagrin, the legal department reports that, be-
cause of the vagueness of a critical provision of the governing federal
statute, it cannot offer any concrete guidance regarding Acme's legal
obligation to make these accommodations.
That federal statute is the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 ("ADA"). 4 The ADA's employment provisions, Title I,5 have been
in full force and effect since July 26, 1994.6 Congress intended for
Title I to facilitate the transition of eight million Americans with
disabilities from the disability welfare system into the labor market.7
4. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990), codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 and 47
U.S.C. §§ 225, 611 (Supp. 1993).
5. The ADA contains separate titles addressing four distinct areas in which new legal
remedies are provided to people with disabilities who encounter discrimination: Title
I-employment, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117; Title II-public services, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165;
Title III-public accommodations, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189; and Title IV-telecommunications,
47 U.S.C. § 225. Housing discrimination against the disabled is proscribed by the Fair Housing
Act Amendments of 1988 ("1988 FHAA"), Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988), codified at
28 U.S.C. §§ 2341, 2342 (Supp. 1992), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3602, 3604-3608, 3610-3614, 3615-
3619, 3631 (1988). This Article focuses exclusively on Title I of the ADA.
6. Title I became effective for employers with 25 or more employees on July 26, 1992, two
years after President Bush signed the ADA into law. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). Title I became
effective for employers with 15 to 24 employees on July 26, 1994. Id. The second "phase-in"
period was intended to allow small businesses to learn from the experiences of larger employers.
See 136 Cong. Rec. H3070-71 (daily ed. May 24, 1990) (recording House debate and vote on
LaFalce-Campbell Amendment). Employers with fewer than 15 employees are not covered by
the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). Fifteen employees is also the statutory threshold for em-
ployer compliance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1988).
The EEOC estimates that 86% of the nation's workforce-86 million employees-is now covered
by the ADA. EEOC News Release, Disabilities Act Expands to Cover Employers with Fifteen or
More Workers, 1994 WL 376729, *1 (located in E.E.O.C. database) (July 18, 1994).
7. Forty-nine million Americans are disabled. John M. McNeil, Americans with
Disabilities: 1991-92, Current Population Reports P70-33 at 16 (U.S. Bureau of the Census,
1993). Over 13 million people with disabilities 21 to 64 years of age are unemployed. That is
48% of the disabled population in that age bracket. Id. at 62. A 1986 Lou Harris poll
determined that approximately 8.2 million Americans with disabilities want to work but cannot
find a job. Nearly half of them attributed their employment status to discrimination. National
Council on Disability, Implications for Federal Policy of the 1986 Harris Survey of Americans
with Disabilities 19 (1988); Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, The Americans
With Disabilities Act of 1990, S. Rep. No. 101-116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1989); House
Committee on Education and Labor, Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, H.R. Rep. No.
485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 32 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314. 'The
practical effect of the ADA's employment provisions-assuming that they are enforced
adequately--could be to enable over eight million workers with disabilities to enter the work
force, thereby removing those individuals from government subsidy rolls and empowering them
to become contributing, taxpaying members of society." Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990: An Overview, 22 N.M. L. Rev. 13, 46 (1992) (symposium issue).
In 1994, another Harris Poll was taken to measure progress since the 1986 survey and since
enactment of the ADA. The results were much the same, if not worse: the number of
unemployed people with disabilities in the 16- to 64-year-old age bracket increased from the
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To achieve that objective, Congress mandated that employers gov-
erned by Title I "reasonably accommodate" the disabilities of job ap-
plicants and employees. 8 Reasonable accommodation will often re-
quire employers to make financial expenditures to modify their facili-
ties, purchase special equipment, or hire readers or interpreters.9 A
disabled employee's right or entitlement to such accommodations
under Title I is limited only to the extent that they would cause an
employer an "undue hardship."'o
Most employers will not be asked to make accommodations as
expensive as the ones requested of Acme Products, but some will. A
recent study found that nine percent of all accommodations made
under Title I cost employers $2,001 to 5,000, while another five per-
cent cost employers greater than $5,000.11 For example, a visually
impaired insurance agent required an $8,200 voice-synthesized com-
puter. A legally blind paralegal applicant required a $12,000 reading
machine. 12 And, for office workers with severely impaired physical
1986 survey from 66% to 68%; the portion of that group that reported a desire to work increased
from 66% to 79%. Humphrey Taylor, Americans with Disabilities Make Gains in Education But
Are No More Likely to be Working in 1993 Than They Were in 1986, 45 The Harris Poll 1994, 4-5
(July 25, 1994). Combining the 1993 census numbers with the 1994 Harris Poll numbers, the
number of unemployed people with disabilities in the 21 to 64 age bracket who want to work is
currently over 10 million.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A), (B).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2) (1994). The 1994 Lou Harris poll de-
termined that 26% of the working-age disabled population needs special equipment or
technology to work effectively. Taylor, 45 The Harris Poll 1994 at 2 (cited in note 7).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a).
11. As of September 30, 1994, the President's Committee on Employment of People with
Disabilities' Job Accommodation Network ("JAN") had compiled data showing that of the ac-
commodations it assisted employers with since October 1992, 18% were cost-free, 50% cost $500
or less, 10% cost between $501 and $1,000, 8% cost between $1,001 and $2,000, 9% cost between
$2,001 and $5,000, and 5% cost greater than $5,000, with a mean accommodation expense of
$992. JAN, Accommodation Benefit/Cost Data, 4 (Sept. 30, 1994). In 1988, the JAN had re-
ported that of the thousands of accommodations it had recommended for disabled employees
between 1984 and 1988, 31% were cost-free, 38% cost less than $500, 19% cost between $500
and $1,000, and 12% cost between $1,000 and $5,000. James G. Frierson, Employer's Guide to
the Americans with Disabilities Act 103-04 (BNA, 1992) (citing JAN, In the Mainstream, Mn.
Report #4 (July-Aug. 1988)). The JAN's cost figures may be somewhat lower than reality
because costs associated with making structural changes to the workplace-which can be very
expensive-tend to be underreported in JAN's data. Interview with D.J. Hendricks, JAN (Dec.
6, 1994). Both a 1982 study sponsored by the U.S. Department of Labor and a 1990 study
sponsored by the Government Accounting Office found that 8% of pre-ADA accommodations
they studied involved costs greater than $2,000. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 1 A Study of
Accommodations Provided to Handicapped Employees by Federal Contractors 28-29 (1982)
("Employees Accommodation Study"); U.S. Gov't Accounting Office, Persons with Disabilities,
Reports on Costs of Accommodations, Report No. B-237003 (1990). Similar studies are
addressed at note 179 and accompanying text.
12. Frierson, Employer's Guide to the Americans with Disabilities Act at 106-07 (citing
examples of accommodations that predated enactment of the ADA). See also Michael C. Collins,
The ADA and Employment: How it Really Affects People with Disabilities, 28 Gonzaga L. Rev.
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functions, a Prab Voice Command I package, which includes a com-
puter, special monitor, voice-controlled keyboard, robotic arm, printer,
telephone system, and a workstation custom designed for wheelchair
use, retails for about $50,000.13 Indeed, prior to the ADA's enactment,
the Bush Administration's Council of Economic Advisers estimated
that Title I would require covered employers to spend between $1.7
and $10.2 billion annually to accommodate disabled employees. 14
Significantly, a large percentage of the 666,000 private busi-
nesses now covered by Title 115 had never before been required by
federal or state law to allocate financial resources to accommodate
employees with disabilities.16 These businesses have little experience
209, 213-14 (1992-93) (symposium issue) (describing accommodations ranging from $800 to
$7,000).
13. In 1989, this device sold for $49,500. Frierson, Employer's Guide to the Americans
with Disabilities Act at 107.
14. Gregory S. Crespi, Efficiency Rejected: Evaluating "Undue Hardship" Claims Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 26 Tulsa L. J. 1, 4 n.17 (1990). The EEOC's estimate of
annual reasonable accommodation costs that Title I will require was radically lower-$16.4
million. 56 Fed. Reg. 8578, 8584 (1991). In the Author's opinion, the EEOC's estimate was
grossly off the mark. See note 185.
15. The EEOC estimates that 264,000 businesses were covered by the initial phase-in of
Title 1 (25 or more employees) and that an additional 402,000 fell within Title I's ambit when
coverage was extended to employers with 15 or more employees on July 26, 1994. EEOC News
Release, 1994 WL 376729 at *1 (cited in note 6).
16. Indeed, the central purpose behind the enactment of Title I was to bring these private
employers under the ambit of federal disability discrimination law. See 135 Cong. Rec. S10,711
(daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (recording the statement by Sen. Harkin that "[t]he ADA extends civil
rights protections for people with disabilities to cover employment in the private sector .... "; S.
Rep. No. 101-116 at 19 (stating that "there are still no protections against discrimination by
employers in the private sector) (cited in note 7). See also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4) (finding that
"unlike individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national
origin, religion, or age, individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of
disability have often had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination").
Though 48 state statutes proscribed discrimination against the disabled in the private sector
by the time of the ADA's enactment, 21 of those statutes did not require reasonable accommo-
dation. See Alaska Stat. § 18.80.220 (1986 & Supp. 1989); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-60 (1986 &
Supp. 1989); Fla. Stat. § 760.10 (1986 & Supp. 1990); Ga. Code Ann. § 34-6A-4 (Supp. 1989);
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 378-2 (1985 & Supp. 1989); Ind. Code § 22-9-1-13 (1976 & Supp. 1980); Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 44-1009 (1986 & Supp. 1989); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 207.170 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1989); 5 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 4572 (1964 & Supp. 1989); Md. Ann. Code art. 49B § 16 (1986 &
Supp. 1989); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 48-1104 (1988); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 613.340 (1986 & Supp. 1989);
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 354-A 7 (1966 & Supp. 1989); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12 (West 1976 &
Supp. 1989); N.Y. Exec. Law § 296 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1990); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
4112.02 (Anderson 1980 & Supp. 1988); 25 Okla. Stat. § 1302 (1981); S.C. Code Ann. § 43-33-530
(Law Co-op, 1987); Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-50-103 (1988 & Supp. 1989); Tex. Labor Code Ann. §§
1.01-10.05 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1988); Utah Code Ann. § 34-35-6 (1988 & Supp. 1989).
Moreover, four statutory schemes placed monetary limits on the costs employers were required
to expend to reasonably accommodate employees with disabilities. See 19 Del. Code Ann. §
722(6)(d)(1) & (2) (Supp. 1988) (stating that undue hardship exists if employer must spend
greater than five percent of the disabled employee's salary on accommodation); La. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 2253(19) (West 1982 & Supp. 1988) (stating that private employers are not required to
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:391
analyzing the accommodations needed by employees with
disabilities;17 they have even less experience drawing the line that
divides legally mandated accommodations from those which would
cause them an undue hardship. With so much riding on the meaning
of "undue hardship," one would expect to find precise and detailed
language in the ADA or its implementing regulations outlining
specifically when the point of undue hardship is reached. 18 The
statute, however, and implementing regulations promulgated by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ('EEOC"),19  go
essentially no further than to define undue hardship as a "significant
difficulty or expense."20 It appears that Congress consciously adopted
this vague standard with the expectation that the courts would
ultimately define its contours.21
spend any money on reasonable accommodations); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 168A-3(10)(a)(6) (1987)
(stating that undue hardship exists if the employer must spend greater than five percent of the
disabled employee's salary on accommodation), discussed at note 209; Va. Code § 51.5-41(C)(2)
(1987) (limiting reasonable accommodation costs to $500 per employee). Therefore, only 23 of
the 48 statutes provided for reasonable accommodation and undue hardship in a fashion similar
to the ADA. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-1461(8)(d) (1985 & Supp. 1989); Cal. Gov't Code §
12440(a) (West 1980 & Supp. 1990); 1988 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-34-402(1)(b); D.C. Code § 1-2512
(1987 & Supp. 1989); Idaho Code § 67-5902(16)(d) (Supp. 1989); 111. Rev. Stat. ch. 68, 3 2-102
(1989); Iowa Code § 216.6 (1988); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 151B § 4(16) (Michie/Law Co-op 1989);
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 37.1102 (West 1985) (this statute has since been radically amended,
see note 268); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 363.03(6) (West 1991); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 213.010(10) (1983 &
Supp. 1990); Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-101(15)(b) (1989); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 28-1-7(J) (1978 &
Supp. 1987); N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02.4-02(16)(d) (Supp. 1989); Or. Rev. Stat. § 659.425 (1987);
43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 955 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1989); R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-7(1)(D) (1986
& Supp. 1989); S.D. Cod. Laws § 20-13-23.7 (1987 & Supp. 1989); 21 Vt. Stat. Ann. § 495d(12)(C)
(Equity 1987 & Supp. 1989); Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.180 (1987); W. Va. Code § 5-11-9 (1966 &
Supp. 1989); Wis. Stat. § 111.34(1)(b) (1988 & Supp. 1989); Wyo. Stat. § 27-9-105(d) (1977 &
Supp. 1989).
17. See Barbara A. Lee, Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act: The Limitations of Rehabilitation Act Precedent, 14 Berkeley J. Empl. & Lab.
L. 201, 203 (1993).
18. Such "safe-harbor" regulations have become increasingly common in highly regulated
industries to protect the regulated community from unknowingly violating the law. See, for
example, 12 C.F.R. §§ 18.11, 350.11 (1994) (establishing safe-harbor banking regulations); 26
C.F.R. 88 1.61-1 et seq. (1994) (establishing safe-harbor tax regulations); 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-
2(g)(2) (1993) (establishing safe-harbor regulations relating to pension benefits); 40 C.F.R. §
300.1100 (1994) (establishing safe-harbor regulations concerning lender liability for violation of
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA')).
Indeed, safe-harbor regulations protect builders from liability for violation of the ADA's twin
sibling, the 1988 FHAA, so long as they comply with the relatively clear regulatory guidelines
provided by the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 24 C.F.R. § 25, app. III to
Subchapter A (1994). Unlike builders attempting to comply with the 1988 FHAA, however,
employers attempting to comply with Title I of the ADA are not provided any safe-harbor
guidelines regarding their obligation to reasonably accommodate employees with disabilities.
19. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1-1630.16 (1994).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10); 29 C.F.R. § 16 3 0. 2 (p)(1).
21. See notes 220-31 and accompanying text.
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This Article focuses on the financial component ("significant...
expense") of the undue hardship standard as it applies to private, for-
profit employers.22 It argues that Congress's adoption of this vague
standard was a serious mistake, principally because the standard
fails to define legal obligations and rights sufficiently to inform
covered businesses and their employees with disabilities of the nature
and extent of those obligations and rights. Congress has failed to
supply any meaningful guidance regarding how far employers must go
in accommodating disabled employees before the point of undue
hardship is attained. Businesses that fail to correctly ascertain that
point will be subject to liability for discrimination.23 In reality,
therefore, the vague standard compels employers to capitulate to
employees' demands for accommodation, or take their chances that a
court's interpretation of this vague standard will mirror their own.
Furthermore, job applicants and employees are left in the awkward
position of not knowing what accommodations they can rightfully
demand from their employers. This situation will assuredly result in
tense, if not hostile, relations between employers and employees with
disabilities. Indeed, in the two years following Title I's effective date
for employers with twenty-five or more employees, approximately
30,000 charges of ADA discrimination were fied, one-quarter of which
involved reasonable accommodation issues.24 The bottom line is that
the vagueness of the undue hardship standard will, in all likelihood,
frustrate the fulfillment of Title I's central goal: integrating millions
of Americans with disabilities into the workforce.
Criticism abounds over Congress's and the EEOC's refusal to
formulate concrete undue hardship guidelines, with commentators
expressing fears that employer compliance with Title I will be impos-
22. It will be left to others to analyze the parameters of the administrative component
("significant difficulty") of the undue hardship standard. This Article focuses exclusively on
private, for-profit employers because issues regarding undue hardship are much more signifi-
cant to those employers than to public or non-profit employers, see notes 210-19 and accompa-
nying text, and because most public and non-profit employers have already been exposed to the
reasonable accommodation obligation and undue hardship standard for many years, see notes
59-81 and accompanying text.
23. Since 1991, this liability has included not only the panoply of equitable remedies
available under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (Supp. 1993), but also compensatory and punitive
damages up to $300,000. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D) (Supp. 1993). See notes 220, 229 and
accompanying text.
24. As of June 30, 1994 (less than two years following the ADA's effective date), 29,720
charges of Title I discrimination had been filed with the EEOC, 25% of which included a charge
that an employer had failed to reasonably accommodate an employee with a disability.
Disabilities Act: Greater Activism, Awareness Mark ADA as Law Extends to Small Employers,
Daily Lab. Rep. C-1, C-1 (July 26, 1994).
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sible, financially ruinous, or both.25 Yet no legislative or regulatory
proposals have been advanced to date to clarify the point at which an
employer's obligation to accommodate reaches the level of undue
hardship.26 This Article proposes a model that satisfies that objective
25. See, for example, Lisa A. Lavelle, Note, The Duty to Accommodate: Will Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act Emancipate Individuals with Disabilities Only to Disable Small
Businesses?, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1135, 1193-94 (1991) (stating that "[t]he fear is that the
duty to hire individuals with disabilities ... will prove to be so costly and burdensome as to
destroy small businesses); Gerald T. Holtzman, Kyle L. Jennings, and David J. Schenk,
Reasonable Accommodation of the Disabled Worker-A Job for the Man or a Man for the Job, 44
Baylor L. Rev. 279, 279 (1992) (stating that the ADA "promises to be both a source of new
litigation worries and a potential compliance nightmare for large and small businesses alike");
Thomas H. Barnard, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Nightmare for Employers and Dream
for Lawyers?, 64 St. John's L. Rev. 229, 252 (1990) (commenting that "Itlhe ADA, while well-
conceived and well-intended, will place an onerous burden on employers"); David Harger, Note,
Drawing the Line Between Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act: Reducing the Effects of Ambiguity on Small Business, 41 U.
Kan. L. Rev. 783, 791 (1993) (stating that "[tlhe deliberate failure of Congress to provide
clarification of reasonable accommodation and undue hardship is wholly insensitive to small
businesses"); George C. Dolatly, Comment, The Future of the Reasonable Accommodation Duty
in Employment Practices, 26 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. 523, 547 (1993) (noting that "[w]ith
insufficient guidelines as to how much accommodation is enough, there is the possibility that
overall cost, both to employers and to the judicial system, may eventually outweigh the
considerable social benefits of the ADA"); Floyd D. Weatherspoon, The Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990: Title I and its Impact on Employment Decisions, 16 Vt. L. Rev. 263, 282
(1991) (stating that "[t]he difficulty of complying ... seems not to be a result of employers
having a recalcitrant disposition toward such laws, but that it is difficult to identify what
constitutes reasonable accommodation and what sufficiently establishes undue hardship");
Edwina Allison Wilson, Practical Considerations for Compliance Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 28 Gonz. L. Rev. 265, 282 (1992/93) (symposium issue) ("[tlhis lack of guidance
can be detrimental to employers").
26. Four student authors have made such proposals. See Julie Brandfield, Note, Undue
Hardship: Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 59 Fordham L. Rev. 113, 131 (1990)
(suggesting a definition of undue hardship that is related to the effect of the accommodation on
profitability and morale), discussed in note 277; Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Comment, Overcoming
Barriers to Employment: The Meaning of Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship in
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1423, 1454 (1991) (proposing a test under
which undue hardship exists if the cost of of the accommodation would "either (a) substantially
impair the ability of the employer to produce goods or provide services, or (b) impose such a high
cost that the employer would be forced to compensate by reducing the overall workforce),
discussed in note 306; Dolatly, Comment, 26 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. at 548-49 (proposing a
statutory definition of undue hardship based on the overall operating costs of the employer and
customary expenditures for like employees); Steven F. Stuhlbarg, Comment, Reasonable
Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: How Much Must One Do Before
Hardship Turns Undue, 59 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1311, 1346-47 (1991) (proposing a complex test for
determining the maximum cost of accommodations that an employer would be required to make
both per applicant and per year), discussed in note 289.
Others have waged broad-scale attacks on Title I generally. Professor Richard A. Epstein
(no relation), for example, rejects Title I as "simply another way of seizing partial control of a
business from its firm managers and of forcing a redistribution of wealth off the public balance
sheet." Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimination
Law 488 (Harvard U., 1692). Epstein argues that Title I should be replaced with a government
grant system focused on concentrating employees with disabilities in certain workplaces. Id. at
493. Similarly, Professor Jerry L. Mashaw argues that Title I is "deeply-flawed" in part because
it "mandates expenditures by private parties now assumed to be bad actors." Jerry L. Mashaw,
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while striking a fair balance between the interests of people with
disabilities and their employers.
Part II of this Article exposes the vague undue hardship stan-
dard in the ADA's statutory and regulatory provisions. Part III ex-
plores the ADA's legislative history to determine what Congress
intended when it adopted this standard. Part IV identifies the ra-
tionales relied on by Congress in selecting this vague standard over a
more precise standard advocated by the business lobby. These ra-
tionales are examined under the bright light of history, and are re-
jected as flawed. Part IV concludes that history, logic, and sound
public policy demand that the vague undue hardship standard be
discarded in favor of a precise, quantitative standard.
Part V returns to the drawing board, and refocuses on the
ADA's legislative history with an eye toward the broad moral princi-
ples Congress embraced in adopting the undue hardship standard.
Part V then uses those principles as a foundation upon which a com-
pletely new, quantitative model of undue hardship is constructed.
Part VI puts the new model to the test. It first employs Professor
Colon Diver's "precision calculus" to measure whether the model
proposed actually achieves the optimal level of precision.27 Part VI
then applies the model to several American corporations, using pub-
licly available data, to determine whether it clearly defines the scope
of disabled employees' new rights and employers' new obligations in a
manner that fairly balances the interests of people with disabilities
and their employers. The Article concludes by urging that the ADA
Against First Principles, 31 San Diego L. Rev. 211, 231 (1994). He proposes that Title I be
discarded in favor of.
explicit quota requirements for employers with a market in "rights to discriminate"
against the disabled. In broad outline this scheme is quite simple: estimate the number
of disabled workers who might with reasonable accommodation be employed; divide that
number by the total number of workers in the economy; and require that each employer
hire that percentage of its workforce from the pool of "disabled" workers. Employers
who fail to hire their share of disabled workers would have to buy a waiver from
employers who are employing more than their share.
Id. at 232.
The Author rejects both of these proposals out of hand, for their starting points embrace a
society in which discrimination against the disabled is a socially acceptable form of behavior and
in which the goal is to ghettoize people with disabilities in certain industries, rather than
attempting to integrate them into the vocational and economic mainstream. Indeed, Professor
Mashaw's solution of bartering employment of disabled workers for cash harkens back to a day
when slaves were auctioned at the public square. The ADA appropriately attempts to accelerate
our collective social conscience in the exact opposite direction.
27. See generally Colon S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 Yale
L. J. 65 (1983).
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be amended to transform the presently vague undue hardship stan-
dard into one resembling the quantitative model proposed.
II. THE VAGUE STANDARD
Title I of the ADA protects "a qualified individual with a dis-
ability" from discrimination regarding any term, condition, or privi-
lege of employment.2s An employee is a "qualified individual with a
disability" if, "with or without reasonable accommodation," she "can
perform the essential functions of the . . . position" at issue.2
"Reasonable accommodation" consists of any alteration in the work
environment which enables a disabled employee to enjoy equal em-
ployment opportunities with non-disabled employees. ° Examples of
reasonable accommodation listed in the statute include:
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and us-
able by individuals with disabilities; and
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to
a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appro-
priate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or poli-
cies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar ac-
commodations for individuals with disabilities.3 1
28. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4. "Disability" is defined as a physical or men-
tal impairment that substantially limits one or more of a person's major life activities, a record
of such impairment, or being regarded as having such impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(g).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). The regulations further define a "qualified individual with a
disability" as "an individual with a disability who satisfies the requisite skill, experience, edu-
cation and other job-related requirements of the employment position such individual holds or
desires, and who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential func-
tions of such position." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). 'Essential functions" are defined as "the funda-
mental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires"
and "does not include the marginal functions of the position." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1).
30. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (1994). See EEOC, Technical Assistance Manual for the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("EEOC Manual') § 3.3 at 111-2 (Warren Gorham Lamont, 1992)
(stating that "[reasonable accommodation is a modification or adjustment to a job, the work
environment, or the way things usually are done that enables a qualified individual with a
disability to enjoy an equal employment opportunity). The reasonable accommodation
obligation requires that an employee be given the opportunity to attain the same level of
performance as similarly situated employees without disabilities: the goal is to remove physical
or structural barriers which would prevent the employee from fully performing the essential
functions of the position. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (1994). However, the reasonable
accommodation obligation does not require an employer to provide adjustments or modifications
to assist the individual throughout her daily activities, such as provision of a prosthetic limb,
wheelchair, or eyeglasses, unless such items are specifically related to the employment at issue.
Id.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2). Other examples listed in the
regulations include making employer-provided transportation, break rooms, training rooms, and
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Whether a particular form of assistance is required as a reasonable
accommodation must be determined on a case-by-case basis32 An
employer need not make the "best" accommodation possible under the
circumstances; its obligation ends with providing an accommodation
sufficient to meet the job-related needs of the employee. Therefore,
the employer may choose the least expensive or simplest accommoda-
tion that is effective for the purposes intended.33
Title I renders it illegal for an employer to refuse to make
reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limita-
tions of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability unless the
employer can demonstrate that making the accommodation would
cause an "undue hardship" on the operation of its business. 34
(A) The term "undue hardship" means an action requiring significant
difficulty or expense, when considered in light of the factors set
forth in subparagraph (B).
(B) Factors to be considered. In determining whether an accommoda-
tion would impose an undue hardship on a covered entity, factors
to be considered include-
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this
[Act];
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities in-
volved in the provision of the reasonable accommodation; the
number of persons employed at such facility; the effect on ex-
penses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such accom-
modation upon the operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall
size of the business of a covered entity with respect to the
number of its employees; the number, type, and location of its
facilities; and
restrooms accessible; providing reserved parking spaces; and providing personal assistants,
such as a page turner for an employee with no hands or a travel attendant to assist a blind
employee on occasional business trips. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o) (1994); S. Rep. No. 101-116 at
31 (cited in note 7); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2 at 62, pt. 3 at 39 (cited in note 7), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 462 (listing other accommodations). In addition to expensive assistive
equipment, illustrated in notes 12-13 and accompanying text, the provision of readers,
interpreters, and other personal assistants can be very expensive, inasmuch as it requires
paying a second salary to assist the employee with the disability.
32. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9 (describing the reasonable accommodation process).
33. Id.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(a). See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d)
(characterizing "undue hardship" as a defense to reasonable accommodation). Likewise, it is a
discriminatory employment practice under the ADA for an employer to reject an employment
applicant for a position, or fire an employee, solely because hiring or retaining that individual
would necessitate reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9(b).
The need to accommodate cannot legally enter into an employer's decision regarding hiring,
discharge, or promotion unless the accommodation would cause an undue hardship. 29 C.F.R.
app. § 1630.9(b).
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(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, in-
cluding the composition, structure, and functions of the work-
force of such entity; the geographic separateness, administra-
tive, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question
to the covered entity.3 5
"Significant difficulty or expense" is further defined in the regulations
as any accommodation that would be "unduly costly, extensive, sub-
stantial, or disruptive, or that would fundamentally alter the nature
or operation of the business. 3 6 The regulations also reveal that undue
hardship under the ADA is significantly different' from undue
hardship in religious accommodation cases under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.31 'To demonstrate undue hardship pursuant to
the ADA... an employer must show substantially more difficulty or
expense than would be needed to satisfy the 'de minimis' Title VII
standard of undue hardship."38
In addition to the four undue hardship factors outlined in the
statute, a fifth is contained in the regulations: 'The impact of the
accommodation upon the operation of the facility, including the
impact on the ability of other employees to perform their duties and
the impact on the facility's ability to conduct business.' 9 The list of
35. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2). The distinction between "facility" and
"covered entity" subsumed within the second, third, and fourth factors relates to business
establishments that operate more than one structural facility. In that situation, the undue
hardship analysis begins with a factual determination of whether there is a sufficient financial
nexus between the business enterprise as a whole and the facility in question to base the
ultimate determination on the resources of the larger enterprise rather than the smaller
facility. For instance, in a simple franchisor/franchisee relationship, the financial resources of
the franchisee will be determinative. 29 C.F.R. § app. 1630.2(p) (1994). In contrast, if a
business owns several stores and operates them all centrally from the home office using the
financial resources of the organization as a whole, the resources of the central enterprise will be
determinative. EEOCManual at § 3.9 (cited in note 30). See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2 at 68-
69 (cited in note 7) (stating that the court will examine the practical realities of the situation).
The theory of '"piercing the corporate veil" should be equally applicable in the ADA undue
hardship context as it is in the corporate liability context. See generally David H. Barber,
Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 Williamette L. Rev. 371 (1981); Jonathan M. Landers, A Unified
Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 589
(1975); Wilson McLeod, Shareholders'Liability and Workers'Rights: Piercing the Corporate Veil
Under Federal Labor Law, 9 Hofstra Lab. L. J. 115 (1991); Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the
Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1036 (1991).
36. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(p). EEOC Manual at § 3.9, 111-12; S. Rep. No. 101-116 at 35
(cited in note 7); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2 at 67.
37. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(d) (1994). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j) (1988) (describing undue
hardship for religious accommodation).
38. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(d). See note 170 and accompanying text for further dis-
cussion of the comparison between undue hardship under Title VII and undue hardship under
Title I of the ADA.
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2)(v). However, an employer cannot claim undue hardship
merely because an accommodation has a negative impact on the morale of other employees. 29
C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(d).
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factors contained in the statute and regulations was not meant to be
exclusive.40 Another factor which might be considered in determining
undue hardship is the number of present and future employees who
will benefit from the proposed accommodation. 41 However, the fact
that an accommodation benefits only one person does not weigh in
favor of a finding of undue hardship.42 Furthermore, an employer
may not claim undue hardship simply because the cost of an
accommodation is high in relation to an employee's wage or salary.43
Ultimately, whether a particular accommodation will cause an
employer an undue hardship must be determined on a case-by-case
basis,44 and the "burden is on the employer to demonstrate that the
needed accommodation would cause an undue hardship. 45
Before an employer may refuse to make a reasonable accom-
modation because of undue hardship, it must consider whether alter-
native accommodations are possible which would not cause an undue
hardship.46 In addition, the portion of the cost which would be borne
by sources unaffiliated with the employer, such as vocational rehabili-
40. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2 at 69 (cited in note 7).
41. Id. Moreover, "[tihe terms of a collective bargaining agreement may be relevant in
determining whether an accommodation would impose an undue hardship." EEOC Manual at §
3.9 (cited in note 30).
42. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2 at 69.
43. EEOC Manual at § 3.9, II-15 (cited in note 30). "[T1o demonstrate that the cost of an
accommodation poses an undue hardship, an employer would have to show that the cost is
undue as compared to the employer's budget. Simply comparing the cost of the accommodation
to the salary of the individual with a disability in need of the accommodation will not suffice."
29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(d). For further discussion of the unavailability of this defense, see note
200.
44. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(d); EEOC Manual at § 3.9; H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3 at 42
(cited in note 7). "fAin accommodation that poses an undue hardship for one employer at a
particular time may not pose an undue hardship for another employer, or even for the same
employer at another time." 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(d). Subsequent to the enactment of the
ADA, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991),
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (Supp. 1993), which, among other things, affords a jury trial right
to persons claiming entitlement to compensatory or punitive damages under the Title I of the
ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c)(1), (d)(1)(B) (Supp. 1993). It is unclear to what extent, if any, the
undue hardship determination is to be left to the jury. In view of the sparse statutory and
regulatory gloss on the undue hardship standard, it is difficult to conceive of a jury instruction
which would both: (1) provide meaningful guidance to the jury; and (2) be premised on existing
law. Nevertheless, in Dutton v. Johnson County Board of County Commissioners, 868 F. Supp.
1260 (D. Kan. 1994), the Court apparently submitted the question of undue hardship to the jury,
which "implicitly found that allowing plaintiff to supplement his annual sick leave with
unscheduled vacation leave would not be an undue hardship, as that term is defined in the
ADA, for the Johnson County Public Works Department." Id. at 1264-65. See note 159.
45. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3 at 42. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(d) (describing what
the employer must show to prove undue hardship).
46. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)-(3) (describing several reasonable accommodations and
the process of determining additional reasonable accommodations).
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tation agencies, 47 or which would be offset by tax deductions or cred-
its,48 is not to be considered as a cost to the employer.49 Even if an
employer can successfully demonstrate that the total net cost of an
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on its business, it is
nevertheless obligated to pay for the portion of the accommodation
which would not impose an undue hardship; the employee must then
be given the opportunity to cover the remaining expense either with
her own funds or with the assistance of external sources. 0 It is in this
provision that the unworkability of the vague undue hardship
standard is immediately apparent, for this provision necessarily as-
sumes that the definition and factors discussed above can actually be
translated into dollars and cents.51 How else could an employer
determine that its obligation to accommodate an employee's disability
extends to only $1,500 of a $2,000 proposed accommodation?52
47. In many cases a state rehabilitation agency, a public interest group such as the Braille
Institute, or the employee, will pay part or all of the cost of the accommodation. For example:
In 47 placements of visually impaired workers arranged by the Sensory Aids Foundation
of Palo Alto, California, the employer paid for the accommodation device in only 14 cases
and shared the cost in 3 other cases. In 27 cases a state vocational rehabilitation agency
or public interest group paid the cost, while in another 3 cases the employee provided
the accommodation device.
Frierson, Employer's Guide to the Americans with Disabilities Act at 101 (cited in note 11)
(citing Sensory Aids Foundation Study).
48. Tax benefits allowed under the Internal Revenue Code for compliance with federal
disabilities laws include a tax deduction of up to $15,000 a year for removal of qualified architec-
tural or transportation barriers, I.R.C. § 190 (1994), a tax credit of up to $5,125 a year for the
provision of reasonable accommodations by small businesses, I.R.C. § 44 (1994), and a tax credit
of up to $2,400 a year for the employment of individuals with "targeted" disabilities. I.R.C. § 51
(1994). For a more detailed discussion of these tax benefits, see EEOC Manual at § 3.11a, III-
34-6 (cited in note 30).
49. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(p). Hence, it is only the proposed accommodation's "net cost"
to the employer that is material to the undue hardship analysis. Id.; EEOC Manual at § 3.9, 111-
12-13. See S. Rep. No. 101-116 at 36 (cited in note 7) (discussing the employer's obligation to
pay for the portion of the reasonable accommodation not causing undue hardship). See also
H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2 at 69 (cited in note 7).
50. 29 C.F.R. app. §§ 1630.2(p), 1630.15(d); EEOC Manual at § 3.1, 111-1; S. Rep. No. 101-
116 at 36; H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2 at 69. The regulations and EEOC Manual are silent
regarding whether the employer and employee may contract for a reduction in wages in
exchange for the employer providing funds to accommodate the disabled employee beyond the
point of undue hardship. The Author suspects that the EEOC and courts will frown on such
agreements if the employer reduces the employee's salary to recoup the entire accommodation
expense. Nevertheless, to the extent such contracts are negotiated at arm's length after the
employer has agreed to commit significant resources to accommodate the disabled employee, the
EEOC and courts should be willing to accept such arrangements to allow disabled employees to
secure otherwise unattainable accommodations.
51. "It follows that, in order to comply fully with the ADA, an employer would have to
know to the penny the exact point at which an accommodation would become an undue
hardship." Stuhlbarg, 59 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 1316 n.23 (cited in note 26).
52. The EEOC Manual provides: "For example: If the cost of an assistive device is $2,000,
and an employer believes that it can demonstrate that spending more than $1,500 would be an
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Unfortunately, nothing in the statute or regulations provides the
calculus for such a translation. Rather, from the statute and regula-
tions we glean only that undue hardship is something more than a de
minimis expenditure-one which is significant, unduly costly, exten-
sive, substantial, or disruptive in light of the nature and resources of
the business where the employee with a disability is to work. This is
the "standard" from which hundreds of thousands of private em-
ployers will have to draw the line between illegal discrimination and
legitimate claims of undue hardship. To better understand how this
standard evolved, we will now explore the ADA's legislative history.
III. WHAT WAS CONGRESS THINKING?
Why did Congress leave the definition of undue hardship so
vague? No explanation is provided in the statute itself. Indeed, one
of the central purposes listed in the ADA is antithetical to such a
vague standard: "to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable
standards addressing discrimination against individuals with dis-
abilities.' 53 To properly analyze the legislative thinking which un-
derpinned the ADA's hazy undue hardship standard, we must first
acquaint ourselves with the ADA's older sibling, the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973,5 for it was in the wake of the Rehabilitation Act that the
concept of undue hardship first evolved.
A. Undue Hardship Under the Rehabilitation Act
1. The 1973 Act and Amendments
In 1964, Congress opened the doors to full membership in soci-
ety to Americans of all colors, nationalities, religions, and gender by
enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964.55 It was not until 1973, how-
undue hardship, the individual with a disability should be offered the option of paying the
additional $500." EEOC Manual at § 3.9, 111-16 (cited in note 30).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (emphasis added). Congress also intended for the regulations
drafted to implement Title I to be "comprehensive and easily understood." 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726
(1991).
54. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973). The discussion of the act in this Article will
focus on §§ 501, 503, and 504 of Title V, 87 Stat. 390, 393, 394 (1973), codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 791, 793, 794 (Supp. 1992) respectively.
55. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964), codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-1075d,
2000a et seq. (1988).
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ever, that Congress even nudged those doors ajars6 to Americans with
disabilities by enacting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 57 The stated
goal of the Rehabilitation Act was notable only for its modest scope:
"to develop and implement, through research, training, services, and
the guarantee of equal opportunity, comprehensive and coordinated
programs of vocational rehabilitation and independent living, for
individuals with handicaps in order to maximize their employability,
independence, and integration into the workplace and community."5 8
Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act requires all federal de-
partments and agencies to conceive and implement affirmative action
plans for the hiring, placement, and advancement of individuals with
disabilities., 9 Section 503 requires entities that contract with the
federal government for more than $10,000 to use affirmative action to
employ people with disabilities.6o Only Section 504 contains a specific
antidiscrimination mandate: "No otherwise qualified individual with
a disability in the United States... shall, solely by reason of her or
his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance. . . ."61 Section 504
prohibits discrimination not only in employment, but also in educa-
56. One commentator has noted that: "While section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] has
unlocked the door for handicapped persons to enter the mainstream of society, it has failed in its
goal of opening that door wide." Bonnie P. Tucker, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act After
Ten Years of Enforcement: The Past and the Future, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 845, 915.
57. Congress had actually passed a similar version of the Rehabilitation Act in 1972, only
to be vetoed twice by President Nixon. Steven William Gerse, Note, Mending the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 1982 U. Ill. L. Rev. 701, 704. See 8 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Doc. 1579 (Oct. 27, 1972)
(explaining President Nixon's reasons for vetoing the Rehabilitation Act of 1972); 9 Weekly
Comp. of Pres. Doc. 302 (Mar. 27, 1973) (explaining President Nixon's objections to the Senate
version of the Rehabilitation Act of 1972).
58. Rehabilitation Act § 2, 87 Stat. at 357. Regarding employment, one stated purpose of
the Rehabilitation Act was to "promote and expand employment opportunities in the public and
private sectors for handicapped individuals and to place such individuals in employment." Id.
59. 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (1988).
60. 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (Supp. 1993). Until October 1992, the amount had been $2,500.
61. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (Supp. 1993), as amended by Rehabilitation Act Amendments of
1974, Pub. L. No. 98-516, 88 Stat. 1617 (1974), Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-569, 106 Stat. 4344 (1992). This language was obviously extracted from Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides in pertinent part that "[nlo person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988). See School Bd. of Nassau County v.
Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 277-78 & n.2 (1987) (discussing Congress's intent to pattern § 504 after
Title VI) (discussed in notes 100-05 and accompanying text).
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tion, public facilities, mass transportation, and in the allocation of
health and welfare services.62
Section 504 was enacted into law with neither implementation
provisions nor authorization for promulgation of regulations;63 it was
also enacted without any definitive legislative history or guidance.64
In recognition of this oversight, when Congress amended Section 504
in 1974, it clarified that this section "constitutes the establishment of
a broad government policy that programs receiving Federal financial
62. 29 U.S.C. § 794(b) (1988). See generally Bonnie P. Tucker and Bruce A. Goldstein,
Legal Rights of Persons with Disabilities: An Analysis of Federal Law ch. 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11 (LRP,
1990 and Supps. 1991-94).
63. As one student author has commented:
Section 504... stands naked within the Rehabilitation Act. It is unaccompanied by any
implementation provisions. Nothing within the Rehabilitation Act indicates whether
section 504 is merely a grand statement of national policy or a specific mandate for the
creation of an extensive body of civil rights regulations. No authority is delegated to any
agency to promulgate or enforce regulations under the Act. This silence must be con-
trasted with the language of section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act, which, in forbidding
discrimination against the handicapped by government contractors, contains a detailed
explanation of the implementing regulations to be drafted.
Mark F. Engebretson, Note, Administrative Action to End Discrimination Based on Handicap:
HEWs Section 504 Regulation, 16 Harv. J. on Legis. 59, 63 (1979).
64. Id.; Rosalie K. Murphy, Note, Reasonable Accommodation and Employment
Discrimination Under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1607,
1616 (1991). Indeed, not a word about this section was uttered by a single member of Congress
in any of the hearings or floor debates which preceded its enactment. Richard K. Scotch, From
Good Will to Civil Rights: Transforming Federal Disability Policy 53 (Temple U., 1984);
Brandfield, 59 Fordham L. Rev. at 116 n.27 (cited in note 26). Even most groups concerned with
disability issues did not take note of § 504 at the time of its enactment. Id. at 52. The only
reference to § 504 in the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act was an eloquent statement
from a representative of the National Federation of the Blind at a subcommittee hearing
mhe provision... prohibiting discrimination against the physically and mentally im-
paired in any Federally assisted program is of major consequence to all disabled people
as they strive to surmount the difficulties and disadvantages of their disabilities and
endeavor to attain a normal, productive and fulfilling life.
This civil rights for the handicapped provision... brings the disabled within the law
when they have been so long outside of the law.
It establishes that because a man is blind or deaf or without legs, he is not less a citizen,
that his rights of citizenship are not revoked or diminished because he is disabled.
But most important of all, the civil rights for the handicapped provision ... creates a
legal remedy when a disabled man is denied his rightful citizenship rights because of his
disability.
It gives him a legal basis for recourse to the courts that he may seek to remove needless
barriers, unnecessary obstacles and unjustified barricades that impede or prevent him
from functioning fully and in full equality with all others.
Rehabilitation Act, 1973, Hearings on S.7 Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 282-83 (1973). See Scotch,
From Good Will to Civil Rights at 54-55.
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assistance shall be operated without discrimination on the basis of
handicap. 65 Nevertheless, the Act remained ineffective in helping to
bring people with disabilities into the mainstream of society until
1978, when additional amendments were enacted.66 Among other
things, the 1978 amendments extended Section 504's antidiscrimina-
tion mandate to federal executive agencies and the United States Post
Office, 67 and granted handicapped individuals a private right of action
for violation of Section 504.68 The remedies provided by this new right
of action included injunctions, affirmative rehiring, back pay, and
attorney fees.6 9 Moreover, without expressly stating so, the 1978
amendments implied that the Rehabilitation Act required covered
employers to reasonably accommodate employees unless doing so
would be excessively costly: "In fashioning an equitable or affirmative
action remedy under [Section 501], a court may take into account the
reasonableness of the cost of any necessary work place accommoda-
tion ... "70
65. Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1974, S. Rep. No. 93-1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C-.AN. 6373, 6390. See Comment, Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act: Analyzing Employment Discrimination Claims, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 867, 870
(1984) (noting the effect of the 1974 amendment as "after-the-fact" legislative history). As the
discussion to this point already indicates, the preferred vernacular for discussing issues related
to people with disabilities has changed over the years. To the extent possible, the Author uses
the currently preferred vernacular, which favors the word "disability" over "handicap," and
refers to people with disabilities as 'people first." However, when quoting the language used by
others in an earlier historical period, the Author has left the vernacular of that period
undisturbed.
66. Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments
of 1978 ("1978 Amendments"), Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955 (1978), codified in scattered
sections of 29, 32, 42 U.S.C.
67. 1978 Amendments, § 119(2), 92 Stat. 2955, 2982 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)
(Supp. 1993)). The amendments did not, however, make § 504's antidiscrimination mandate
applicable to government contractors, the only truly private employers covered by the
Rehabilitation Act.
68. 1978 Amendments, § 120(a), 92 Stat. 2955, 2982, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988).
See Gerse, 1982 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 705 (cited in note 57) (discussing the remedies available under
§ 504). These amendments also created a private right of action under § 501. 1978
Amendments, § 120(a), 92 Stat. 2955, 2982 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a) (Supp. 1993)).
The amendments did not, however, create a private right of action under § 503, which, to this
day, requires aggrieved individuals to pursue administrative claims through the Department of
Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 793(b) (Supp. 1993). See, for example, D'Amato v. Wisconsin Gas Co., 760
F.2d 1474, 1483-84 (7th Cir. 1985) (discussing lack of private right of action under § 503);
Hodges v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 728 F.2d 414, 416 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that the
legislative history does not support a private right of action under § 503); Painter v. Home Bros.,
Inc., 710 F.2d 143, 144 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that there is no private right of action under §
503); Beam v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 679 F.2d 1077, 1078 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding
that there is no private right of action under § 503).
69. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. 1993) (incorporating remedies
provisions of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
70. 1978 Amendments, § 120(a), 92 Stat. 2955, 2982. "Although this amendment explicitly
applies only to discrimination against federal employees, it would be incongruous to construe
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2. Administrative Regulations
Section 504 sat idly in the United States Code until the 1976
case of Cherry v. Mathews.71 In that case, plaintiff sued to require the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW") to
promulgate regulations to enforce Section 504's antidiscrimination
mandate. The district court ruled in plaintiffs favor, holding that
"[t]he statute's discrimination prohibitions were certainly not in-
tended to be self-executing.... Congress contemplated swift
implementation of § 504 through a comprehensive set of
regulations. ' 2 In response to Cherry, President Gerald Ford issued
an executive order requiring HEW to promulgate regulations "to
provide for consistent implementation within the Federal Government
of Section 504 .... "73 HEW assigned drafting responsibility to its
Office of Civil Rights, 74 which published Section 504's first set of
implementing regulations in April, 1977. 75
The administrators in HEW's Office of Civil Rights believed
that merely requiring handicapped persons to be treated equally
section 504 to require accommodation, whatever the cost, given legislative concern with the
costs of compliance in federal employment." Mark E. Martin, Note, Accommodating the
Handicapped: The Meaning of Discrimination Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 55
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 881, 900 (1980).
71. 419 F. Supp. 922 (D. D.C. 1976).
72. Id. at 924.
73. Exec. Order No. 11,914, 3 C.F.R. § 117 (1977). See Tucker, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 846
n.7 (cited in note 56) (discussing the events surrounding HEWs promulgation of regulations
under § 504, including the decision in Cherry).
74. Brandfield, 59 Fordham L. Rev. at 116 & n.28 (cited in note 26); Engebretson, 16
Harv. J. on Legis. at 66-67 (cited in note 63).
75. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,688 (1977), codified at 45 C.F.R. § 84.1-.61 (1989); Timothy M. Cook,
The Scope of the Right of Meaningful Access and the Defense of Undue Burdens Under Disability
Civil Rights Laws, 20 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 1471, 1482 (1987). The political battle to force the
secretary of HEW to sign these regulations is well chronicled in Joseph P. Shapiro, No Pity:
People with Disabilities Forging a New Civil Rights Movement 64-69 (Times Books, 1993), which
should be consulted generally for further insights into the political movement which led to
enactment of the ADA. These regulations applied only to recipients of HEW grants. In January
1978, HEW promulgated a second set of regulations designed to be used by all other federal
agencies as a model from which to promulgate regulations governing § 504 compliance among
their own grantees. 43 Fed. Reg. 2136 (1978), codified at 45 C.F.R. § 85 (1993). See
Engebretson, 16 Harv. J. on Legis. at 68 n.36 (noting that HEWs regulations were presumably
to be used as a model). Since these regulations were issued, 54 additional federal agencies have
promulgated regulations pursuant to § 504. Stuhlbarg, 59 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 1328 n.71 (cited in
note 26). See, for example, 5 C.F.R. §§ 900, 701-710 (1994) (Office of Public Management); 7
C.F.R. §§ 15b.1-.42 (1994) (Department of Agriculture); 10 C.F.R. §§ 4.101-.233 (1994) (Nuclear
Regulatory Commission); 10 C.F.R. §§ 1040.61-.74 (1994) (Department of Energy); 13 C.F.R. §§
113.1-.8 (1994) (Small Business Administration); 14 C.F.R. §§ 1251.100-.400 (1994) (National
Aeronautics and Space Administration); 15 C.F.R. §§ 8 b.1-.25 (1994) (Department of
Commerce); 28 C.F.R. §§ 42.501-.540 (1993) (Department of Justice).
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would not eliminate discrimination against them.16 Thus, the regu-
lations they promulgated defined a "qualified handicapped person"
under Section 504 as one "who, with reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the job in question.!" The regula-
tions provided, however, that reasonable accommodation is not re-
quired if "the recipient can demonstrate that the accommodation
would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program. 78
Although the regulations did not define undue hardship, they did
specify three factors to be considered in determining whether a pro-
posed accommodation would impose an undue hardship on a recipient
of federal financial assistance:
(1) The overall size of the recipient's program with respect to number of em-
ployees, number and type of facilities, and size of budget;
76. Murphy, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 1616 (cited in note 64). See generally Scotch, From Good
Will to Civil Rights at 82-120 (cited in note 64). The administrators explained their conclusions
as follows:
There is overwhelming evidence that in the past many handicapped persons have
been excluded from programs entirely or denied equal treatment, simply because they
are handicapped. But eliminating such gross exclusions and denials of equal treatment
is not sufficient to assure genuine equal opportunity. In drafting a regulation to prohibit
exclusion and discrimination, it became clear that different or special treatment of
handicapped persons, because of their handicaps, may be necessary in a number of con-
texts in order to ensure equal opportunity. Thus, for example, it is meaningless to
"admit!' a handicapped person in a wheelchair to a program if the program is offered
only on the third floor of a walk-up building. Nor is one providing equal educational op-
portunity to a deaf child by admitting him or her to a classroom but providing no means
for the child to understand the teacher or receive instruction.
These problems have been compounded by the fact that ending discriminatory
practices and providing equal access to programs may involve major burdens on some
recipients. Those burdens and costs, to be sure, provide no basis for exemption from
section 504 or this regulation: Congress' mandate to end discrimination is clear. But it
is also clear that factors of burden and cost had to be taken into account in the regula-
tion in prescribing the actions necessary to end discrimination and to bring handicapped
persons into full participation in federally financed programs and activities.
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Final Rule, 42 Fed. Reg. 22676 (1977).
77. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1993) (emphasis added). HEW also published regulations
requiring reasonable accommodation under § 501. See 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704(a) (1994).
78. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(a) (1993) (emphasis added). The undue hardship defense was also
incorporated into the § 501 regulations. See 29 C.F.R. § 1613.704(a) (1994). Both the
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship concepts were derived from the regulations
promulgated in 1977 by the Department of Labor to implement § 503: "A contractor must make
a reasonable accommodation to the physical and mental limitations of an employee or applicant
unless the contractor can demonstrate that such an accommodation would impose an undue
hardship on the conduct of the contractor's business." 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(d) (1993). See
Engebretson, 16 Harv. J. on Legis. at 83 (cited in note 63) (stating that the Office of Civil Rights
used regulations issued by the Department of Labor).
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(2) The type of the recipient's operation, including the composition and struc-
ture of the recipient's workforce; and
(3) The nature and cost of the accommodation needed.7 9
The regulations further provided that "[tihe weight given to each of
these factors in making the determination as to whether an accom-
modation constitutes undue hardship will vary depending on the facts
of a particular situation.' 0 HEW provided examples in the regulatory
appendix of how the undue hardship regulation might be applied:
[A] small day-care center might not be required to expend more than a nomi-
nal sum, such as that necessary to equip a telephone for use by a secretary
with impaired hearing, but a large school district might be required to make
available a teacher's aide to a blind applicant for a teaching job. Further, it
might be considered reasonable to require a state welfare agency to accommo-
date a deaf employee by providing an interpreter.. .8
This regulatory framework served as the foundation of the undue
hardship standard as it moved from the regulatory to the judicial
arena.
3. Supreme Court Decisions
The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the meaning
of undue hardship under the Rehabilitation Act. Nevertheless, three
of the Court's Rehabilitation Act decisions are germane to a discus-
sion of undue hardship. In Southeastern Community College v.
Davis,82 a hearing-impaired woman sought admission into defendant
college's nursing program. Her application was rejected because
defendant determined that her disability made it unsafe for her to
practice as a nurse. The district court concluded that plaintiff was
not an "'otherwise qualified handicapped individual' protected against
discrimination by § 504. ' 83 Relying on the HEW regulations, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. The
Fourth Circuit "suggested that § 504 required 'affirmative conduct' on
the part of [defendant] to modify its program to accommodate the
79. 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(c) (1993). The undue hardship factors for § 501 are identical. See 29
C.F.R. § 1613.704(c) (1993). All three factors are imbedded in the undue hardship factors
contained in the ADA. See text accompanying note 35.
80. 45 C.F.R. § 84, app. A 16 (1993).
81. Id.
82. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
83. Id. at 403 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794).
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disabilities of applicants, 'even when such accommodations become
expensive."'84
In a decision that would later be widely criticized by disabled
rights advocates and commentators,85 the Supreme Court reversed. It
first stated that Section 504 does not require educational institutions
"to disregard the disabilities of handicapped individuals or to make
substantial modifications in their programs to allow disabled persons
to participate. '8 6 The Court interpreted the Rehabilitation Act's refer-
ence to an "otherwise qualified person" to mean "one who is able to
meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap."87
Plaintiff contended that defendant could have accommodated her
handicap by providing individual supervision by faculty members
when she attended patients, and by dispensing with the necessity of
some required courses.88 She argued that the HEW regulations appli-
cable to educational institutions89 required such accommodations.9 o
The Court disagreed: 'Whatever benefits [plaintiff] might realize
from such a course of study, she would not receive even a rough
equivalent of the training a nursing program normally gives. Such a
fundamental alteration in the nature of a program is far more than
the 'modification' the regulation requires."9 1
The most confusing and problematic aspect of the Court's deci-
sion was a discussion about affirmative action. Recognizing that
Congress had mandated affirmative action by federal employers un-
der Section 501, and that no similar language was included in Section
504, the Court concluded that "neither the language, purpose, nor
84. Id. at 404 (quoting Davis v. Southeastern Community College, 574 F.2d 1158, 1162 (4th
Cir. 1978)) (emphasis added by the Author).
85. See, for example, Judith Welch Wegner, The Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered:
Ensuring Equal Opportunity Without Respect to Handicap Under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69 Cornell L. Rev. 401, 457-58 (1984) (criticizing the Davis court for
failing to articulate a reliable standard for accommodation); Martin, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 885-86
(cited in note 70) (criticizing the Davis court for confusing accommodation with affirmative
action); Murphy, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 1623 (cited in note 64) (arguing that the Davis court
undermined the obligation to accomodate); Donald Jay Olenick, Note, Accommodating the
Handicapped. Rehabilitating Section 504 After Southeastern, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 171, 185-86
(1980) (stating that the Court overlooked the distinctions between affirmative action and
accommodation); Pamela Huessy Simon, Comment, Employment Discrimination-Analyzing
Handicap Discrimination Claims: The Right Tools for the Job, 62 N.C. L. Rev. 535, 554-56
(1984) (arguing that the Davis court avoided an analysis of accommodation).
86. Davis, 442 U.S. at 405 (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 406.
88. Id. at 407.
89. 45 C.F.R. § 84.44.
90. Davis, 442 U.S. at 408-09.
91. Id. at 410 (emphasis added). The Court further stated that if the regulations could be
interpreted to require the modifications sought by plaintiff, "they would constitute an unauthor-
ized extension of the obligations imposed by that statute." Id.
412 [Vol. 48:391
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history of [Section] 504 reveals an intent to impose an affirmative-
action obligation on all recipients of federal funds."2 While surely a
correct statement, the Court appeared to lump affirmative action
together with reasonable accommodation, and implied that Section
504 did not require even reasonable accommodation:
We do not suggest that the line between a lawful refusal to extend
affirmative action and illegal discrimination against handicapped persons will
always be clear. It is possible to envision situations where an insistence on
continuing past requirements and practices might arbitrarily deprive
genuinely qualified handicapped persons of the opportunity to participate in a
covered program. Technological advances can be expected to enhance
opportunities to rehabilitate the handicapped or otherwise to qualify them for
some useful employment. Such advances also may enable attainment of these
goals without imposing undue financial and administrative burdens upon a
State. Thus, situations may arise where a refusal to modify an existing
program might become unreasonable and discriminatory.93
The Court ruled against plaintiff, holding that "[i]t is undisputed that
[plaintiff] could not participate in [defendant's] nursing program
unless the standards were substantially lowered. Section 504 im-
poses no requirement upon an educational institution to lower or to
effect substantial modifications of standards to accommodate a handi-
capped person.1 4
The Court revisited Davis in Alexander v. Choate,95 a case
involving Tennessee's reduction of annual inpatient hospital days
reimbursable by Medicaid. The Court observed that Davis:
struck a balance between the statutory rights of the handicapped to be inte-
grated into society and the legitimate interests of federal grantees in preserv-
ing the integrity of their programs: while a grantee need not be required to
make "fundamental" or "substantial" modifications to accommodate the handi-
capped, it may be required to make "reasonable" ones.9 6
In a lengthy footnote, the Court acknowledged that its use of the
phrase "affirmative action" in Davis failed to appreciate the distinc-
tion between true remedial affirmative action on the one hand and
reasonable accommodation to remove barriers on the other.9 7
92. Id. at 411.
93. Id. at 412-13 (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 413 (emphasis added and footnote omitted).
95. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
96. Id. at 300.
97. Id. at 300 n.20. The Court downplayed its confusing rationale in Davis noting that
"[r]egardless of the aptness of our choice of words in Davis, it is clear from the context of Davis
that the term 'affirmative action' referred to those 'changes,' 'adjustments,' or 'modifications' to
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Significantly, the Court squarely recognized, as it had failed to in
Davis, that "to assure meaningful access, reasonable accommodations
in the grantee's program or benefit may have to be made."9 8
Moreover, whereas in Davis the Court questioned the validity of the
HEW regulations, in Alexander the Court acknowledged that those
regulations provide "an important source of guidance on the meaning
of [Section] 504."99
The Court's most recent treatment of Section 504 came in
School Board of Nassau County, Florida v. Arline,100 its only analysis
to date of how that section applies to the employment sector.
Plaintiff, who taught elementary school for thirteen years, was fired
because she had contracted tuberculosis. 10o The case centered on
whether plaintiff was "handicapped" under Section 504, and if so,
whether she was "otherwise qualified" for the teaching position. The
Court concluded that plaintiff was handicapped,1 2 but that further
findings of fact were required to determine if she was also otherwise
qualified.103 In a footnote, the Court explained how Davis and
Alexander would apply to Section 504 employment discrimination
claims:
In the employment context, an otherwise qualified person is one who can per-
form "the essential functions" of the job in question. When a handicapped per-
son is not able to perform the essential functions of the job, the court must also
consider whether any "reasonable accommodation" by the employer would en-
able the handicapped person to perform those functions. Accommodation is
not reasonable if it either imposes "undue financial and administrative bur-
existing programs that would be 'substantial' or that would constitute 'fundamental alteration[s]
in the nature of a program... 'rather than to those changes that would be reasonable accom-
modations." Id. (citations omitted). Thus, the Court suggested that anything beyond reasonable
accommodation would be considered remedial affirmative action beyond the scope of § 504.
98. Id. at 301.
99. Id. at 304 n.24. The Court had previously embraced the HEW regulations in
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 634 (1984). In Alexander, the Court relied on
the regulations to support its conclusion 'that reasonable adjustments in the nature of the
benefit offered must at times be made to assure meaningful access." 469 U.S. at 301 n.21.
100. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
101. Id. at 276.
102. Id. at 285-86. On this issue, the Court concluded 'that the fact that a person with a
record of a physical impairment is also contagious does not suffice to remove that person from
coverage under § 504." Id.
103. Id. at 289. In a footnote, the Court observed that:
[a] person who poses a significant risk of communicating an infectious disease to others
in the workplace will not be otherwise qualified for his or her job if reasonable accom-
modation will not eliminate that risk. The Act would not require a school board to place
a teacher with active, contagious tuberculosis in a classroom with elementary school-
children.
Id. at 287 n.16.
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dens" on a grantee, or requires "a fundamental alteration in the nature of [the]
program .... "104
Significantly, the Court equated the above language with the regula-
tory concept of "undue hardship": 'where reasonable accommodation
causes undue hardship to the employer, failure to hire or promote the
handicapped person will not be considered discrimination.'15
4. Lower Court Decisions
The Rehabilitation Act literature traditionally has focused on
six cases that discuss the undue hardship standard in the
employment context. 06 Of these cases, Nelson v. Thornburgh0 7 is the
most widely discussed, and was actually cited in the legislative
104. Id. at 287 n.17 (citations omitted) (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1985) and Davis, 442
U.S. at 412,410).
105. Id. at 287-88 n.17 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84, app. A at 1 16). The Court also referred
approvingly to the undue hardship factors contained in 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(c). Id. See text
accompanying note 79.
106. Several other cases have addressed undue hardship in the educational setting. See,
for example, New Mexico Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. State of New Mexico, 678 F.2d 847, 855
(10th Cir. 1982) (remanding the case because the district court did not analyze the cost of
modifying the educational services for the handicapped); Tatro v. State of Texas, 625 F.2d 557,
564-65 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that § 504 required a school system to catheterize a student who
suffered from spina bifida every three to four hours and that such accommodation would not
cause an undue financial burden); Camenisch v. University of Texas, 616 F.2d 127, 133 (5th Cir.
1980) (holding that § 504 required a college to provide a sign language interpreter for a deaf
student), vacated on other grounds, 415 U.S. 390 (1981); Kohl v. Woodhaven Learning Ctr., 672
F. Supp. 1226, 1248 (W.D. Mo. 1987) (holding that § 504 required a vocational skills school to
admit a hepatitis carrier to its training program despite the necessity of expenditures of $6,500
immediately and $4,000 annually to inoculate employees), rev'd, 865 F.2d 930 (8th Cir. 1989);
Espino v. Besteiro, 520F. Supp. 905, 914 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (holding that the analogous Education
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1420 (Supp. IV 1992), required a
school district to expend $5,700 annually to accommodate a multi-handicapped child by
providing a fully air-conditioned classroom).
Other cases have addressed the financial scope of the reasonable accommodation obligation
on transportation systems. See, for example, Rhode Island Handicapped Action Committee v.
Rhode Island Public Transit Authority, 718 F.2d 490, 499 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding that § 504 did
not require a transit system to install wheelchair lifts on the system's 42 new buses at a cost of
over $320,000); Dopico v. Goldschmidt, 687 F.2d 644, 653 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that § 504
required a city to expend $6 million of a $490 million federal capital and operating subsidy for
mass transit to modify a transit system to accommodate wheelchair users); American Public
Transit Association v. Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (striking down DOT
regulations implementing § 504, which required, among other things, that every new bus
purchased by a transit system include a $12,000-$15,000 wheelchair lift); Eastern Paralyzed
Veterans Association of Pennsylvania v. Sykes, 697 F. Supp. 845, 852-54 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (holding
that an issue of material fact existed as to whether § 504 required a city transit system to spend
$18.7 million out of a $535 million annual operating budget to install elevators at the 24
stations on a subway line).
107. 567 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd, 732 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1984).
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history of the ADA.108 In Nelson, three blind income-maintenance
workers brought suit under Section 504 against their employer, the
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare ("DPW"). Plaintiffs were
unable to perform the essential functions of their paperwork-intensive
jobs without the assistance of readers. Prior to filing suit, plaintiffs
had hired part-time readers and paid the readers' salaries out of their
personal funds.1 9 Plaintiffs claimed that DPW's refusal to pay for the
part-time readers, or to provide mechanical devices to enable them to
accomplish reading functions on their own, constituted discrimination
in violation of Section 504." 0 DPW defended on the ground that
providing such accommodations would have imposed an undue
hardship on its operations.",
The district court found as a fact that the proposed mechanical
devices would not have been sufficient to permit plaintiffs to perform
the essential functions of their jobs.1 2 It further found that the cost of
providing the part-time readers would have been $6,638 per. plaintiff
per year,"3 about thirty percent of plaintiffs' $21,379 to $22,804
salaries. 14 The court analyzed the three undue hardship factors
provided in the regulations"s and noted that they "do not spell out
precisely" how the defense of undue hardship can be established."16 It
concluded, however, that the examples provided in the regulatory
appendix were directly on point and controlling:
Applying the regulations to the facts of this case reveals that the answer
called for by the regulations is clear. "[T]he provision of readers" is an express
HHS example of reasonable accommodation. Moreover, in view of DPW's
$300,000,000 administrative budget, the modest cost of providing half-time
readers, and the ease of adopting that accommodation without any disruption
of DPW's services, it is apparent that DPW has not met its burden of showing
undue hardship. To be sure, DPW's financial resources are limited. But there
is no principled way of distinguishing DPW on this basis from the large school
108. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3 at 41 (cited in note 7) (stating that Nelson adopts a
flexible approach to determining whether an accommodation is an undue hardship).
109. Nelson, 567 F. Supp. at 370.
110. Id. at 371.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 376.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 373 & n.7.
115. See text accompanying note 79.
116. Nelson, 567 F. Supp. at 379.
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district employing an aide for a blind teacher, or from the state welfare agency
providing an interpreter for a deaf employee." 7
The court therefore ordered DPW to provide plaintiffs with half-time
readers as a reasonable accommodation of their handicaps."8
The Nelson court concluded that the undue hardship standard
did not preclude having a second employee assist a disabled employee
in performing her job. The court in Treadwell v. Alexander 19 came to
the exact opposite conclusion. In Treadwell, plaintiff sought a
position as a seasonal park technician for the United States Army
Corps of Engineers ("Corps") shortly after undergoing a quadruple
coronary bypass surgery in which a pacemaker was implanted; his
application was rejected because of his disability. 20 The evidence
established that if plaintiff were hired as a park technician, it would
have been necessary for other technicians to perform many of his
duties. Only two to four other technicians would have served the
150,000-acre park while plaintiff was on duty.' 2' The district court
concluded that such "doubling up," in view of the agency's "limited
resources," would have imposed an undue hardship on the agency. 22
Relying on the three undue hardship factors contained in the Section
501 regulations, the court of appeals affirmed. 123
The court in Arneson v. Heckler 24 reached a decision that
straddled the Nelson and Treadwell courts' rationales. Plaintiff was a
claims representative for the Social Security Administration ("SSA")
who became afflicted with a neurological disorder that impaired his
ability to concentrate while performing cognitive and motor func-
tions. 25 Although the SSA initially accommodated plaintiff by relo-
cating his desk to a private office and providing him with a telephone
headset to enable him to use both hands while talking, he was subse-
quently transferred to a new branch office, where he was again placed
in a large room with other claims representatives. That branch at-
117. Id. at 380 (footnotes omitted) (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84, app. A at 16). The court failed
to note that the examples provided in the HEW regulatory appendix were all qualified by the
language that such accommodations "might" be necessary. See text accompanying note 81.
118. Nelson, 567 F. Supp. at 384.
119. 707 F.2d 473 (11th Cir. 1983).
120. Id. at 474.
121. Id. at 478.
122. Id. The district court's opinion is reported at 27 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 543 (S.D. Ga.
1981). The district court did not substantiate this 'limited resources" description with any
analysis of the agency's budget, employees, or costs.
123. Treadwell, 707 F.2d at 478.
124. 879 F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1989).
125. Id. at 394-95.
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tempted to accommodate him by moving his desk to the back of the
common work area and by providing him a telephone headset similar
to the one he had used previously. 126 Plaintiff's work performance
began to deteriorate, and he was given the choice of being dismissed
or applying for voluntary disability retirement; he chose the latter.127
Plaintiff sued the SSA claiming discrimination under Section 501 of
the Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted judgment for the
SSA.128
On appeal, plaintiff argued that if he had been properly
accommodated, his work performance would have been satisfactory.
He contended that three accommodations were needed: (1) a
telephone headset like the one provided; (2) a quiet workplace; and (3)
clerical assistance to proofread his work. 2 9 The SSA argued that the
second accommodation requested was infeasible because of the
limited workspace at that branch office and that the third
accommodation would essentially have required '"hring two people to
do the job of one."30 The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded for
additional findings noting that the trial court had failed "to determine
the cost of such accommodations and the impact they would have on
the operation of the SSA office" and whether "additional funding may
be available to offset the cost to the SSA.""' Although the court noted
that "it is beyond the expectations of the Rehabilitation Act that the
SSA be required to hire another person capable of actually performing
[plaintiffs] job,"132 it implied that, if all plaintiff needed to enable him
to perform his job was a part-time proofreader, such an accom-
modation would not have imposed an undue hardship on the SSA. 133
The court concluded by imploring the SSA as a federal government
agency to be "a model employer of the handicapped" and to make
"whatever reasonable accommodations are available."'134
126. Id. at 395.
127. Id.
128. Id.




133. Id. at 397-98.
134. Id. at 398. On remand, the district court determined that hiring a proofreader would
not have accommodated plaintiff and that only hiring another claims representative capable of
performing his job (at an annual cost of $26,000 to $34,000) would have sufficed. Arneson v.
Heckler, 53 F.E.P. Cases (BNA) 963, 966 (E.D. Mo. 1990). The district court concluded that such
an accommodation "would place an undue financial hardship" on the SSA. Id. at 967. The
Eighth Circuit again reversed, directing that, if necessary, plaintiff be provided with a reader
similar to readers provided to other disabled employees of the SSA. The court made clear,
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An analysis of Gardner v. Morrisl3 muddies the water even
further. Plaintiff, a civil engineer with the Corps, suffered from a
manic-depressive disorder. His application for a promotion and trans-
fer to Saudi Arabia was rejected following a psychiatrist's report
which concluded that the medical facilities in Saudi Arabia were not
capable of accommodating plaintiffs condition, and that the nearest
competent physician was a one-hour flight, or thirteen-hour drive,
away.136 The district, court granted judgment for plaintiff on his
Section 501 claim.137 The Eighth Circuit began its analysis by noting
that plaintiffs suit was grounded on both Sections 501 and 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. Because it determined that Section 501 provides
federal employees an equal or greater measure of relief than provided
by Section 504, the court analyzed plaintiffs claim exclusively under
Section 501138 and focused on that section's regulations governing
reasonable accommodation and undue hardship. 139
Plaintiff argued that the Corps could have reasonably accom-
modated his psychiatric condition and allowed for his promotion and
transfer to Saudi Arabia by providing a written set of instructions to
doctors in Saudi Arabia to be followed in the event a manic episode
occurred.110 The court of appeals concluded, however, that the only
accommodation which would have permitted plaintiff to work in
Saudi Arabia without a serious risk to his own health would have
been for the Corps to set up a facility in Saudi Arabia sufficient to
treat plaintiffs condition. The court held that such an accommoda-
tion would have imposed an undue hardship on the Corps:
Certainly it would be unreasonable to require the Corps to construct a hospital
to accommodate [plaintiffs] handicap. Hiring a full-time physician and provid-
ing on-site laboratory facilities are also not the type of reasonable accommoda-
tions envisioned by Congress when it enacted the Rehabilitation Act. The cost
of such accommodations... would be unreasonable. 141
however, that the reader provided should not be someone actually capable of performing
plaintiff's job. Arneson v. Sullivan, 946 F.2d 90, 93 (8th Cir. 1991).
135. 752 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1985).
136. Id. at 1275-76.
137. Id. at 1277.
138. Id. at 1277-78. The court also noted that unlike § 504, § 501 requires federal employ-
ers to engage in affirmative action and "to be a model employer of the handicapped." Id. at
1280. Nonetheless, the court did not consider whether the Corps had lived up to the goal of
affirmative action in its treatment of plaintiff.
139. Id. at 1280, 1283.
140. Id. at 1281.
141. Id. at 1284.
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The court reversed the decision of the district court in its entirety142
Finally, two cases involving disabled applicants for Post Office
jobs, Bey v. Bolger143 and Dexler v. Tisch,144 further scrambled the
undue hardship picture. In Bey, plaintiff, who had a history of car-
diovascular disease, was denied reinstatement to the position of dis-
tribution clerk with the Postal Service. Plaintiff claimed that he
could have been accommodated by being assigned to "light-duty"
status.45 The court held that defendant successfully demonstrated
that "an accommodation could not have been reasonably made due to
an undue hardship on the operation of its program because of the
nature of the Postal Service's operation, the composition of its
workforce, and the nature and the cost of any accommodation."146 The
court found that only a limited number of light-duty status positions
were available, and that those positions were reserved for employees
who had five years of Postal Service experience or were injured on the
job.147 Plaintiff satisfied neither condition. The court concluded that
"[t]he Postal Service is not required under the law to offer 'light duty
status' positions to every person who applies because of the individ-
ual's handicap. Such an outcome would result in an extraordinar
cost and would hamper the operation of the Postal Service.' ' 1
In Dexler, plaintiff, who suffered from achondroplastic dwarf-
ism resulting in his being only four feet, five inches tall, applied for an
entry-level position with the Post Office as a clerk or mail handler.
His application was rejected for the stated reason that his handicap
would have prevented him from adequately performing the required
job functions.4 9 At trial, experts for plaintiff testified that a $300 step
stool or a platform would have permitted him to perform the essential
job functions150 The district court nevertheless concluded that under
Section 504, plaintiff was "not qualified for the job in spite of his
142. Id. A recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit arrived at a similar result. See Barth v. Gelb, 2 F.3d 1180, 1188-89 (1993)
(upholding the denial of a diabetic's request for transfer to a Voice of America foreign service
position, finding that such a transfer would have caused undue hardship on the agency's
overseas operations).
143. 540 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
144. 660 F. Supp. 1418 (D. Conn. 1987).
145. Bey, 540 F. Supp. at 919.
146. Id. at 927. These are the three § 501 undue hardship factors contained in 29 C.F.R. §
1613.704(c). The court also found that defendant had satisfied its burden of establishing that
reasonable accommodation was not possible without endangering plaintifi's own health and
safety because of his uncontrolled hypertension and cardiovascular disease. Id. at 926.
147. Id. at 927.
148. Id.
149. Dexler, 660 F. Supp. at 1420.
150. Id. at 1423.
420 [Vol. 48:391
UNDUE HARDSHIPS
handicap."'' The court assumed that the issue of reasonable
accommodation was relevant only to plaintiffs Section 501 claim, and
therefore focused exclusively on the Section 501 regulations.12 The
court concluded that even if a step stool or platform were used, plain-
tiffs job still would have required restructuring by reassigning the
task of unloading trucks to another employee. 53 The court also found
that plaintiff's use of a step stool would have caused a safety risk and
would have impaired productivity because of the time required to
constantly move it into position,M and that a platform would have
been even less useful than a step stool because it would have been
more cumbersome to move.155 The court then quoted the three undue
hardship factors and concluded "that the suggested accommodations
would impose an undue hardship on the Postal Service."156 From an
administrative standpoint, the court determined that plaintiffs
restructured job would have often left him without work to do and
that he could not have performed certain tasks without the aid of a
taller co-employee. The court concluded that "[wihile the actual cost
of the [step stool or platform] would not be large," use of either would
have caused plaintiff to be less efficient than his co-employees.157
Citing Bey, the court stated that "[s]uch a significant loss of efficiency
is not required as part of reasonable accommodation under the
Rehabilitation Act.'1 58 It held that "[w]hile none of these hardships is
conclusive or overwhelming, taken together they demonstrate that
accommodating [plaintiff] would unduly interfere with the operation
of the New Britain Post Office."' 59
151. Id. at 1426.
152. Id. at 1426-27. In fact, the court's analysis was backwards. Section 501 requires
affirmative action; § 504 requires reasonable accommodation. See text accompanying notes 59
and 77.
153. Dexler, 660 F. Supp. at 1424.
154. Id. at 1423.
155. Id. at 1424.
156. Id. at 1427.
157. Id. at 1428.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1429. Several other § 504 employment cases at least tangentially addressed
undue hardship issues. See, for example, Guice-Mills u. Derwinski, 967 F.2d 794, 797-98 (2d
Cir. 1992) (holding that it would have been an undue hardship for a hospital to accommodate a
head nurse's disability by allowing her to report to work at 10:00 a.m. instead of 8:00 a.m.);
Carter v. Bennett, 840 F.2d 63, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (affirming the district court's decision that an
employer who provided a visually impaired employee with a special reading machine, a tape
recorder, and a Braille typewriter was not also required to provide the employee with a voice-
synthesized computer and other additional accommodations); Strathie v. Department of
Transportation, 716 F.2d 227, 234 (3d Cir. 1983) (remanding the case for a determination on
whether accomodating a hearing-impaired school bus driver by allowing him to continue driving
with a hearing aid would create a safety risk, notwithstanding a state requirement that drivers
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It was against this historical backdrop that Congress debated
how to define undue hardship under the ADA. We shall now turn our
attention to that debate.
B. Legislative History of the ADA's Undue Hardship Provision160
When Senator Lowell Weicker first introduced the ADA in
April, 1988, he did not dispute that enactment of the bill would entail
substantial financial costs. He stated boldly, however, that "the costs
should have excellent hearing); Prewitt v. U.S. Postal Service, 662 F.2d 292, 308 & n.22 (5th Cir.
1981) (rejecting the de minimis test for undue hardship and holding that the burden of proof is
on the employer to establish undue hardship); Davis v. Frank, 711 F. Supp. 447, 454 (N.D. Ill.
1989) (holding that a deaf plaintiff could be accommodated without undue hardship if his
employer provided cards containing frequently used words, trained his coworkers in sign
language, and provided a special computer keyboard to facilitate written communication);
Harrison v. Marsh, 691 F. Supp. 1223, 1231 (W.D. Mo. 1988) (holding that a secretary disabled
by a radical mastectomy could be accommodated by less demanding typing requirements
without undue hardship); American Federation of Government Employees, Local 51 v. Baker,
677 F. Supp. 636, 639 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that an employer could accommodate employees
at a coin-checking plant without undue hardship by hiring a rehabilitation specialist to help
disabled employees adjust to a newly-instituted individual-station system); Crane v. Dole, 617 F.
Supp. 156, 163 (D. D.C. 1985) (holding that the plaintiffs hearing impairment should be ac-
commodated with a special phone designed to amplify voices, but not by hiring additional per-
sonnel or modifying schedules); Fitzgerald v. Green Valley Area Educational Agency, 589 F.
Supp. 1130, 1137 (S.D. Iowa 1984) (holding that a preschool must accommodate a teaching
applicant by eliminating the requirement that he also drive a school bus, even if doing so
required hiring an independent carrier to transport students); Upshur v. Love, 474 F. Supp. 332,
342 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (holding that § 504 did not require a school district to hire an aide to assist
a blind applicant for an administrative position).
To date, only three ADA cases have addressed whether a proposed accommodation would
cause an employer undue hardship. In Dutton v. Johnson County Board of County
Commissioners, 859 F. Supp. 498, 509 (D. Kan. 1994), the district court denied defendant's
motion for summary judgment which in part contended that allowing the plaintiff to use
vacation time to cover unscheduled absences due to migraine headaches would cause an undue
hardship on the defendant's operations. The court ruled that the defendant had not established
that the plaintiffs unscheduled absences were "unduly disruptive." Id. at 508. The case was
then tried to a jury, which apparently rejected defendant's undue hardship defense. See note
44. In its order reinstating plaintiff, the court held that this finding was "properly supported by
the evidence," in view of the fact that "defendant put on no evidence at trial which indicated any
significant hardship flowing from such an accommodation." Dutton v. Johnson County Board of
County Commissioners, 868 F. Supp. 1260, 1265 & n.5 (D. Kan. 1994).
In Schmidt v. Safeway, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991, 997 (D. Ore. 1994), the district court rejected
defendant's contention that providing the plaintiff, an alcoholic truck driver, with a leave of
absence to pursue rehabilitation, in lieu of termination would have caused an undue hardship.
The court noted that defendant failed to support this defense with evidence of "economic impact
upon the company or disruption of its operations." Id.
In Ethridge v. Alabama, 860 F. Supp. 808, 816 n.20 (M.D. Ala. 1994), the district court
concluded that requiring a police department to employ a person whose disability prevented him
from safely handling a firearm would cause the department an undue hardship.
160. For a detailed and comprehensive legislative history of the ADA, see Bernard D.
Reams, Jr., et al., Disability Law in the United States: A Legislative History of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, Public Law 101-336 (Hein, 1992); G. John Tysse, ed., The
Legislative History of the Americans with Disabilities Act (LRP, 1991).
UNDUE HARDSHIPS
associated with this bill are a small price to pay for opening up our
society to persons with disabilities."''
The initial draft of the ADA did not contain an undue hardship
provision, much less a definition. Rather, the original version of the
ADA provided that "t]he failure or refusal ... to make reasonable
accommodations... shall not constitute an unlawful act of discrimi-
nation on the basis of handicap if such... accommodation would fun-
damentally alter the essential nature, or threaten the existence of, the
program, activity, business, or facility in question.''162 Although this
provision tracked much of the Supreme Court's dicta in Davis,
Alexander, and Arline, business interests quickly labelled it the
"bankruptcy provision" and opposed it vigorously.163 The ADA's
sponsors began to fear that retaining this provision would jeopardize
the bill's ultimate passage. Thus, in the spirit of compromise, the
sponsors transformed the "bankruptcy provision" into the current
undue hardship provision--"significant difficulty or expense. " 164
The committee reports offer little guidance regarding how
great Congress intended an expense to be before it becomes
"significant," and therefore an undue hardship. The reports initially
noted that the ADA undue hardship standard "is derived from and
should be applied consistently with interpretations by Federal agen-
cies applying the term set forth in regulations implementing sections
501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.165 The committee
reports also incorporated the examples of undue hardship contained
in the original HEW regulations.166 The House Judiciary Committee
161. 134 Cong. Rec. S5109 (daily ed. April 28, 1988).
162. S. 2345, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 7(a)(1) (April 28, 1988), in 134 Cong. Rec. S5112 (daily
ed. April 28, 1988). Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole noted his concerns over this provision
the very day the bill was introduced: 'q have reservations about many aspects of this bill includ-
ing the elimination of the undue hardship critieria [sic] for reasonable accommodation.... ." 134
Cong. Rec. S5117 (daily ed. April 28, 1988).
163. Cooper, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1448 (cited in note 26); Stuhlbarg, 59 U. Cin. L. Rev. at
1323-24 n.54 (cited in note 26).
164. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989, Hearings before the Senate Committee
on Labor and Human Resources and the Subcommittee on the Handicapped, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess. 90 (1989) ("Senate Hearings') (remarks of Sen. Harkin) (discussing the replacement of the
"bankruptcy provision" which would have required reasonable accommodations up to the point
the existence of the business was threatened with the "undue hardship" standard); W. Robert
Gray, The Essential-Functions Limitation on the Civil Rights of People with Disabilities and
John Rawls's Concept of Social Justice, 22 N.M. L. Rev. 295, 323 (1992) (same); Bonnie P.
Tucker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Overview, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 923, 927 (1989)
(same).
165. S. Rep. No. 101-116 at 36 (cited in note 7); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2 at 67 (cited in
note 7).
166. S. Rep. No. 101-116 at 36; H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2 at 67. See text accompanying
note 81.
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Report further stated that the "undue hardship" provision of Title I
imposes a more substantial obligation on employers than the "readily
achievable" provision167 of Title 111168 regarding public accommoda-
tions.169 Likewise, the reports established that the ADA's undue
hardship test is significantly more stringent than the undue hardship
test applied in Title VII religion cases:
The Committee wishes to make it clear that the principles enunciated by
the Supreme Court in TWA v. Hardison, [432] U.S. 63 (1977) are not applicable
to this legislation. In Hardison, the Supreme Court concluded that under
[Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 an employer need not accommodate
persons with religious beliefs if the accommodation would require more than a
de minimus [sic] cost for the employer. By contrast, under the ADA, reason-
able accommodations must be provided unless they rise to the level of
"requiring significant difficulty or expense" on the part of the employer, in
light of the factors noted in the statute-i.e., a significantly higher standard
than that articulated in Hardison. This higher standard is necessary in light
of the crucial role that reasonable accommodation plays in ensuring meaning-
ful employment opportunities for people with disabilities.170
167. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(9) ("[tlhe term 'readily achievable' means easily accomplishable and
able to be carried out without much difficulty or expense").
168. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189.
169. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3 at 40 (cited in note 7).
170. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2 at 68 (cited in note 7) (emphasis added). See S. Rep. No.
101-116 at 36 (cited in note 7) (emphasizing inapplicability of the standards from Title VII
religion cases); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3 at 40 (same). Title VII provides that an employer is
obligated to accommodate an employee's religious needs where such accommodations can be
made without undue hardship on the conduct of its business. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); 29 C.F.R. §
1605.2(b)(1) (1994). The burden is on the employer to prove that a requested accommodation
would cause an undue hardship. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(b)(2) (1994). In light of
the above-quoted language, however, this is where the similarity between Title VII-mandated
religious accommodation and ADA-mandated disability accommodation ends.
It has been suggested that employers should be entitled to claim that the cumulative effect
of multiple accommodations would cause an undue hardship. Americans with Disabilities Act of
1989, Hearings on H.R. 2273 Before the Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 87-88,
133 (1989) (statements of John J. Motley, III on behalf of the National Federation of
Independent Business and James A. DiLuigi on behalf of the American Hotel and Motel
Association); Americans with Disabilities Act, Hearing Before the House Committee on Small
Business, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1990) ("Small Business Hearing") (statement of Kenneth E.
Lewis on behalf of the National Federation of Independent Business); Harger, 41 U. Kan. L.
Rev. at 790 n.46 (cited in note 25); Stuhlbarg, 59 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 1322 (cited in note 26). The
legislative history quoted above, however, is inconsistent with the notion of cumulative undue
hardship. The Hardison approach addresses accommodation issues individually, not cumula-
tively. Each disabled employee is entitled to accommodations requiring significantly more than
a de minimis expenditure. Therefore, an employer cannot claim that in light of previous
accommodations to other employees, making any accommodation to the next disabled employee
requesting one would cause an undue hardship. Every disabled employee who requires
reasonable accommodation is entitled to some accommodation irrespective of previous
accommodations the employer has made to other employees. If it were otherwise, a disabled
employee's entitlement to accommodations would depend on the mere happenstance of how
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Finally, the House Judiciary Committee Report used the Nelson case
to illustrate the concept of undue hardship, thereby implying that the
extensive accommodations required in that case could be required
under the ADA, notwithstanding its undue hardship provision.171
Apart from these generalities, however, Congress steadfastly
rejected repeated requests from business groups and its own members
to define undue hardship more precisely. As one business lobbyist
stated:
We are troubled.., that neither the current regulations nor the proposed
bill provide any standard by which the obligations of an employer are to be
measured. Even assuming the bill could identify all of the appropriate factors
for inquiry, the term "undue hardship" is not specific and would allow the
courts and agencies to create widely differing definitions based upon their
subjective judgment of what is "undue" in any given situation.
For this reason, we believe it is imperative that Congress specify what
standard the courts and agencies should use in determining whether an em-
ployer has satisfied its obligations under law. What is the standard by which
"undue hardship" is to be measured? 17 2
many other disabled employees had beaten him to the punch. Congress did not intend for Title
I to produce such arbitrary results. See note 175 and accompanying text for further evidence in
the legislative history that employers cannot claim cumulative undue hardship.
171. Noting that the court in Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983),
found that the "dollar burden" of paying for the part-time readers "was only a small fraction of
the state agency's personnel budget," the House Judiciary Committee reasoned that absorbing
that cost "would not require 'significant expense' and thus would not be an undue hardship."
H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3 at 41 (cited in note 7). The report also noted, however, that "the
same accommodations may be an undue hardship for a small employer because they would
require expending significant proportions of available resources." Id. 'By selecting Nelson to
illustrate the 'undue hardship' concept under the ADA, the legislative history underscored that
substantial expenditures may be required." Arlene Mayerson, Title I-Employment Provisions
of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 64 Temp. L. Rev. 499, 519 (1991) (symposium issue).
172. Senate Hearings, app. at 413 (cited in note 164) (letter from Zachary D. Fasman, on
behalf of U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to Sen. Harkin (May 26, 1989)). Another business
lobbyist expressed similar concerns:
The first item which troubles me, and I am sure a great many employers, is the
broad, vaguely defined concepts of "reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship."
The concept of reasonableness has perplexed and eluded lawyers and lawmakers ever
since it was introduced. The terms are subjective by defimition; one person's
reasonableness is another's undue hardship. I believe the use of these concepts, broadly
defined, in this legislation will only perpetuate the overburdening of our already
backlogged legal system.
What is needed is a common denominator; something that will allow for measure-
ment and objectivity so that an employer and employee can tell when the balance has
been reached or the line has been crossed. For most employers, and particularly in con-
struction, cost effectiveness is a major factor in the analysis of what can reasonably be
done to accommodate an employee. Under H.R. 2273, it is not clear how much an emp-
loyer would be expected to spend, and to what lengths he or she must go in achieving ac-
commodation.
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One Congressman urged his colleagues to develop a "concrete for-
mula!':
so that an employer can know precisely how much would have to be spent in
order to "reasonably" accommodate employees with physical and or mental im-
pairments. At present, an uncertain legal standard exists as businesses must
demonstrate to the satisfaction of bureaucrats or the courts that reasonable
accommodation would pose an undue hardship.173
Another Congressman insisted that "business has to have some way
to predict what they are responsible for, so that they can plan it and
not break the law and also achieve a reasonable result for their enter-
prise.'174
The concerns articulated by these lobbyists and legislators led
to two proposed amendments in House committees. The House
Education and Labor Committee considered an amendment to limit
ADA expenditures to five percent of annual net profit for businesses
with gross annual receipts of $500,000 or less. The proposed amend-
ment "failed by a wide margin."'175 In the House Judiciary Committee,
an amendment was proposed that would have established as a per se
undue hardship any proposed accommodation that exceeded ten
percent of the disabled employee's annual salary. The amendment
was rejected by a vote of 25-11.176 This same amendment was
introduced on the House floor by Representative James Olin.177 The
Hearing on H.R. 2273, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989, Joint Hearing before the
Subcommittees on Employment Opportunities and Select Education of the House Committee on
Education and Labor, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1989) ("Joint Hearing") (statement of Paul D.
Wharen, on behalf of Associated Builders and Contractors).
These very same sentiments were echoed by witnesses testifying before the House
Committee on Small Business: "I think that business wants to work with the disabled. I am
disabled and I also want to help disabled people. But I want the law to be very specific." Small
Business Hearing at 37 (cited in note 170) (testimony of Kenneth E. Lewis, on behalf of National
Federation of Independent Business). "Business is always much more at home knowing what
the ground rules are, and that they are not walking on a swamp." Id. (testimony of Joseph J.
Dragonette, on behalf of United States Chamber of Commerce).
173. Small Business Hearing, app. at 63 (statement of Rep. DeLay).
174. Id. at 37 (statement of Rep. Olin).
175. See 136 Cong. Rec. H2317 (daily ed. May 15, 1990) (statement of Rep. DeLay)
(explaining the failure of the proposed spending cap). The defeat of this amendment is further
evidence that Congress did not intend for employers to be able to claim cumulative undue
hardship. See note 170 and text accompanying note 262.
176. Stuhlbarg, 59 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 1339 & n.148 (cited in note 26) (citing Judiciary
Committee Vote No. 477, May 1, 1990).
177. The amendment read as follows: "Excessive Cost Hardship.-For the purpose of this
title, it is presumed an undue hardship if an employer incurs costs in making an accommodation
which exceeds 10 percent of the salary or the annualized hourly wage of the job in question."
136 Cong. Rec. H2470 (daily ed. May 17, 1990). Representative Olin argued that "the fact of the
matter is we need something tangible. We should not be passing laws that affect almost all
businessmen in this country where the proprietor of that business does not know what he needs
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Olin Amendment failed 187-213,178 and the ADA together with its
vague undue hardship provision became law shortly thereafter.
IV. ANALYZING CONGRESS'S RATIONALES FOR ADOPTING
A VAGUE STANDARD
Why did Congress turn back every attempt by the business
lobby and business-oriented legislators to increase the precision of
undue hardship? The legislative history of the ADA suggests four
explanations. First, Congress anticipated that, for the most part,
reasonably accommodating employees with disabilities would not
require employers to make anything more than trivial expenditures.
Consequently, Congress regarded the business lobby's clamoring for a
more precise standard as much ado about nothing. Second, Congress
believed that the undue hardship concept, as it had come to exist
under the Rehabilitation Act, had worked well for seventeen years. It
concluded that any ambiguity which initially existed regarding its
meaning and scope had been sufficiently clarified by judicial deci-
sions. Third, to the extent that the ADA undue hardship standard is
not sufficiently precise, Congress decided that courts would be better
able to define the standard's parameters on a case-by-case basis than
it could do in one fell swoop. Finally, Congress concluded that, be-
cause of the infinite permutations of disabilities, needs for accommo-
dation, and levels of employer resources, a fixed standard could not
possibly be applied fairly in all situations. Hence, it concluded that a
flexible standard like "significant difficulty or expense" was most
appropriate. We will now explore whether these rationales were
supported by the evidence before Congress or by sound public policy
considerations.
A. Much Ado About Nothing
Lobbyists and legislators seeking to protect the vaguely de-
fimed undue hardship standard from attacks on its imprecision argued
that the standard would rarely if ever come into play under the ADA
because reasonable accommodation costs under Title I would be
minimal to nonexistent. For instance, the Senate Report noted:
to do to abide by the law. It is a big mistake." Id. at H2475. For further discussion regarding
this amendment, see notes 251-60 and accompanying text.
178. 136 Cong. Rec. at H2475 (daily ed. May 17, 1990). If 14 representatives had switched
their negative votes to affirmative votes, the amendment would have passed.
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Costs to businesses for reasonable accommodations are expected to be
less than $100.00 per worker for 30% of workers needing an accommodation,
with 51% of those needing an accommodation requiring no expenses at all. A
Louis Harris national survey of people with disabilities found that among
those employed, accommodations were provided in only 35% of the cases.17 9
Proponents of the vague standard asserted that: "a majority of ac-
commodations provided by Federal Contractors involved little or no
cost";180 "[t]he cost of most accommodations is nominal";18' "there
really is not any great cost attached to making accommodations;' '182
and that compliance with the Rehabilitation Act's reasonable accom-
modation requirement "has been 'no big deal"'.13 and "has not been
onerous."' 4  Indeed, following enactment of the ADA, the EEOC
concluded that Title I will not have a "significant economic impact" on
a substantial number of small business entities.85s
179. S. Rep. No. 101-116 at 89 (cited in note 7). Other studies with similar findings were
bandied about by the status quo proponents. See, for example, Employees Accommodations
Study at 20, 29 (cited in note 11) (finding that less than one-half of disabled workers require
accommodations; 51.1% of accommodations are cost-free; 18.5% cost $1-99; 11.9% cost $100-
499); U.S. Gov't Accounting Office, Reports on Costs of Accommodations (cited in note 11)
(reporting that 51% of accommodations cost nothing, 30% cost less than $500; 8% cost more
than $2,000); Daniel Finnegan, et al., The Costs and Benefits Associated with the Americans
with Disabilities Act 38 (1989) (finding that the average cost of accommodations per disabled
employee that requires accommodations is $200), cited in EEOC, Equal Employment
Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 8578, 8584; Frierson, Employer's
Guide to the Americans with Disabilities Act at 103-04 (cited in note 11) (citing JAN, In the
Mainstream, Min. Report #4 (July-Aug. 1988)) (finding that 31% of accommodations are cost-
free; 19% cost less than $50, 19% cost between $50 and $500; 19% cost between $500 and
$1,000; 12% cost between $1,000 and $5,000).
180. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2 at 33 (cited in note 7).
181. Equal to the Task, 1981 DuPont Survey of Employment of the Handicapped 17-18
(DuPont, 1982), cited in 56 Fed. Reg. at 8583 (cited in note 179).
182. Equal Employment Opportunity for the Handicapped Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 446
before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 103
(statement of Weldon Rougeau, Director, Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, U.S.
Dep't of Labor).
183. S. Rep. No. 101-116 at 10 (cited in note 7). The Senate Report described as "typical"
accommodations such as a $26.95 timer with an indicator light which allowed a deaf medical
technician to perform laboratory tests; a $45 light probe which permitted a visually impaired
receptionist to determine which telephone lines were ringing; and a $49.95 telephone handset
which allowed an insurance salesperson with cerebral palsy to write while talking. Id.; H.R.
Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2 at 33 (cited in note 7).
184. Id. During floor debate on the Olin Amendment, one status quo proponent stated:
Under section 503 we have Federal contractees. They are private sector people. Not
one person has come after 16 years of experience with this kind of language and stan-
dard and said, "It has imposed on me a burden that I cannot meet."
Not one, not one example, after 16 years. Private sector contractors with the
Federal Government have come forward and said this is unreasonable.
136 Cong. Rec. H2474 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Hoyer).
185. 56 Fed. Reg. at 8579 (cited in note 179). In analyzing the costs of the ADA's
reasonable accommodation requirement, the EEOC concluded that the average cost of
accommodation under the ADA for every disabled employee (including those not needing
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What was forgotten in all of this hyperbole was the significant
broadening effect that the ADA likely will have on both the number
and cost of proposed accommodations. The central goal of Title I was
accommodations) would be $261. Id. at 8584. The EEOC then used this figure to extrapolate
that the total annual cost of Title I-mandated reasonable accommodations would be
$16,443,000. Id. To arrive at this number, the EEOC assumed that Title I would cover only 15
million employees who were not previously covered by the Rehabilitation Act or analogous state
statutes. Id. This estimate assumed that 71% of the workforce, or 71 million employees, were
protected by the Rehabilitation Act or analogous state statutes. See note 6. (EEOC's estimate
that 86 million of the nation's 100 million employees are now covered by the ADA). The EEOC
then assumed that those 15 million newly covered employees would produce 1,800,000 vacancies
annually (12% annual vacancy rate), of which 3.5% or 63,000 would be filled by people with
disabilities. 56 Fed. Reg. at 8584. Multiplying $261 by 63,000, the EEOC arrived at its $16.4
million estimate.
In the Author's opinion, this analysis grossly underestimated the annual cost of accommo-
dation which Title I will require. First, the EEOC's estimate that only 15 million employees will
be "newly covered" by Title I assumed that the 48 state statutes which had prohibited disability
discrimination prior to the ADA's enactment required basically the same level of accommodation
as Title I. That assumption was inaccurate. Twenty-one of those statutes did not require
reasonable accommodation at all and four others narrowly circumscribed the level of accommo-
dation required. See note 16. If those 25 statutes are excluded from the EEOC's analysis,
probably about half of the nation's 120 million employees (the census data reveals a workforce of
120 million, rather than the 100 million figure relied on by the EEOC)-and 16 million disabled
employees, McNeil, Americans with Disabilities, 1991-92 at 64 (cited in note 7)-were left
essentially uncovered by effective reasonable accommodation mandates prior to enactment of
the ADA.
Second, the EEOC's estimate that only 3.5% of the American workforce is comprised of
disabled employees was far off the mark. The actual number is 13.4%, id., and that percentage
should increase as Title I begins to fulfill its objectives. Thus, whereas the EEOC's analysis
concluded that the ADA would result in new protection for only 63,000 new disabled employees
per year, a more accurate prediction would be closer to 964,800 (60 million previously
"uncovered" jobs x 12% annual vacancy rate X 13.4% of jobs filled by disabled applicants).
Moreover, the EEOC's estimate overlooked the central goal of the Title I-bringing eight million
previously unemployed citizens with disabilities into the workplace. See note 7 and
accompanying text. Even if this goal is only partially fulfilled, it will radically increase both the
number of accommodations required and the overall expense of making accommodations. See
text accompanying notes 186-89.
Third, the EEOC's estimate failed to account for accommodations which the ADA will
require previously uncovered employers to make for current employees. These accommodations
fall into four categories: (1) accommodations to employees who were previously paying for their
own accommodations because no law required their employer to do so (like the blind income-
maintenance workers in Nelson, see text accompanying notes 107-18); (2) accommodations to
disabled employees who, under the ADA, now demand their employers to equalize their access
to restrooms, break rooms, and other workplace facilities, see note 31 and accompanying text;
(3) accommodations to disabled -employees seeking promotions, reassignments, or transfers
whose new job responsibilities will require reasonable accommodations; and (4) accommodations
to non-disabled employees who become disabled during their employment. (Every day
approximately 11,000 workers are seriously injured on the job. Mary K. O'Melveny, The
Americans with Disabilities Act and Collective Bargaining Agreements: Reasonable
Accommodations or Irreconcilable Conflicts?, 82 Ky. L. J. 219, 220 n.11 (1994) (citing Charles
Noble, Keeping OSHA's Feet to the Fire, Technology Rev. 43, 44 (Feb.-Mar. 1992))). In the final
analysis, the Bush Administration's estimate that Title I will result in an additional $1.7 to
$10.2 billion in annual accommodation costs, see note 14 and accompanying text, was much
more realistic than the EEOC's estimate of $16.4 million.
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to put eight million currently unemployed citizens with disabilities to
work.186 It is plausible to assume that this population is more se-
verely disabled than the currently employed disabled population, and
that its unemployment is largely attributable to the failure to obtain
adequate accommodations. Indeed, these were critical assumptions
underlying the need for a federally mandated reasonable accommoda-
tion requirement. It is equally plausible, therefore, that the fre-
quency and scope of accommodations which will be necessary to assist
this population in obtaining employment will be significantly greater
than the frequency and scope of accommodations required by citizens
with disabilities who were employed prior to the ADA.187 Moreover, in
view of the disparity between the publicity surrounding employee
entitlements under the Rehabilitation Act and state disability
statutes, and the publicity regarding such entitlements under the
ADA,188 it can be safely predicted that even the sixteen million citizens
with disabilities who were employed prior to Title I's effective date
will demand accommodations more frequently-and with greater
price tags-than they ever had prior to the ADA's enactment.189
Hence, although accommodation costs prior to the ADA may have
been "no big deal," accommodation costs under the ADA-particularly
for those disabled citizens pulled into the employment sector for the
first time--may be a very big deal indeed.
186. See note 7 and accompanying text.
187. A 1994 Lou Harris poll determined that 26% of the working-age disabled population
require special equipment or technology to work effectively. Taylor, Americans With Disabilities
Make Gains at 2 (cited in note 7). This percentage does not include those who will need
modifications to their workplace or those who will require personal assistants such as readers,
interpreters, page turners, travel assistants, etc.
188. The ADA requires each covered employer to post notices in conspicuous places regard-
ing its obligations under Title I. 42 U.S.C. § 12115. Moreover, since 1992, nearly two million
ADA-related publications have been disseminated to the public free of charge. EEOC News
Release, 1994 WL 376729 at *2 (cited in note 6). In addition, as of July 1994, EEOC field offices
had made more than 1,700 ADA presentations to an aggregate audience of 129,000. Id.
189. The number of inquiries received by the JAN since Title I became effective supports
this trend: In 1992, the JAN received 37,000 accommodation-related inquiries; in 1993, it re-
ceived 61,000. Strong Interest Seen In Accommodating Disabilities, Daily Lab. Rep. (Feb. 24,
1994). In the first half of 1994, 36,264 such inquiries were received. Interview with D.J.
Hedricks, JAN (Oct. 3, 1994). It is notable that all of this data was compiled before Title I ap-
plied to the 396,000 employers with 15 to 24 employees for whom coverage began on July 26,
1994. See note 15. We can therefore assume that these inquiry figures will continue to grow for
quite some time.
There is also mounting evidence that the price tags of accommodations requested are
growing. A comparison of the 1988 and 1994 JAN studies, see note 11, reveals that the
percentage of workplace accommodations costing greater than $1,000 grew from 12% in 1988 to
21% in 1994. The 1988 study did not include data on accommodations costing more than $5,000;
the 1994 study found that 4% of accommodations currently being made cost greater than $5,000.
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B. If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It
Simple inertia and the status quo were powerful forces weigh-
ing against the business lobbyists and members of Congress urging
enactment of a precise undue hardship standard. Disability rights
advocates argued that there was no need to tinker with the undue
hardship standard as it had come to exist under the Rehabilitation
Act:
[T]his term undue hardship and the flexible standard adopted by the ADA do
not come out of thin air. They were not invented for the ADA. They are taken
directly from the regulations under the 1973 Rehabilitation Act for sections
501, 503, and 504. After over a decade of experience with those laws, there
have been none of the nightmares envisioned and espoused by the business
community.
What is interesting, however, is that all of these fears were voiced during
the development of the section 504 regulations. But these provisions did not
result in bankruptcy or hardship.190
EEOC Commissioner Evan Kemp asserted that the concepts of rea-
sonable accommodation and undue hardship "are old terms ... and
the courts . . . have done a fairly good job in defining [them]."191
Indeed, this argument was employed successfully to defeat the Olin
Amendment, which would have established a fixed undue hardship
standard:
We have heard it said on this floor that the definition of "undue hardship"
is "vague and undefined and difficult to understand." I want to bring to the at-
tention of the Members that first of all this is the same definition that has
been in public law since 1973, and the country knows exactly what it means
because it has been well defined; it has been tested in every court in the land,
and in fact it is very clear what "undue hardship" means.192
190. Small Business Hearing at 26 (cited in note 170) (testimony of Arlene B. Mayerson on
behalf of Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund). Ms. Mayerson further stated that the
undue hardship standard "does work. I think that if anyone looks at the case law for instance
over the last 12 years ... [it would] reassure the business people that the courts do not go hog
wild with this standard by any means." Id. at 38.
191. Joint Hearing at 23 (cited in note 172).
192. 136 Cong. Rec. H2472 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Bartlett). The
House Judiciary Committee Report stated that the reason the committee rejected a similar
amendment was that "the flexible approach used under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
which has been in operation for 17 years, is appropriate for the ADA as well." H.R. Rep. 101-
485, pt. 3 at 41 (cited in note 7).
Similarly, when Senator Jesse Helms challenged Senator Harkin regarding the costs to
employers which would result from a vague undue hardship standard, Senator Harkin employed
this rationale as a defensive weapon:
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MR. HELMS ... I want to say this to the distinguished managers of the bill, with all
due respect, nobody knows what this bill is going to cost. It may be we do not care what
it is going to cost.
But I will tell you this much: I predict that 12 months after the implementation of
this bill you are going to have a furor in this country which will make the catastrophic
insurance issue look like a tea party. You wait until the flood tide of restrictions and de-
mands rolls down upon the small business men and women of this country.
This bill is too broad. Nobody and I mean, nobody has any idea what it will cost. I
was interested in the estimated or average annual cost of providing just some of the
types of accommodations or auxiliary aids required under this act.
Can either managers of the bill tell me, for example, what the provisions of a full-
time reader required to assist a blind executive, accountant, attorney, or other
professional whose job requires extensive reading are? Does anybody have any idea
about the cost of just that?
MR. HARKIN. Let me just answer the Senator that again it really depends upon
whether or not this is undue hardship for the employer or the business in question. If it
is IBM, perhaps that is not a big deal. But if it is a small pharmacy, as the Senator said
earlier, that is a different story.
What I presume you mean, is, if a blind person came in for a job, and said, "You
must provide a reader for me." Well, if I had Tom Harkin's pharmacy out in Adel, IA, I
could not afford that. That would probably be an undue hardship so I would not have to
do that. On the other hand, if it was IBM, maybe that would be something that could be
done....
MR. HELMS. Well, nevertheless, section 102(b)(1)(e) provides that an employer's fail-
ure to make "reasonable accommodations"-and the Lord only knows what that means
because that will be decided in court-the employer's failure to make these reasonable
accommodations for the disabilities of a qualified applicant for employment constitutes
illegal discrimination under section 102(b)(1)(e). And the committee report itself specifi-
cally mentions the provision of readers for blind people. That is the reason I brought it
up.
The committee report also mentions personal assistance for wheelchair-bound
people, so forth and so on. Now the provision of some accommodations may cost small
business people many thousands of dollars and send them down the chute.
The act may even require the hiring of additional personnel to achieve an
accommodation, as the Senator himself said.
So to wind up my question, does this bill contemplate any point at which the
accommodation of a disabled employee poses an undue hardship? Does it do so if these
costs exceed 5 percent of the employee's salary, paid for by the employer for the
performance of the job in question, or 10 percent or 20 percent? Can the Senator
enlighten me at what point it becomes an undue hardship on a small business man or
woman[?]
MR. HARKIN ... Let me also say this about attendants.... Many severely physically
disabled workers who are qualified for employment are not hired or are forced to quit
their jobs because they may need some assistance during the work day. It makes no
sense for a talented person who has skills to contribute, to sit idly at home receiving
benefits because he needs assistance in the rest room twice a day, or needs someone to
provide some assistance to him on out-of-town business trips. The question, as in any
other accommodation, is whether it poses an undue hardship on the employer given the
size of the employer's operation and the cost of the accommodation. This accommoda-
tion has been provided by employers under section 504 for over a decade without diffi-
culty. Attendant care can usually be arranged easily and will not be an undue hardship
on most employers.
MR. HELMS. You know, I bet you the person-and I say this with no disrespect to him
or her-who wrote that has never run a small business in his or her life. That is a
bunch of senseless verbiage.
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This rationale even received the presidential seal of legitimacy when
President Bush stated during the ADA signing ceremony that:
[tihe Rehabilitation Act standards are already familiar to large segments of
the private sector that are either Federal contractors or recipients of Federal
funds. Because the Rehabilitation Act was enacted 17 years ago, there is al-
ready an extensive body of law interpreting the requirements of that Act.
Employers can turn to these interpretations for guidance on how to meet their
obligations under the ADA.
193
Were the disability rights advocates, EEOC Commissioner,
Congress, and President of the United States all wrong? A more
detailed analysis of their arguments suggests that they were.
How Congress came to believe that the courts had supplied a
uniform and coherent interpretation of the undue hardship standard
under the Rehabilitation Act is a complete mystery. The cases dis-
cussed above in Parts III.A.3 and III.A.4 were easily accessible for
members of Congress and committee staffers to read and analyze.
With legislator after legislator-and even the President of the United
States-claiming that judicial interpretations were ample and consis-
tent, it is surprising, if not inexplicable, that none of the congressional
committee reports even addressed this claim, let alone confirmed its
accuracy. Indeed, the Nelson and Prewitt cases were the only undue
hardship cases even mentioned in the reports. 194
Had the committees undertaken to factually support this ra-
tionale, they would have been forced to conclude that judicial deci-
sions under the Rehabilitation Act regarding undue hardship were
neither ample nor consistent. First, only 265 lawsuits had been filed
under the Rehabilitation Act between 1973 and 1990-just over fif-
teen per year. 195 In contrast, in the first two years following Title I's
Let me say this to the Senator-and I will conclude and I thank him for his pa-
tience-the bottom line is that every question I have brought up is going to be decided in
a Federal court after thousands of employers are sued under this act if it becomes law.
134 Cong. Rec. SlO, 773-74 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (emphasis added).
193. 26 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1165 (July 26, 1990).
194. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2 at 68 (cited in note 7) (citing Nelson and Prewitt as
leading cases regarding undue hardship); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3 at 41-42 & nn.30-32
(same).
195. R. Lee Creasman, Jr. and Patricia Greene Butler, Will the Americans with Disabilities
Act Disable Employers?, 42 Labor L. J. 52, 56 (1991) (citing EEOC Official Tells Small-Business
Group Agency Aims for Workable ADA Regulations, 138 Daily Lab. Rep. A10 (1990)). These 265
lawsuits were predicated on the entire gamut of Rehabilitation Act coverage: education,
transportation, public services, and employment. Since the ADA became effective, the EEOC
alone has intervened in nearly that many lawsuits per year-25 in the first two years-and
those cases have related solely to Title I-proscribed employment discrimination. Daniel J.
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effective date for employers with twenty-five or more employees,
approximately 30,000 charges of Title I discrimination were filed, one-
quarter of which involved reasonable accommodation issues.196 Those
265 Rehabilitation Act lawsuits over an almost two-decade period
could not possibly have provided a large enough database to
sufficiently clarify an issue which will be litigated exponentially more
often under the ADA.
Second, the Supreme Court had never addressed the financial
scope of an employer's obligation to reasonably accommodate employ-
ees under the Rehabilitation Act. Although Davis, Alexander, and
Arline brushed across issues germane to undue hardship, none of
those cases involved a claim that accommodating a person with a dis-
ability would have been too costly. Those cases addressed adminis-
trative burdens, not financial burdens.
Third, of all of the lower court decisions discussed in Part
III.A.4, only a handful squarely addressed whether a proposed em-
ployment accommodation would have imposed an undue hardship on
an employer, and of those, only Nelson and Gardner focused on the
financial costs involved.197 And even those two cases were inconsis-
tent. Whereas the Nelson court looked to the enormous budget of the
employing agency in determining that expensive accommodations
would not have caused an undue hardship, 98 the court in Gardner
looked exclusively to the enormous costs of the proposed accommoda-
tions, without addressing the budget or resources of the employing
agency. 99 Neither of these approaches can withstand critical analy-
Murphy, Sorting Out ADA's Enforcement: Businesses Face Uncertainty Under Disability Law,
Investor's Bus. Daily A1-A2 (Aug. 18, 1994).
196. See note 24. Only employers with 25 or more employees, of which there are 264,000,
could have been the subject of such charges prior to July 1994. See note 15. It is likely that
significantly more charges per year will be filed against the 396,000 employers of 15-25
employees, which have been subject to Title I only since July 26, 1994.
197. Further, even though Gardner was ostensibly grounded on the financial cost of ac-
commodations the court deemed necessary, the court failed to examine the actual financial cost
involved.
198. Nelson, 567 F. Supp. at 380. See also Kohl, 672 F. Supp. at 1233-34 (looking to the
total budget of a federal aid recipient).
199. See Gardner, 752 F.2d at 1283-84. "Like the accommodation in Nelson, the cost in
Gardener [sic] of providing on-site medical facilities would not have imposed an undue hardship
on defendant when viewing the cost in the context of the Corps' budget as a whole." Robert B.
Fitzpatrick, Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the ADA, 39 Fed. Bar
News & J. 69, 73 (1992). For additional criticism of the court's holding in Gardner, see Kathryn
W. Tate, The Federal Employer's Duties Under the Rehabilitation Act: Does Reasonable
Accommodation or Affirmative Action Include Reassignment?, 67 Tex. L. Rev. 781, 810-11 &
nn.162-63 (1989) (arguing that the Corps did not prove undue hardship); Cooper, 139 U. Pa. L.
Rev. at 1453-55 (cited in note 26) (arguing that accommodation would not have burdened the
Corps as a whole).
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sis. 'When one looks at an accommodation for one employee in terms
of an employer's entire budget," as in Nelson, "almost all accommoda-
tion[s] . . . are 'reasonable' and not an 'undue hardship."'200
Conversely, examining an accommodation's cost without considering
the resources of the employer, as in Gardner, will invariably yield a
finding of undue hardship.
Fourth, the Rehabilitation Act cases were hopelessly in conflict
on other relevant issues. The Bey court found undue hardship be-
cause, if each employee in the workforce were entitled to the accom-
modation plaintiff sought, the aggregate cost to the employer in lost
productivity would have been tremendous. 201 The court in Nelson, on
the other hand, looked specifically at the financial cost required to
accommodate each plaintiff individually in determining that an un-
due hardship did not exist.2 2 The Nelson court reached this result
even though the employer needed to hire additional part-time em-
ployees to assist the plaintiffs in performing their jobs. The court in
Treadwell, however, ruled that this sort of "doubling up" would have
constituted an undue hardship, at least in light of the "limited re-
sources" of the Corps.203 On the same issue, the court in Arneson,
200. Lawrence P. Postal and David D. Kadue, An Employer's Guide to the Americans with
Disabilities Act: From Job Qualifications to Reasonable Accommodations, 24 John Marshall L.
Rev. 693, 714 (1991). See also Tucker, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 889 (cited in note 56) (noting that
comparing the cost of an accommodation to the overall budget of the agency would eviscerate
the undue hardship defense altogether). For this reason, the following statement in the
regulatory appendix to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(d) seems misplaced: "For example, to demonstrate
that the cost of an accommodation poses an undue hardship, an employer would have to show
that the cost is undue as compared to the employer's budget." 29 C.F.R. app. 1630.15(d). No
similar statement appears in the statute, the regulations themselves, the EEOC Manual (cited
in note 30), or any of the Committee Reports. Another approach taken in cases outside of the
employment setting compares an accommodation's cost to the amount of financial assistance
received by the federal grantee, concluding that such aid is granted on the condition that it be
used at least in part to benefit the disabled. See Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Association of
Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Sykes, 697 F. Supp. 845, 852-54 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Dopico v. Goldschmidt,
687 F.2d 644, 650 (2d Cir. 1982); Espino v. Besteiro, 520 F. Supp. 905, 909 (S.D. Tex. 1981);
Camenisch, 616 F.2d at 129, 133, vacated on other grounds, 415 U.S. 390 (1981). This approach
was bolstered by the Supreme Court's dicta in Consolidated Rail, 465 U.S. at 632-33 n.13, that
"Congress apparently determined that it would require contractors and grantees to bear the
costs of providing employment for the handicapped as a quid pro quo for the receipt of federal
funds." However, comparing an accommodation's costs to the total amount of federal funds
received suffers from the same flaw as comparing the cost to the recipient's budget: "[v]irtually
any expenditure would be justifiable in relation to what would almost always be a significantly
larger 'comparative' expenditure." Tucker, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 889.
201. Bey, 540 F. Supp. at 927.
202. Nelson, 567 F. Supp. at 380.
203. Treadwell, 707 F.2d at 478. It is hard to imagine that the resources of the Corps were
more limited than the resources of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, or that the
"doubling up" of the seasonal park technician's duties would have been more financially
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while acknowledging that the Rehabilitation Act does not require an
agency to hire an additional full-time employee to assist a disabled
employee, strongly suggested that the hiring of a part-time assistant
would not cause an undue hardship.204 Finally, other courts grounded
a finding of undue hardship on health or safety concerns.2 5 Yet
nowhere in the HEW regulations on reasonable accommodation or
undue hardship are the health or safety consequences of an
accommodation listed as factors to be considered.206
The committees with jurisdiction over the ADA not only failed
to analyze the case law they contended amply and coherently defined
the contours of the undue hardship standard, they also failed to exam-
ine relevant scholarly literature. If they had consulted such
literature, they would have learned that commentators had concluded
that "[r]ather than provid[ing] a clear criterion for decision by
designating some limit on the burden that may be imposed on
employers, 'undue hardship' seems in practice to have served simply
as a label for accommodations that courts have refused to require in
particular cases ''207 and that "[i]mprecise terminology, such as
'reasonable accommodation' and 'undue financial burden' has resulted
in inconsistent interpretations of section 504 [demonstrating] the
need for more precise standards."208  Indeed, both of these
burdensome to the Corps than doubling up of the duties of the income-maintenance workers for
the DPW.
204. Arneson, 879 F.2d at 397-98. Arneson is of dubious precedential value in ADA
litigation because the court's analysis was explicitly predicated on § 501's affirmative action
requirement, not § 504's reasonable accommodation requirement. Id. at 396. Because Title I of
the ADA requires only reasonable accommodation, not affirmative action, courts interpreting
the ADA should be wary of relying on Arneson. To a lesser extent, the same can be said of
Dexler, Gardner, Carter, and Baker, each of which were grounded on § 501 (and at least in part
on § 501's affirmative action requirement), rather than § 504.
205. See Dexler, 660 F. Supp. at 1423 (finding that the use of step stools presented safety
concerns); Gardner, 752 F.2d at 1281 (finding that the plaintiffs medical condition would en-
danger himself and others); Bey, 540 F. Supp. at 926 (finding that the plaintiff would endanger
his own health and safety by performing job duties); Kohl, 865 F.2d at 941 (finding that the
plaintiff would pose a significant risk of communicating an infectious disease).
206. The ADA provides, separate and apart from the issue of undue hardship, that an
employer need not employ a person with a disability, or provide an accommodation, where the
plaintiffs health or safety, or the health and safety of others, would bejeopardized. 42 U.S.C. §§
12111(3), 12113(b); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(r), 1630.15(b)(2) (1993). In a similar vein, the Arline
court held that an employee could not be considered "otherwise qualified" if he posed a health or
safety threat to himself or others. 480 U.S. at 287 n.16. But to the extent that courts
construing the Rehabilitation Act's undue hardship standard factored health or safety issues
into their analyses, their ultimate conclusions regarding undue hardship have limited
precedential value in ADA undue hardship cases.
207. Comment, Employment Discrimination Against the Handicapped and Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act: An Essay on Legal Evasiveness, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 997, 1011 (1984).
208. Gerse, 1982 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 718 (cited in note 57). In an article published at about
the time the ADA was enacted, Professor Tucker noted that "the courts have applied different
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commentators urged Congress to enact amendments to the
Rehabilitation Act to increase the precision of the undue hardship
standard. 09
Fifth, Congress's conclusion that Rehabilitation Act precedents
were adequate to guide employment decisions under the ADA ignored
a crucial distinction between the scope of the Rehabilitation Act and
the scope of the ADA: The Rehabilitation Act applies only to public-
sector employers and private-sector employers that receive federal
funding or hold federal contracts. 210 Indeed, the central impetus
behind Congress's enactment of Title I of the ADA was to provide
analyses, and reached confusing and conflicting results, when determining what constitutes
'undue hardship' to employers or program administrators." Tucker, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 888
(cited in note 56). She observed that "[w]hile everyone seems to agree that the term 'undue
hardship' denotes excessive costs, there is no consensus as to how to determine whether the cost
of accommodation is excessive." Id. More recently published scholarship has been even more
direct: "Courts disagree radically on how far accommodation has to go before it becomes undue
hardship"; "twelve years of case law construing and clarifying the terms 'reasonable
accommodation' and 'undue hardship' have [not] resolved the terms ambiguities . ... "
Stuhlbarg, 59 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 1336, 1339 (cited in note 26). See also Margaret E. Stine,
Comment, Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 37 S.D. L. Rev. 97, 113 (1992) (stating that "[ujnfortunately, cases
decided prior to the enactment of the ADA demonstrate no uniformity in the courts as to the
interpretation of 'undue hardship"'; Brandfield, 59 Fordham L. Rev. at 119 (cited in note 26)
(stating that "[flower courts... have not been able to determine with any uniformity when the
Rehabilitation Act mandates accommodation'); Harger, 41 U. Kan. L. Rev. at 799 (cited in note
25) (stating that "case law interpreting the Rehabilitation Act provides little or no guidance to a
small business trying to understand its obligation to accommodate reasonably and make
decisions in accordance with the law's).
209. The first commentator proposed an amendment providing that "[the maximum
statutory level for accommodation costs shall be equal to X percent of the employee's annual
salary.. . ." Comment, 97 Harv. L. Rev. at 1013 (cited in note 207). Notice this proposal's
similarity to the Olin and House Judiciary Committee amendments rejected by Congress during
debate on the ADA. This proposal, and the Olin and House Judiciary Committee amendments,
were inspired by a provision of the North Carolina Handicapped Persons Protection Act, N.C.
Gen. Stat. §§ 168A-3(10)(a)(6), (7) (1987), providing that employers are not required to
accommodate disabled employees at a cost any greater than 5% of the employee's annual salary.
The second commentator's proposed amendment provided that "[a] recipient is not required
to make accommodations which are excessively expensive or disruptive" when viewed in light of:
(1) the "total operating budget of the program or activity"; (2) the "total wage budget"; and (3)
the "long.term benefits of the accommodation." Gerse, 1982 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 729. Professor
Tucker proposed the following model for the Rehabilitation Act:
[When deciding whether [a] proposed accommodation for a handicapped employee is
reasonable or constitutes an undue hardship to the employer, agencies and courts
should be required to compare the nature and cost of the accommodation requested
against 1) the size, type, and budget of the employer's business; AND 2) the amount of
federal financial assistance received by the employer; AND 3) the position and salary
sought or held by the handicapped employee; AND 4) the handicapped employee's
overall cost effectiveness to the employer. These factors should be given equal weight
and no one factor should be determinative.
Tucker, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 892. Proposals to clarify the meaning of undue hardship under
the ADA are discussed in notes 277 and 289.
210. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 793, 794. See text accompanying notes 59-61.
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remedies to employees of private businesses who were left unpro-
tected by the Rehabilitation Act.211 Hence, to the extent the undue
hardship standard had evolved under the Rehabilitation Act, it had
evolved in the context of large public or quasi-public employers whose
budgets were comprised in large part, or exclusively, of.revenue col-
lected from taxpayers, rather than in the context of wholly private
employers.
This distinction has enormous significance considering that the
ADA, unlike the Rehabilitation Act, applies to several hundred-thou-
sand private employers never before covered by the Rehabilitation
Act.212 These employers must make reasonable accommodations not
from money provided by the government, but rather from income and
profit earned competitively through ingenuity and labor.213 As the
Supreme Court noted in Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Darrone, in
the Rehabilitation Act, "Congress apparently determined that it
would require contractors and grantees to bear the costs of providing
employment for the handicapped as a quid pro quo for the receipt of
federal funds.' '21 4 A quid pro quo rationale obviously cannot be applied
to private employers required to accommodate disabled employees
from wholly private funds. Further, unlike a public employer, a
private business's central purpose is to create and maximize profit.215
211. See note 16.
212. S. Rep. No. 101-116 at 88 (cited in note 7).
213. Brandfield, 59 Fordhain L. Rev. at 121 n.56 (cited in note 26) (arguing that "cost is a
more important issue under the ADA because it deals with private businesses rather than the
government's deep pockets, which were at issue under the Rehabilitation Act"); Sue A. Krenck,
Note, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1969, 2001 (1994) (stating that
"[b]ringing private employers into the accommodation picture, as the ADA does, alters the
economic analysis substantially').
214. Consolidated Rail, 465 U.S. at 632-33 n.13. "Federal employers and federal
contractors, however, who are performing government functions rather than simply operating
for-profit businesses should be held to a more onerous duty to accommodate handicapped
persons. Indeed, Congress recognized this principle when it imposed an affirmative action
obligation on federal agencies and contractors to hire handicapped people." Tucker, 1989 U. Ill.
L. Rev. at 892 n.247 (cited in note 56).
215. See Tucker, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 892 (stating that federal employers and contractors
are distinguishable from private employers to the extent the latter exist solely for profit-making
purposes); Allan Cox, The Cox Report on the American Corporation 200-201, 210 (Delacorte,
1982) (stating that over 95% of business executives place the most importance on profits);
Francis W. Steckmest, Corporate Performance 27 (McGraw-Hill, 1982) (stating that "profit is the
major driving force of the private enterprise system"). As one member of Congress observed:
The private sector does not have deep pockets. The private sector has to make a
profit to provide the jobs that we enjoy today and the standard of living that we enjoy
today. The bill, if it is properly written, should tell the private sector, No. 1, who is
disabled and how do you comply with the bill in making a public accommodation to those
who are disabled.
136 Cong. Rec. H2316 (daily ed. May 15, 1990) (statement of Rep. DeLay). Congressman DeLay
reiterated these concerns during debate on the Olin Amendment:
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A $6,638 accommodation may not cause undue hardship to a state
agency with 38,000 employees and an annual budget of
$300,000,000,216 but its impact on a private employer with fifteen
employees that is barely breaking even will be radically different.217
Consequently, even if the cases interpreting undue hardship under
the Rehabilitation Act had been uniform and consistent, they could
not possibly serve as the proper framework for evaluating claims by
private employers that proposed accommodations would cause them
an undue financial hardship.218
In summary, the argument that the standard codified in the
ADA had been applied without problems or inconsistencies under the
Rehabilitation Act was deeply flawed. In the seventeen years of
Rehabilitation Act jurisprudence prior to the ADA's enactment, courts
rarely had addressed the concept of financial undue hardship. The
dearth of case law on this subject is hardly surprising in view of the
The gentleman from New York [Mr. Owens] talks about having a long case history, a
dealing with section 5[014 of the Rehab Act since 1973. That is case history on go-
vernment entities with deep pockets. We are going from deep pockets of government in-
dustry and applying this bill to private sectors that could not have the deep pockets of
government, and that is the big difference. Employers must know how they are to com-
ply with this law.
136 Cong. Rec. H2473 (daily ed. May 17, 1990).
216. See discussion of Nelson, text accompanying notes 107-18.
217. As one commentator observed, "[ijsofar as... the facts pertaining to huge organiza-
tions receiving enormous grants are necessarily entirely different than facts pertaining to a
small employer who is barely getting by, section 504 obviously cannot provide significant
guidance to a small business in determining how to comply with the ADA." Stuhlbarg, 59 U.
Cin. L. Rev. at 1334 (cited in note 26). See also Harger, 41 U. Kan. L. Rev. at 799 (cited in note
25) (stating that "[a~nalogizing the facts of cases involving huge businesses receiving enormous
federal grants to the smallest of businesses is practically impossible"); Cooper, 139 U. Pa. L.
Rev. at 1441 n.99 (cited in note 26) (stating that "the federal government, with its tremendous
resources, is able to absorb far greater costs without undue hardship than a private employer is
likely to be').
218. This distinction was not lost on business lobbyists, who vigorously pressed this argu-
ment at committee hearings:
We believe it is one thing to require institutions receiving substantial federal funds to
use a part of those monies to ensure that the workplace is as hospitable as possible to
the disabled; it is quite another to require precisely the same actions, and the same
levels of expenditure, on behalf of all private employers as a matter of positive law.
Similarly, we believe there is a substantial difference between the obligations of the
federal government to its disabled citizens, who as citizens are entitled to demand that
the government spend their tax dollars in socially beneficial ways, and the obligations of
private sector employers trying desperately to compete in a global economy.
Senate Hearings, app. at 412 (cited in note 164) (letter from Zachary D. Fasman, on behalf of
U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to Sen. Harkin 2 (May 26, 1989)). Another lobbyist interjected that
" t]here is no relationship between profit and undue hardship [in the bill]. What do you do with
a business that is not making a profit? Do you have to go borrow the money in order to make
these accommodations? Those things are not clearly spelled out." Small Business Hearing at 40
(cited in note 170) (testimony of David Pinkus, on behalf of National Small Business United).
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fact that the public and quasi-public entities covered by the
Rehabilitation Act could not truly suffer a financial undue hardship
from a mandate that a portion of government funds received be set
aside for reasonable accommodation. Moreover, the few cases that did
address undue hardship under the Rehabilitation Act utilized
different analyses and arrived at inconsistent results. Finally, even to
the extent that some coherent meaning of undue hardship could be
extracted from this mish-mash of jurisprudence, that meaning is of
minimal value under the ADA, which extends coverage to private
employers that will suffer undue hardship much more readily than
the beneficiaries of government funds covered by the Rehabilitation
Act.
C. Leave it to the Courts
Accepting for a moment the argument that the courts had
already clarified the meaning of undue hardship, it is hard to explain
why status quo proponents also argued that judicial interpretation
would clarify its meaning.219 Apart from its inherent inconsistency
with the previous rationale, this argument is deficient in several
respects. First, and most significantly, the ADA threatens employers
with liability for discrimination unless they accurately distinguish
between accommodations which would cause them an undue hardship
and those which would not.220  Consequently, employers must be
provided with a method which enables them to make this distinc-
tion.221 To simply say that "the courts, over time, will provide such a
method" is an insufficient response. It is unfair to impose liability on
219. See 136 Cong. Rec. H2473 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Owens that
"[wie leave it up to the courts. They have a long history of interpreting what undue hardship
is"); Senate Hearings at 109-10 (statement of Sen. Harkin that the courts will decide what
accommodations are reasonable); 136 Cong. Rec. H2317 (daily ed. May 15, 1990) (statement of
Rep. DeLay criticizing the rationale that "we are going to rely on the courts to legislate and tell
us what those parameters would be and those definition would be").
220. Indeed, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 authorized the award of compensatory and puni-
tive damages for an employer's failure to make reasonable accommodations as required by Title
I. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2). See note 229 and accompanying text. However:
damages may not be awarded under this section where the covered entity demonstrates
good faith efforts, in consultation with the person with the disability who has informed
the covered entity that accommodation is needed, to identify and make a reasonable ac-
commodation that would provide such individual with an equally effective opportunity
and would not cause an undue hardship on the operation of the business.
Id. § 1981a(a)(3).
221. "What the small business community needs is a firm, clear, quantifiable, mechanical
procedure which would convert data into answers, so that one can know, without needing to
guess, whether a suggested accommodation would [create an undue hardship]." Stuhlbarg, 59
U. Cin. L. Rev. at 1338 (cited in note 26).
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an employer for failure to comply with an obligation that Congress
has consciously decided not to define clearly.22 Congress' failure in
this regard was nothing short of an abdication of its responsibility.223
Second, it is equally unfair to require employers to expend
untold litigation costs to obtain the clarity in the judicial process that
Congress could have achieved so easily in the legislative process. 224 It
is one matter to subject an employer to the rigors and expense of
litigation for engaging in conduct that it knew might subject it to
litigation and which it could have prevented. It is quite another to
subject an employer to litigation merely because Congress lacked the
fortitude to clearly define the scope of the employer's responsibilities,
and decided instead to 'qet the courts decide."225
222. Representative DeLay made this argument just days prior to House passage of the
ADA:
The proponents of the bill in hearings even admit that it is ambiguous and vague in its
language, and that the courts will decide who are disabled and how do you comply. This
is a very ominous position that our business people are being put in, especially the small
business person who does not have the capability of hiring expensive lawyers to defend
against frivolous suits or suits that are being brought to harass a particular place of
business.
136 Cong. Rec. H2316 (daily ed. May 15, 1990).
223. As one Congressman eloquently stated:
One of the purposes of this and every piece of legislation is to provide a basis for
reasonable expectation between parties in conflict. Even though great strides have been
made in cleaning up this bill in that regard, it is still nebulous. What the meaning of
"undue hardship" or "reasonable accommodation" is will vary depending on where you
sit. This legislation should attempt to narrow the gap between those expectation levels.
At this point, those expectations are left for courts all over this country to decide. No
one will ever be certain that they have complied. Let's make them at least a little more
certain. Congress is abrogating it [sic] constitutional duty by writing vague laws which
must be clarified by the Federal courts. Our responsibility is to write laws which can be
clearly understood when reading them-not have another branch of government do our
job.
H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3 at 94 (cited in note 31) (dissenting views of Rep. Douglas). See also
Holtzman, Jennings, and Schenk, 44 Baylor L. Rev. at 304 (cited in note 25) (stating that "It~he
ADA is a classic example of a legislative body punting to the courts where tough determinations
need to be made"); Harger, 41 U. Kan. L. Rev. at 791 (cited in note 25) (labeling such an
approach "wholly insensitive to small businesses'.
224. See 136 Cong. Rec. H2448 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Armey) (stating
that "[b]y leaving clarification up to the courts, we are inviting costly and unnecessary
litigation'; Joint Hearing at 48 (cited in note 172) (statement of Mark R. Donovan, Manager of
the Community Employment and Training Programs of Marriott Corporation, that "language in
the Bill should be written ... to minimize its use as a foundation for frivolous claims against
employers'; Edward J. McGraw, Note, Compliance Costs of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
18 Del. J. Corp. L. 521, 540 (1993) (claiming that "[ain onslaught of litigation must be expected
from an Act which specifically contemplates interpretation on a case-by-case basis").
225. Congressman DeLay advanced this argument in support of the Olin Amendment:
Mr. Chairman, it frightens me when someone tell[s] me that the courts will decide on
this issue. I[t] frightens me greatly. This is harmful to the employer by applying this
higher expense. It is the wrong argument. The employers are willing to accept this
higher expense for certainty of compliance rather than leave their fate up to the courts.
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Third, and equally distressing, leaving the vague standard in
place for judicial clarification leaves job applicants and employees in
the awkward position of not knowing what accommodations they can
rightfully demand from their potential or current employers.
Employees with disabilities must either accept their employers'
claims of undue hardship at face value or prepare for a lengthy and
expensive court battle to obtain accommodations that in the end may
not be worth the fight. This situation will assuredly result in tense, if
not hostile, relations between employers and employees with
disabilities, a state of affairs antithetical to Congress' goal of
facilitating the full employment of people with disabilities.226
Finally, the assumption that the courts will adequately clarify
what Congress did not ignores both history and reality. Our analysis
of Rehabilitation Act jurisprudence teaches us that courts have been
woefully unsuccessful in clarifying the meaning of undue hardship
under that act. There is no reason to believe that they will be any
more successful in defining the scope of undue hardship under the
ADA. Courts have little inclination to draw the precise mathematical
lines that the ADA will require them to draw in undue hardship
cases. 227 They are even less likely to develop guidelines suitable for
136 Cong. Rec. H2473 (daily ed. May 17, 1990).
226. See 136 Cong. Rec. S9694 (daily ed. July 13, 1990) (statement of Sen. Armstrong)
(stating that the ADA would create "an adversarial relationship between people with disabilities
and the proprietors of small businesses"); Krenck, Note, 72 Tex. L. Rev. at 1973 (cited in note
213) (saying that "[tihe ADA pits employers against people with disabilities, creating conflict
between the two groups that must work together if the statute's goal of integration is to be
met"). One commentator's response to Congress's "let the courts decide" rationale resonates
with insight:
LV]ague standards are likely to lead to increased costs. With insufficient guidelines as to
how much accommodation is enough, there is the possibility that overall cost, both to
employers and to the judicial system, may eventually outweigh the considerable social
benefits of the ADA. The problem of quantifying reasonable accommoda-
tion-delineating the standard beyond the law's vague generalizations-persists. As a
result, employers, left without a road map for business planning, will have a hard time
foreseeing their duty. They will be fearful of the legal ramifications of engaging in dis-
criminatory practices, without even knowing when they have crossed that line.
Employees will not know whether their rights have been violated and, therefore,
whether to bring suit. Courts, in turn, will not have a clear standard by which to render
judgments in discrimination cases. The potential is great for a lack of uniformity in de-
cisions, which may lead to substantively unfair judgments. In the end, both employers
and employees are ill-served.
Dolatly, 26 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. at 547 (cited in note 25).
227. Recall that the ADA requires that even if an employer can successfully demonstrate
that the total cost of an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on its business, it is
nevertheless obligated to pay for the portion of the accommodation which would not impose an
undue hardship. This obligation assumes that the undue hardship standard should be defined
precisely enough to enable translation into dollars and cents. See notes 50-51 and accompany-
ing text. Yet the judiciary is the most unlikely branch of government to supply the calculus
necessary for such translation.
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universal application, particularly because Congress specified that
undue hardship is to be decided on a case-by-case basis.
In contrast, Congress is well-equipped to develop such bright-
line guidelines.228 Just one year following enactment of the ADA,
Congress adopted precisely these sorts of guidelines in legislation
defining the maximum liability for compensatory and punitive
damages applicable to employers who violate Title I of the ADA and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.29 Hence, Congress has
provided employers with advance knowledge of the scope of their
financial obligations arising from violation of Title I without providing
them any guidance regarding the level of financial expenditures
required to comply with Title j.230
D. For Flexibility's Sake
The final defense employed by status quo proponents to repel
requests for a more precise undue hardship standard was that, above
all else, the undue hardship standard had to be flexible; a precise
standard, they argued, could not achieve that objective. As one
Congressman stated: "Flexibility, not a rigid formula rule, is what is
needed to make this legislation effective and workable."231 Another
concurred that "the strength of the ADA, is that 'undue hardship' is a
flexible standard, which is designed to take into account a range of
different factors."2 32 The House Judiciary Committee rejected a fixed
standard because it believed "that setting a ceiling on reasonable
accommodation is inappropriate and that the flexible approach used
under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act... is appropriate for the
ADA as well."233 Indeed, the Olin Amendment was opposed in part
"because it would [have] erode[d] the flexible approach embodied in
228. See, for example, 26 U.S.C. § 1(c) (Supp. 1993) (setting forth federal income tax table
for unmarried individuals ranging from 15% to 39.6%, depending on taxable income).
229. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 established maximum liability for compensatory and
punitive damages as follows:
Number of Employees Maximum Liability




42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (Supp. 1993). See note 237 regarding pending legislation which would
repeal these limits.
230. See note 316.
231. 136 Cong. Rec. H2474 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Morrison).
232. Id. at E1915 (daily ed. June 13, 1990) (statement of Rep. Hoyer).
233. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3 at 41 (cited in note 7).
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the Rehabilitation Act and adopted by the ADA."234 Even some
commentators have argued that "[a] strict definition of undue
hardship that would provide a clear-cut answer in every situation is
not possible, because of the range of possible accommodations and the
variances in employer resources."235
This flexibility argument is flawed for two reasons. First, to
the extent it attempts to account for an infinite number of permuta-
tions of disabilities and methods of reasonable accommodation, it is
irrelevant to the undue hardship question. The undue hardship ques-
tion focuses exclusively on the wherewithal of the employer to absorb
financial costs. It matters not whether those costs are necessitated by
a blind employee requiring a Braille computer or a deaf employee
requiring an interpreter. The financial impact on the employer is the
only relevant factor.
Second, to the extent that the flexibility rationale assumes
that a mathematically precise standard cannot possibly be flexible
enough to address all of the varying levels of employer resources from
which reasonable accommodation will be made, it simply is not cor-
rect.2 36 Again, just one year following enactment of the ADA,
Congress in fact enacted legislation which contained such a mathe-
matically precise formula to cover the very same range of employers.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 utilized a sliding scale to measure the
level of damages which could be assessed against employers for violat-
ing Title I: the larger the employer, the greater the damages which
could be assessed.237 The same analytical concept can be applied to
234. 136 Cong. Rec. H2474 (daily ed. May 17, 1990) (statement of Rep. Payne); id. at E1915
(statement of Rep. Hoyer that Olin Amendment was defeated in large part because of this
inflexibility).
235. Cooper, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1454-56 (cited in note 26). See G. William Davenport,
The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Appraisal of the Major Employment-Related
Compliance and Litigation Issues, 43 Ala. L. Rev. 307, 328 (1992) (stating that "logic compels
that [a bright-line test] be rejected as well because America's 43 million disabled citizens do not
present a homogenous group by any stretch of the imagination. What will constitute undue
hardships must always be determined by the facts of each particular case" (citations omitted)).
236. Unfortunately, the Olin Amendment legitimized the flexibility argument, inasmuch as
a 10% per se cap on reasonable accommodation would truly not have been "flexible" enough to
ensure that some disabled employees receive appropriate accommodations. The real problem
with the Olin Amendment's approach, however, was not that it lacked flexibility, but rather that
it improperly focused on the employee's financial resources, rather than on the employer's. This
issue will be discussed further at notes 245-60 and accompanying text.
237. See note 229 and accompanying text. Why Congress adopted this approach to limit
damages for violation of Title I of the ADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is un-
clear, inasmuch as there was no legislative debate regarding the need for a sliding scale and no
committee reports were drafted on the Civil Rights Act of 1991. A committee report was drafted
regarding similar legislation which died in the previous Congress, but that legislation did not




measure the scope of accommodation required by the ADA without
causing any problems the flexibility proponents might have fathomed.
A precise standard can be developed that fairly defines the scope of
obligations of both a fifteen-employee business and a fifteen-thou-
sand-employee business. Consequently, a vague undue hardship
standard is not necessary to ensure that the ADA has sufficient flexi-
bility to address all possibilities fairly.
Having critically analyzed the rationales advanced during the
legislative process in favor of the ADA's vague "significant difficulty
or expense" undue hardship standard, we can now comfortably con-
clude that such a vague standard is not compelled by history, logic, or
sound public policy. Rather, history, logic, and sound public policy
demand a quantitative undue hardship standard.23 8 With full im-
plementation of Title I now achieved, it is likely only a matter of time
until all of the arguments raised above are brought to bear on
Congress and the EEOC, together with requests for amendments
and/or new regulations. Thus, it is appropriate to develop a quantita-
tive proposal to bring to the bargaining table. Not only can such a
standard be created, but one must if the ADA has any hope of
fulfilling the noble objectives for which its drafters and supporters
had strived.
V. BACK TO THE DRAWING BOARD: TOWARD A QUANTITATIVE
UNDUE HARDSHIP MODEL
To begin the construction process, it will be helpful to
determine the broad moral principles Congress seemed to embrace
during its consideration of the ADA generally and the undue hardship
provision specifically; for we should endeavor to incorporate those
principles into our new quantitative model if at all possible. We will
uncover two such principles, one which shall be referred to as the
"fairness principle," and the other as the "equalizing principle."
Interestingly, this scale may be repealed. As of this writing, legislation is pending in
Congress under the title of the "Equal Remedies Act" which would dismantle the sliding scale
and allow unlimited compensatory and punitive damages for violation of Title I of the ADA and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. H.R. 96, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). See S. 17, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). See generally Equal Remedies Act of 1991, S. Rep. No. 102-286, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
238. Other commentators agree. See Brandfield, 59 Fordham L. Rev. at 127 (cited in note
26); Dolatly, 26 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. at 548 (cited in note 25); Stuhlbarg, 59 U. Cin. L. Rev.
at 1338 (cited in note 26); Comment, 97 Harv. L. Rev. at 1013 (cited in note 207).
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A. The Fairness Principle
The fairness principle attempts to balance two competing in-
terests. On the one hand is society's goal of leveling the employment
playing field for citizens who cannot secure jobs without receiving
accommodations. This goal can be achieved only if businesses are
compelled by law to provide such accommodations. On the other hand
is private enterprise's goal of generating and maximizing profit-its
very reason for existing. We live in a capitalistic economy in which
profit maximization is valued as a laudable goal. In such an economy,
society cannot justifiably expect private businesses to abandon the
goal of profit maximization to fulfill society's goal of employing people
with disabilities. The fairness principle therefore labels as "undue
hardship" the point at which a private business's ability to maximize
profit is threatened by society's mandate that it accommodate em-
ployees with disabilities. 2 9 It is at that point, and only that point,
that the societal goal embodied in Title I must yield.
The very words "undue" and "hardship," when used in tandem
in the reasonable accommodation context, immediately convey what
the fairness principle is all about. After all, it is a financial
"hardship" for a private employer to be required to set aside funds
otherwise distributable as profit to the business' owners for the sole
purpose of accommodating employees with disabilities. When at-
tached to "hardship," the word "undue" merely signifies the point at
which that hardship is more than the society should demand of pri-
vate employers.
The fairness principle is by definition flexible. What is fair to
ask of one employer is not necessarily fair to ask of another employer,
or even of the same employer at a different time.240 For instance,
whereas a giant multinational corporation might "fairly" be asked to
spend thousands of dollars to accommodate an employee with a
disability, requiring the same level of accommodation from a local
restaurant would probably not be "fair."241 The greater the resources
239. See Tucker, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 891 (cited in note 56) (arguing that "the [undue
hardship] test must give due recognition to the employer's primary objective of maximizing
profits'.
240. See 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(d) (stating that "an accommodation that imposes an
undue hardship for one employer at a particular time may not pose an undue hardship for
another employer, or even for the same employer at another time").
241. As stated by the House Judiciary Committee, "[alithough an action may be a signifi-
cant expense... in the abstract, or when considered with regard to a small employer, it may not
be an undue hardship when considered in light of the size of the employer .... " H.R. Rep. No.
485, pt. 3 at 35 (cited in note 7). The EEOC Manual explicitly provides that "(iln general, a
larger employer would be expected to make accommodations requiring greater effort or expense
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available to an employer, the greater the scope of accommodations
which can be made without requiring the employer to sacrifice its
profit-maximizing goal.
Turning to the legislative history, the first piece of evidence
that Congress embraced this fairness principle is the compromise
made by the Act's sponsors between the 1988 and 1989 legislative
sessions. Recall that the initial bill contained not an undue hardship
provision, but rather the "bankruptcy provision" which would have
required businesses to make all requested accommodations unless
doing so would have threatened their existence. 42 Business groups
succeeded in replacing the "bankruptcy provision" with the undue
hardship provision because the former asked of them more than soci-
ety should demand of private employers. The undue hardship stan-
dard, on the other hand, better respected the balance between busi-
nesses' profit-maximizing goal and society's goal of putting individu-
als with disabilities to work.
Additional evidence of the fairness principle is present in the
second and third factors of the statutory undue hardship provision,
requiring analysis of the "overall financial resources" of the employer
and "the effect [of proposed accommodations] on expenses and
resources. . . ."23 The only logical reason why the level of an
employer's resources should be examined is to determine when an
accommodation would too greatly deplete those resources to be ac-
ceptable in our capitalistic economy. Still further evidence of the
fairness principle exists in the House Judiciary Committee's explana-
tion of why an additional statutory factor was added to address local
facilities:
The Committee is responding particularly to concerns about employers who
operate in depressed or rural areas and are operating at the margin or at a
loss. Specifically, concern was expressed that an employer may elect to close a
than would be required of a smaller employer." EEOC Manual at § 3.9 (cited in note 30).
Commentators have made the same observation. See, for example, Fitzpatrick, 39 Fed. B. News
& J. at 73 (cited in note 199) (recognizing that "[tlhe definition of undue hardship suggests that
a large employer should absorb a higher cost of accommodation than should a small employer");
Lavelle, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. at 1186-87 (cited in note 25) (noting that "the better off a
covered entity is financially, the harder it will be to show an undue hardship, at least
economically'; Matthew B. Schiff and David L. Miller, Reasonable Accommodation Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 28 Gonzaga L. Rev. 219, 220 (1992/93) (symposium issue)
(alleging that "[larger, profitable employers should be prepared to provide virtually any
reasonable accommodation"); Davenport, 43 Ala. L. Rev. at 325 (cited in note 235) (arguing that
"all other factors being equal, it should be recognized that smaller employers will be granted
considerably greater leeway than larger firms in claiming undue hardship').
242. See notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
243. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B)(ii) & (iii).
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store if it is losing money or only marginally profitable rather than undertake
significant investments to make reasonable accommodations to employees with
disabilities. The Committee does not intend for the requirements of the Act to
result in the closure of neighborhood stores or in loss of jobs. The Committee
intends for courts to consider in determining "undue hardship," whether the
local store is threatened with closure by the parent company or is faced with
job loss as a result of the requirements of this Act.244
In light of this legislative history, for Congress or the EEOC to con-
sider seriously any proposed modification of the undue hardship
standard, the fairness principle must lie at its core.
B. The Equalizing Principle
The equalizing principle provides that all employees of a given
company are entitled to exactly the same financial level of reasonable
accommodation expenditures, irrespective of their position, salary, or
the degree to which they contribute to the success of the company.245
Under the equalizing principle, the janitor who mops the company
floors at night is entitled to accommodations equally expensive as
those which might be provided to the corporate executive who walks
on those floors during the day.246 Although this result may appear
counterintuitive at first blush, it is unquestionably what Congress
intended.
The committee reports cited study after study for the proposi-
tion that people with disabilities are, generally speaking, the least
well employed, least well educated, and most economically disadvan-
244. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3 at 40-41 (cited in note 7).
245. The equalizing principle requires that all employees within a business organization be
entitled to the same financial level of accommodation. It does not require that all employees in
all business organizations be entitled to the same level of accommodation. This is because the
fairness principle is linked to the financial resources of individual companies: the greater the
resources of an individual company, the more that company should be required to expend on
reasonable accommodations. If the equalizing principle applied to the total American labor
force, it would require some companies to pay less than what society could justifiably ask of
them-to the detriment of employees with disabilities-and some companies to pay more than
what society could justifiably ask of them-to the detriment of those companies. In tandem, the
fairness principle and equalizing principle permit employees working for profitable companies to
receive more expensive accommodations than employees working for less profitable companies.
The tradeoff for this inter-organizational 'inequality" is that each covered employer must push
the reasonable accommodation envelope as far as society can ask. Requiring all covered
employers to push this envelope will assure the maximum level of accommodation possible
nationwide. In a nutshell, that is the central goal of Title I.
246. That being said, the equalizing principle tolerates a distinction between part-time and
full-time employees. Indeed, there is something intrinsically unequal about entitling a 10-
hour/week employee to the same level of accommodation as a 40-hour/week employee. Thus, to
the extent the discussion above addresses the equalizing principle, it is discussing that principle
solely in the context of full-time employees. Part-time employees are addressed at note 287.
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taged segment of the American population. For instance, the reports
cited a Lou Harris poll finding that two-thirds of all Americans with
disabilities between sixteen and sixty-four years of age are unem-
ployed.247 They also noted that, in 1984, half of all adults with dis-
abilities had household incomes of $15,000 or less-double the per-
centage of the non-disabled population in that income bracket.248 It
was in large part because of these disparities that Congress began
considering the ADA in the first place, "to allow individuals with
disabilities to be part of the economic mainstream of our society."249
Congress' statutory findings reiterated these concerns:
(6) census data, national polls, and other studies have documented
that people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status
in our society, and are severely disadvantaged socially, vocation-
ally, economically, and educationally;
(8) the Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities
are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independ-
ent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals; and
(9) the continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination
and prejudice denies people with disabilities the opportunity to
compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for
which our free society is justifiably famous, and costs the United
States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from
dependency and nonproductivity. 250
Congress wanted the ADA to enable the disabled population to pull
itself up by its own bootstraps and, over time, close the gaps in
education, employment, and economic status which had persisted for
too long. To achieve this goal, Congress realized that those most in
need of financial assistance to procure accommodations would have to
be provided with such assistance, unless doing so would run afoul of
247. S. Rep. No. 116 at 9 (cited in note 7); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2 at 32 (cited in note
7). See also National Council on Disability, Implications for Federal Policy at 19 (cited in note
7). That number has now grown to 68%. See note 7. Census data, however, reveal that the
percentage of disabled unemployed persons in the 21-64-year-old age bracket is only 48%.
McNeil, Americans With Disabilities: 1991-92, Current Population Reports at 62 (cited in note
7).
248. S. Rep. No. 101-116 at 9. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2 at 32. The Senate Report
concluded from these statistics that "[ilndividuals with disabilities experience staggering levels
of unemployment and poverty." S. Rep. No. 101-116 at 9. It also quoted President Bush as
stating that "[the statistics consistently demonstrate that disabled people are the poorest, least
educated and largest minority in America."' Id. See also H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2 at 29
(concluding that "people with disabilities as a group occupy an inferior status socially,
economically, vocationally, and educationally').
249. S. Rep. No. 101-116 at 10; H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2 at 34.
250. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6), (8), (9).
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the fairness principle. Consequently, when Congress spelled out the
factors relevant to determining undue hardship, it focused all of those
factors on the resources of the employer. By placing the exclusive
focus on the employer's resources, rather than the employee's position
and salary, Congress attempted to equalize the right of all disabled
employees to reasonable accommodations.
The Olin Amendment 251 put this equalizing principle to a
critical test, and it was during the debate on that amendment that the
principle was asserted most forcefully and eloquently. The
amendment's ten-percent salary cap was antithetical to the equalizing
principle because it would have provided greater reasonable acco-
mmodation benefits to the most financially secure employees. Under
the Olin Amendment, as an employee's need for financial assistance
to procure reasonable accommodations increased, his legal entitle-
ment to such assistance would have decreased. In the extreme exam-
ple, our $10,000/year janitor would have been entitled to only
$1,000/year in accommodations whereas our $100,000/year corporate
executive would have been entitled to $10,000/year in accommoda-
tions.252
Representative Patricia Schroeder argued forcefully that the
Olin Amendment would have "discriminate[d] among the lowest paid
workers in America."2 53 She noted that the amendment was:
doubling up discrimination that the bill is trying to undo, so I urge Members to
look at this very carefully, realize what this will mean, if we have this cap per
employee based on their salary, and realize how that can be very discrimina-
tory for low-income employees.
It is great for Donald Trump. It is lousy for the person who is cleaning up
after Donald Trump.254
Another Congressman raised similar concerns:
Today, are we going to say that a company manager who earns $40,000 is
entitled to a greater accommodation than the mailclerk who receives a salary
of $15,000? The intent of this legislation is to provide equity where none
251. For a more detailed discussion of this amendment, see notes 177-78 and accompanying
text.
252. This amendment would also have had a crushing effect on the ability of blind and deaf
individuals to secure jobs. Even for employees earning $50,000, the ten percent Olin Amend-
ment cap would have limited such employees to $5,000 for readers or interpreters, an amount
clearly inadequate to pay the salary of even part-time readers or interpreters. See Tucker and
Goldstein, Legal Rights of Persons With Disabilities § 5:8 n.24 (cited in note 62) (discussing
North Carolina statute limiting accommodations to 5% of employee's salary).




exists. The Olin amendment would allow further discrimination by making
available to employees with the lowest paying jobs a lesser accommodation,
without consideration of the individual's skills or qualifications.... I must
also oppose this amendment because it unfairly switches the focus away from
the resources of the employer and onto the annual salary of the employee.
255
Still another Congressman argued that "those who are applying for
lower paying jobs ought not to find themselves screened out of these
opportunities, while those who are applying for higher paying jobs are
successful because they fall within the 10 percent cap."256
It is important to remember that the Olin Amendment nearly
passed,2 57 in large part because there was a significant groundswell of
support in the House for a more precise undue hardship standard.258
The argument that likely kept the amendment from becoming law
was that it violated the spirit of the equalizing principle.259 Indeed,
the EEOC Manual states that the amendment was rejected "because
it would unjustifiably harm lower-paid workers who need
accommodations. Instead, Congress clearly established that the focus
for determining undue hardship should be the resources available to
the employer."260
255. Id. at H2474 (statement of Rep. Payne).
256. Id. at H2474 (statement of Rep. Morrison). One Congressman tried to make the Olin
Amendment more palatable to those of its detractors who were sensitive to its encroachment on
the equalizing principle:
I would, for example, be interested in possibly supporting an amendment that the
gentlewoman from Colorado [Mrs. Schroeder] might offer that would allow the lower
paid workers to have, for example, a 20-percent cutoff so that we could have some
progressivity in it, whatever the number might be chosen.
The important thing though is to have certainty, certainty for the employers so
that they can understand this law and plan on their own without the advice of counsel to
look back through the case law, through 17 years, and without relying on their local
Federal judge to figure it out for them.
Id. at H2473 (statement of Rep. Cooper). Neither Representative Schroeder nor other
equalizing principle proponents took Representative Cooper up on his offer.
257. It failed by 27 votes. Id. at H2475.
258. See notes 173-78, 215, 222-25 and accompanying text.
259. Some other arguments made against the Olin Amendment were analyzed at notes 192
and 234 and accompanying text. Additional arguments against the Olin Amendment not
addressed in the body of this Article included: (1) that ten percent of salary was too arbitrary;
(2) the difficulty of applying the ten percent rule if a proposed accommodation benefited more
than one employee or one employee for more than one year; and (3) that rather than creating a
ceiling, the ten percent rule in reality would have created a floor to which every disabled
employee would have claimed entitlement. During the debate on this amendment, there was
much ado over whether the Bush Administration supported or opposed it. At various moments
during the debate, legislators made claims that the administration supported the amendment,
opposed the amendment, and had no position regarding the amendment. The debate is worth
reading, and can be found at 136 Cong. Rec. H2470-75 (daily ed. May 17, 1990).
260. EEOC Manual at § 3.9 (cited in note 30). A thorough search of the ADA's legislative
history will, however, unearth one stray reference which is antithetical to the equalizing
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Had the Olin Amendment attempted to achieve its central goal
of a more precise undue hardship standard without violating the
spirit of the equalizing principle, it might well be law today.
Unfortunately, no such proposal was made and, as they say, the rest
is history. But it is not too late.
C. Construction of A New Model
The above discussion establishes certain ground rules. First,
any modified undue hardship standard must be faithful to both the
fairness principle and the equalizing principle. Under the fairness
principle. Two weeks prior to House consideration of the Olin Amendment, Representative
Steve Bartlett, one of the House's principal sponsors of the ADA, stated for the record his
analysis of how various questions posed by his colleagues would be answered. One of these
questions related to undue hardship:
Q. What does the term "undue hardship" mean? Would hiring a reader at $6.00
per hour to accommodate a $5.00 per hour blind clerk be considered an undue hardship?
The hypothetical posed would clearly be an undue hardship, assuming that the
question is a continuous "reading" requirement. On the other hand, hiring a $6.00 per
hour reader for one hour per year would not be an undue hardship.
136 Cong. Rec. H1921 (daily ed. May 1, 1990) (emphasis added). In the Author's view,
Representative Bartlett's interpretation was implicitly rejected when the Olin Amendment was
defeated. As is noted in the body above, the EEOC so concluded when it stated that the Olin
Amendment "was rejected because it would [have] unjustifiably harm[ed] lower-paid workers
who need accommodations." EEOC Manual at § 3.9. Furthermore, because all of the statutory
undue hardship factors relate to resources available to the employer-not the salary of the
employee-Representative Bartlett's analysis was not predicated on an application of the
statute. Whether the assistant earns more than the disabled employee he is assisting is simply
irrelevant to the undue hardship analysis. See id. (stating that "the resources available to the
employer" is the entire focus). Indeed, despite being lobbied by business groups to expand the
list of factors to include the "value of the position at issue, as measured by the compensation
paid to the holder of the position," 56 Fed. Reg. 35,730 (1991), the EEOC concluded that
"[slimply comparing the cost of the accommodation to the salary of the individual with a
disability in need of the accommodation will not suffice." 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(d).
In light of the fact that Congress firmly embraced the equalizing principle, the following
scholarly commentaries must also be rejected:
[Tihe 'undue hardship' test should consider the handicapped employee's position and
salary and should require some reasonable relationship to the cost of the accommodation
sought. It would hardly seem reasonable, and thus would constitute an undue hardship,
for an employer to pay $16,000 per year for an interpreter to assist a deaf employee
earning $10,000 per year.
Tucker, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. at 892 (cited in note 56);
One might determine whether providing a part-time assistant is an undue hardship by
examining such factors as the job duties of the assistant, the assistant's impact on the
employee's job, the cost of the assistant, and what funding might be available to help
offset the employer's cost. Presumably, if the impact of the assistance to the employee is
substantial, and the overall cost to the employer is reasonable when compared with the
position's value to the business, then such assistance would be required. Thus, an in-
terpreter for a young man who flips hamburgers at McDonald's probably would not be
reasonable, whereas a reader for a partner in a law firm probably would be.
John W. Parry, Employment Under the ADA- A National Perspective, 15 Mental & Phys. Disab.
L. Rep. 525, 530 (1991).
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principle, there must be a ceiling above which employers cannot justi-
fiably be expected to allocate resources to accommodate employees
with disabilities; however, the greater the resources of an employer,
the greater the demands which can be made upon it to reasonably
accommodate these employees. Under the equalizing principle, the
exclusive focus of the undue hardship inquiry must be on the re-
sources available to the employer, irrespective of the circumstances or
salary peculiar to the employee seeking an accommodation; all dis-
abled employees of a given company must be entitled to the same
financial level of accommodation.
Second, assuming that reasonable accommodations are truly
necessary to enable an employee to perform the essential functions of
a job or equalize his access to the workplace, a covered employer must
allocate at least some resources to accommodate that employee,
inasmuch as the undue hardship standard will always require
something more than a de minimis expenditure. 261 As a corollary to
that rule, an employer cannot claim an undue hardship due to the
cumulative effect of accommodating several employees with
disabilities; each employee is to be treated separately, and each
employee is, at a minimum, entitled to something more than a de
minimis expenditure of funds.2 62
Finally, the new model should be mathematically precise so
that every covered employer and every employee will know the extent
of their obligations and entitlements in monetary terms. If an em-
ployer cannot cover an entire requested accommodation without suf-
fering an undue hardship, then both the employer and the employee
should be able to pinpoint the exact dollar amount of the accommo-
dation for which the employee should be responsible.
With these ground rules in place, we must now determine the
data which should be used to determine an employer's "resources."
The financial statements of most business organizations are replete
with contenders, including total sales, gross income, net income
(profit), total assets, net worth, net working capital, and the size of
the employer's labor force or payroll, among others. The two criteria
best tailored to our needs are net income and net working capital.263
261. See note 170 and accompanying text.
262. See notes 170 and 175 and accompanying text.
263. Total sales and gross income are rejected because a company may have high total
sales or gross income only because of a high level of expenses; such a company may have limited
resources from which to make accommodations. Similarly, a company with a high level of total
assets may have an even higher level of liabilities, thereby limiting its ability to make accom-
modations. Although net worth is a good indicator of a company's long-term financial strength,
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Net income is an excellent barometer of the current economic success
of a given company; it will therefore be used as the figure central to
the new model.264 As we will soon see, however, there will be times
when a company's profit is not indicative of its current ability to
accommodate employees with disabilities. In those situations, a
company's net working capital, the "difference between [its] short-
term assets and [its] liabilities,"2 5 should be a fairly good indication of
the extent to which resources are available for reasonable
accommodations, inasmuch as that figure "roughly measures the
company's potential reservoir of cash."216 The proposed model
therefore employs net working capital as a secondary or fall-back
figure.
We must next decide how to measure one employee's request
for accommodation against a company's profit or net working capital.
In making this decision, we must avoid the trap into which some of
the courts addressing undue hardship under the Rehabilitation Act
fell, namely comparing a relatively small figure for a single request
for accommodation against the resources of an entire company; mak-
ing such a comparison will inevitably favor a finding of 'no undue
hardship."267
The most sensible method of "individualizing" company-wide
profit is to divide that figure by the average number of the company's
it masks assets which are insufficiently liquid to be available for accommodations on a short-
term basis. Finally, the size of an employer's labor force or payroll has little correlation with
the liquid capital available to the employer from which to accommodate disabled employees.
For instance, a labor-intensive organization may be struggling financially whereas a less labor-
intensive organization may be thriving. To require the former to set aside a greater measure of
its resources for reasonable accommodations merely because of its large labor force would
impinge upon the fairness principle.
264. Other commentators have also suggested that profit should be the bellwether of undue
hardship. See Brandfield, 59 Fordham L. Rev. at 131 (cited in note 26) (arguing that "[blecause
maximizing profitability is the purpose and prerogative of American businesses, it serves as the
proper benchmark to determine whether an accommodation imposes undue hardship"); Stine,
37 S.D. L. Rev. at 119 (cited in note 208) (stating that "[pirofitability provides a quantifiable
measure of the determinative factors in the statute); Small Business Hearing at 36 (cited in
note 170) (reporting the statement of Kenneth E. Lewis on behalf of National Federation of
Independent Business that the undue hardship standard could be made more precise if undue
hardship were equal to "a certain dollar amount of net profit...').
265. Richard A. Brealey and Stewart C. Meyers, Principles of Corporate Finance 97
(McGraw-Hill, 4th ed. 1991).
266. Id.
267. See note 200 and accompanying text. Another approach would break up each com-
pany into its divisions or operating units and establish different undue hardship figures for each
division or unit. See Holtzman, Jennings, and Schenk, 44 Baylor L. Rev. at 306 (cited in note
25) (suggesting such an approach). The equalizing principle makes this approach unacceptable
because it would result in greater accommodation expenditures for disabled employees working
in a company's most profitable units, much the same as the Olin Amendment would have
provided greater accommodation expenditures to higher-paid employees.
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full-time employees, thereby producing a quotient we shall label the
"per capita profit share" of each employee:
PER CAPITA - employer's annual net income
PROFIT SHARE average number of full-time employees
For example, a company that recorded $1 million in net profit in a
given year with an average of one hundred full-time employees would
have had a per capita profit share of $10,000 per employee. The per
capita profit share equals the amount of profit which is theoretically
available to accommodate each individual employee in the workforce
at exactly the same level. The per capita profit share satisfies the
fairness principle because the greater a company's profit, the greater
its ability to provide reasonable accommodations without undue
hardship. For instance, if our hypothetical 100-employee company
recorded an annual profit of $5 million, rather than $1 million, the
per capita profit share of each of its employees would increase to
$50,000. The per capita profit share also satisfies the equalizing
principle by establishing one figure applicable to each employee
within a given company regardless of that employee's position or
salary.268
268. Another method of complying with the equalizing principle would use the median or
average salary of all employees in the company as the basis for the undue hardship determina-
tion. Each disabled employee would be entitled to a certain percentage of the median or average
wage of the entire workforce for reasonable accommodations. This method, however, would not
be sufficiently faithful to the fairness principle because a company with a high median or
average wage but minimal resources over and above its labor costs will be obligated to pay more
in reasonable accommodation costs than a company with a lower median or average wage but
with significant resources over and above its labor costs. Although a company's median or
average wage may be a rough proxy for its ability to make reasonable accommodations, its profit
measures that ability much more directly. Thus, using the per capita profit share construct to
determine undue hardship satisfies both the fairness and equalizing principles better than
using a company's median or average wage.
Michigan's current approach to undue hardship is based on a state average wage. The
Michigan statute is similar to the proposed model in that it quantifies undue hardship to a
specific dollar figure and makes larger employers responsible for greater accommodation costs
than smaller employers; it is the only statute in the country which achieves both quantification
and flexibility. It does so according to the following sliding scale:
Number of Employees Maximum Equipment Costs Maximum Assistant Costs
< 5 x 7xyear 1; 5xthereafter
5-14 1.5x lOx year 1; 7x thereafter
> 14 2.5x 16x year 1; lOx thereafter
x = average weekly wage in the state of Michigan (which at the time the legislation was
enacted was approximately $470).
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Now that we have established the construct that will be used
to determine undue hardship, we must next determine how to com-
pare an employee's request for accommodation to that construct. To
help us along, let us revisit our example of a company whose per
capita profit share is $10,000 per employee. How much of that per
capita profit is it "fair" to ask the employer to expend on an individual
employee in the form of reasonable accommodations? In other words,
at what point does the employer's goal of profit maximization become
subordinate to the requirement that it help fulfill the societal goal
embodied in the ADA?269 By trial and error, we can derive a
percentage that seems to answer these questions. Suppose that the
employer is required to spend seventy-five percent of the per capita
profit share on reasonable accommodations. That would result in the
employer spending $7,500 of the employee's per capita profit share on
accommodations, thereby leaving the employer with $2,500 in per
capita profit. At this level of accommodation, the employer's goal of
profit maximization seems subordinate to its provision of social
benefits: $7,500 in social benefits versus $2,500 in profit. In contrast,
if the undue hardship figure is set at twenty-five percent of the per
capita profit share, the employer would spend only $2,500 on
accommodations and would retain $7,500 of the per capita profit.
Here socie ys mandate seems subordinate to the employer's goal of
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 37.1210 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994); Cynthia Lynne Pike, Note,
Assessing the Impact: The 1990 Amendments to the Michigan Handicappers' Civil Rights Act
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 37 Wayne L. Rev. 1903, 1910-11 & n.39 (1991). Only
the last gradation of the Michigan statute covers employers governed by the ADA (which applies
only to employers with 15 or more employees). Thus, under Michigan law, all ADA-covered
employers are required to expend a maximum of $1,175 on equipment costs, $7,050 on assistant
costs in the first year of employment, and $4,700 on assistant costs every year thereafter, to
reasonably accommodate each disabled employee in need of an accommodation (using 1990
data).
Unfortunately, this approach is even less sensitive to the fairness principle than one based
on a company's median or average wage because the state's average weekly wage is the same for
all employers regardless of the actual resources available to any particular employer.
Furthermore, making gradations in reasonable accommodation requirements according to the
number of employees working for a given company ignores a crucial reality: some employers
with more than 14 employees will have fewer resources to make accommodations than employ-
ers with less than four employees. Consequently, rather than using a statewide or national
figure as the basis for making these gradations, the proposed methodology uses figures tied
directly to the resources of each individual company: net income and net working capital.
The clarity of Michigan's reasonable accommodation requirement established yet another
reason why the current vague standard should be rejected: In states like Michigan, Delaware,
Louisiana, North Carolina, and Virginia, where employers and employees are supplied with
quantitative statutory guidance, see note 16, they are likely to look to that guidance rather than
attempting to comply with the vague federal requirement. In those states, federal law will
actually be supplanted by state law, which is hardly what the ADA's drafters intended.
269. See text accompanying note 239.
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profit maximization: $7,500 in profit versus $2,500 in social benefits.
The percentage that strikes the most equitable balance between the
employer's profit-maximizing goal and society's mandate to equalize
access to the workforce is fifty percent. At that level of accommodati-
on, our hypothetical employer would spend $5,000 of per capita profit
on reasonable accommodations, but would also be entitled to retain
$5,000 in profit. Once the employer is asked to spend more than fifty
percent of the per capita profit share on accommodations, however, its
profit-maximizing goal becomes subordinate to society's goal and,
consequently, the fairness principle is compromised. Therefore, the
proposed model sets the undue hardship figure at fifty percent of an
employer's per capita profit share. 70
What effect will a fifty percent per capita profit share undue
hardship standard have on the average employer? A relatively mini-
mal one. We start with the statistic that 13.4 percent of the current
workforce is comprised of employees with disabilities. 271 Of that 13.4
percent, past studies have indicated that only about 35 percent
require any accommodations.272 Even assuming that the broadening
effect of the ADA273 will increase those percentages to 15 percent and
50 percent respectively, only 7.5 percent of the average company's
employees will require accommodations. And even if each of these
employees is entitled to the maximum expenditure required by the
undue hardship standard proposed,2 74 an employer would be required
270. Why 50% and not 40% or 30%? Ultimately, the answer to this question lies in the
political process, for as sure as the sun will rise tomorrow, business groups will argue that they
should be entitled to a standard that allows them to retain significantly more profit than what is
proposed here. However, inasmuch as the overriding goal of Title I is to place 8.2 million people
with disabilities into the labor market for the first time, the undue hardship standard needs to
be set as high as can be tolerated by businesses. The Author strongly believes that businesses
can tolerate an undue hardship standard of 50% of the per capita profit share, which in the
worst case scenario will require employers to expend only 3.75% of their annual net profit
accommodating disabled employees. See notes 271-75 and accompanying text. Recalling that
the business lobby pushed for an amendment limiting cumulative accommodations to 5% of an
employer's annual net profit, see note 175 and accompanying text, it is reasonable to ask
businesses to accept a methodology which will result in a smaller burden even in the worst case
scenario.
271. See note 185.
272. See text accompanying note 179.
273. See notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
274. This scenario is rather extreme considering that even the most recent data compiled
by the JAN reveal that only 9% of accommodations currently being made cost between $1,001
and $2,000, only another 8% cost between $2,001 and $5,000, and only 4% cost more than
$5,000. See note 11. Nevertheless, because it is difficult to anticipate how much more these
numbers will grow while the ADA broadens the frequency and scope of accommodations, see
notes 186-89 and accompanying text, we will assume, for the sake of argument, that each
employee requiring accommodations will require employer expenditures up to the point of
undue hardship.
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to spend only 3.75 percent of its annual net income on reasonable
accommodations. 215
In summary, we have thus far defined undue hardship by the
following equation:
employer's annual net income
UNDUE HARDSHIP= 50% x
average number of full-time employees
Our work is not over, however. Businesses sometimes operate at a
loss. If the above equation were applied to such a business, any
expenditure would be considered an undue hardship. This result
would run afoul of our second ground rule-that each employee re-
quiring accommodation is entitled to more than a de minimis expendi-
ture.276 We therefore must build into the new model a further mathe-
matical construct which would ensure that companies make greater
than de minimis expenditures during unprofitable periods.
Furthermore, we must account for "bonanza" years in which a com-
pany's profit is so excessively aberrant that the basic undue hardship
equation would result in asking the company to do more than would
be acceptable under the fairness principle; after all, businesses need
to be left with sufficient resources to survive through bad years. To
account for these extremes, we must set a floor and a ceiling, below
275. The calculation used to derive this percentage is as follows:
50% x net incom - 7.5% x #employees# employees
The number of employees cancels out, thereby leaving 3.75% of net income as the maximum
aggregate level of accommodation. The Author acknowledges that this figure assumes that each
company's workforce will comply with the national average in terms of the percentage of
disabled employees and the percentage of disabled employees requiring accommodations. For
the smallest employers, these averages may be far from reality because averages tend to have
less relevance when numbers are very small-such as for employers with less than 50 employ-
ees. For instance, if a 50-employee company hires only eight employees with disabilities, it will
exceed the national average of 13.4%. If it instead hires only five such employees, it would fall
well below the national average at 10%. Therefore, the maximum aggregate level of
accommodation for some companies could fall well above or well below this 3.75% figure,
depending upon how much their disabled employee population strays from these averages.
Nevertheless, in view of these averages, it is unlikely that even a small employer will be
required to spend as much as 10% of its annual net income on reasonable accommodations.
Moreover, the sliding scale established in Table 1 protects against such an anomaly by setting
comparatively low maximum levels of accommodation for employers with the smallest levels of
net working capital (which are also likely to have the smallest number of employees).
276. See text accompanying note 261.
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and above which the per capita profit share construct would no longer
control the undue hardship analysis.277
The floor and ceiling must be flexible: a de minimis expendi-
ture for a Fortune 500 company is surely larger than a de minimis
expenditure for a small, family-owned operation. Likewise, in its
bonanza years, a Fortune 500 company should be required to spend
significantly more on reasonable accommodations than a small opera-
tion in its bonanza years. Just like the sliding damages scale
Congress established for businesses of varying sizes under the Civil
Rights Act of 1991,278 a similar scale should be developed to determine
the minimum and maximum obligations of employers of all sizes to
reasonably accommodate employees with disabilities. Those pa-
rameters should be based on a measure of total resources more stable
than profit, so that a given company's undue hardship floor and ceil-
ing will be relatively constant from year to year. This is where net
working capital comes into play. Table 1 below creates a sliding scale
of minimum and maximum reasonable accommodation obligations
based on a given company's net working capital.
277. One of the proposals which has been advanced to clarify undue hardship suggests that
a regulation be promulgated that:
[aln employer will sustain undue hardship if as a result of providing a reasonable ac-
commodation the employer suffers:
(a) an X percentage decrease in its net margin. To determine the percentage
change in net margin, cost of accommodation should be added to the previous fiscal
year's total cost of sales (expenses) and then divided by the previous fiscal year's
revenues. If this figure is X percentage greater than the previous fiscal year's true
expense/revenues margin, the accommodation has caused an undue hardship....
Brandfield, 59 Fordham L. Rev. at 131 (cited in note 26). Aside from not specifying what X
should be, this proposal fails to ensure that employers make accommodations that exceed de
minimis costs at one extreme, and are protected against runaway costs at the other. It fails to
take into account the rampant fluctuations that are standard in American industry. The stan-
dard proposed in this Article anticipates those fluctuations, as is demonstrated through Table 1.
278. See note 229.
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Table 1
Company Net Working Min. Accommodation (floor) Max. Accommodation (ceiling)
Capital ("NWC") per year/per disabled employee per year/per disabled employee
Expenditure % of!NWC Expenditure % of NWC
Less than $20 thousand $100 N/A $1,000 5.0
$20-100 thousand $200 1.0 $2,000 2.0
$100-500 thousand $400 0.4 $4,000 0.8
$500 thousand-$2.5 million $800 0.16 $8,000 0.32
$2.5-12.5 million $1,600 0.064 $16,000 0.128
$12.5-62.5 million $2,400 0.0192 $24,000 0.0384
$62.5-312.5 million $3,600 0.00576 $36,000 0.01152
$312.5 million-1.56 billion $5,400 0.001728 $54,000 0.003456
More than $1.56 billion $8,100 0.0005192 $81,000 N/A
How were these figures derived? Arbitrarily.279  Table 1 is simply
intended to serve as an example of how undue hardship floors and
ceilings could be established for the entire range of employers. Surely
the political process will produce different figures, possibly even
derived using a different methodology. So be it. What is important is
that employers and employees know the applicable figures in ad-
vance, and that the figures are set with respect for both the fairness
principle and the goal of fully employing qualified individuals with
disabilities.280 Part VI.B will demonstrate how Table 1, in conjunction
with the per capita profit share equation, achieves these goals.
279. Actually, there is some method to the Author's madness. The table above is loosely
based on the sliding damages scale of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See note 229. Like the first
three gradations of that scale, under Table 1, the minimum and maximum potential exposure of
a given company for a single accommodation request doubles from gradation to gradation for the
first five gradations. At that point, like the final gradation of the Civil Rights Act of 1991's
scale, each increase in from gradation to gradation in Table 1 is 50% of the previous gradation.
The maximum at each level is set at ten times the minimum. The net working capital figures
upon which the minimums and maximums are established increase from gradation to gradation
by a factor of five.
The minimum and maximum percentages of net working capital a company must expend on
individual accommodations regress by a factor of 0.4 through the first five gradations and by a
factor of 0.3 for the final five gradations. As will be demonstrated subsequently in Table 2, this
significant regression is necessary to ensure that larger employers (who will likely have large
workforces) will have sufficient resources to accommodate all of their disabled employees
needing accommodations. Thus, whereas a company with a net working capital of $1.56 billion
may have to expend only 0.0005192% of its net working capital on an individual accommodation
(if 50% of its per capita profit share fell below $8,100), it may have to make that level of
accommodation to thousands of employees. In the aggregate, the overall percentage of its net
working capital which may be devoted to reasonable accommodations could actually exceed 20%.
See Table 2.
280. To those who would argue that the proposed model tips the balance too heavily in
favor of employees with disabilities, the following responses come to mind. First, it was the
business community that was most eager to codify a quantitative standard from which
1995] UNDUE HARDSHIPS 461
A few clean-up issues must be addressed. First, what data
should be used to establish an employer's annual profit, number of
employees, and net working capital? The only answer that can be
given at this point is "data that is reliable and accurate." That might
mean tax returns, it might mean annual reports to shareholders, and
it might mean something completely different.281 Such minutiae is
best left to economists, accountants, committee staffers, and
bureaucrats s2
Second, what if a disabled employee's need for accommodations
will exist beyond the first year of employment, as will be the case with
blind employees needing readers and deaf employees needing inter-
preters? For employees who fall into this category, it is most
appropriate to calculate the point of undue hardship annually, with
obligations to employees could be measured and predicted. The proposed model gives the
business community what it wanted in that regard. Second, the ADA exempts from coverage
entirely those businesses that would be most threatened by the reasonable accommodation
requirement, companies with less than 15 employees. Third, simply because a prospective
employee claims to be disabled and greets his employer with a set of accommodation demands
does not mean that the employer must immediately resort to the undue hardship calculation
and cut a check for the specified amount. The prospective employee must still satisfy the
definitions of "disabled" and "otherwise qualified"; reasonable accommodation is required only if
necessary to enable the employee to perform the essential functions of the job or to equalize the
employee's access to the workplace; and the employer is entitled to select the least expensive
means of achieving these objectives. Only at that point does the employer need to resort to the
undue hardship model proposed above. See notes 28-30 and 33 and accompanying text.
281. To those who might suggest that the proposed methodology would necessarily require
private companies to open their books to the public, the Author disagrees. First, under the
proposed model, an undue hardship calculation is required only upon a request for
accommodation by a qualified applicant or employee. At that point, the only disclosure which
need be made is the employer's financial obligation regarding accommodating that particular
employee. That level of disclosure is a far cry from public disclosure of company books. Second,
the current undue hardship standard implicitly requires the employer to open its books even
wider if an employee challenges its refusal to accommodate. Because the statute and
regulations place emphasis on the employer's resources, the EEOC and courts will likely require
the employer to open its books to establish that a proposed accommodation would cause undue
hardship. To the extent that the standard proposed would reduce litigation, it would also
reduce the frequency of such disclosures.
282. The Author acknowledges that accounting conventions can vary widely among indus-
tries and that smaller, closely held companies' books are sometimes unreliable and/or inaccu-
rate. To the extent deriving acceptable data is complicated, the goal of establishing a quantifi-
able point of undue hardship is frustrated. In view of this potential problem in the proposed
model, some tradeoffs between complete fidelity to the fairness principle and securing data
reliable enough to drive the undue hardship engine may be necessary. For instance, although
using net working capital to derive Table 1 is most faithful to the fairness principle, using that
criterion may prove too complicated because of variations in accounting methods between
companies, particularly smaller companies. It may be that a criterion less faithful to the fair-
ness principle-such as a company's operating budget, labor budget, total sales, etc.-will in
actuality permit a more reliable undue hardship determination. Inasmuch as the goal of this
Article is not to rigidly suggest that the proposed model is the perfect be-all and end-all, the
Author leaves this analysis for others more qualified to make it.
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new financial data changing the employee's entitlement to employer
expenditures each year. In one year, a blind employee may be
entitled to a $5,000 contribution toward a reader, but in the next
perhaps only $2,000. If it were otherwise, and the initial point of
undue hardship were "locked in!' over the duration of the individual's
employment, both the fairness principle and the equalizing principle
would be compromised. The fairness principle would be compromised
because employers who began accommodating employees with
disabilities during successful times would be required to expend too
much during lean times; conversely, an employee who was hired
during lean times would never receive the full benefit of an employer's
ability to accommodate during successful times. The equalizing
principle would be compromised because different employees within
the same company would be entitled to different levels of
accommodation, depending solely on the fortuity of when they were
hired. It is true that this annual recalculation will result in some
employees with disabilities losing their jobs in lean years. However
unfortunate this result, job losses during lean times is not a
phenomenon unique to workers with disabilities-all employees face
this possibility at one time or another.283
Third, should accommodations which will benefit an employee
for more than one year-such as equipment or assistive devices-be
treated differently than those which will not? In other words, should
the cost of such accommodations be spread or amoritzed over multiple
years in analyzing undue hardship? The answer here must be "no." If
the employee were to derive a benefit from an accommodation's
extended usefulness in enabling her to perform her job, it would have
to be assumed that the employee would continue working for the
employer for longer than the initial year in question. That
assumption would often be invalid, and in such instances, would be
detrimental to the employer.284 Consequently, in keeping with the
283. The current undue hardship regulations strongly imply that employers will be permit-
ted to readjust reasonable accommodation expenditures as their fortunes ebb and tide: "an
accommodation that poses an undue hardship... at a particular time may not pose an undue
hardship ... at another time." 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.15(d). Thus, this aspect of the proposed
model is no different than the current standard.
284. Recent data compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics reveal that the median em-
ployee tenure with the same employer is 4.5 years. Steven R. Maguire, Employer and
Occupational Tenure: 1991 Update, 116 Monthly Lab. Rev. 45, 45 (1993). Among the hundreds
of occupations surveyed, median tenure ranges from 0.8 years among kitchen food preparers, of
which there are some 128,000 nationwide, id. at 50, to 20.3 years among fire prevention
supervisors, of which there are 65,000 nationwide, id. at 49.
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spirit of the fairness principle, long-lasting accommodations should be
analyzed as a one-time cost to the employer.285
Fourth, what about accommodations that will benefit more
than one disabled employee? The answer here is a bit more complex.
If the accommodation at issue benefits a second disabled employee in
only an incidental manner, but is not one to which the second em-
ployee would have been entitled to enable her to perform the essential
functions of her job, or equalize her access to the workplace, the first
employee should be "charged" with the entire accommodation and the
second employee should not be "charged" at all. On the other hand, if
two employees are entitled to the same accommodation, and one
accommodation can be acquired which will enable both to perform
their jobs, or equalize access to the workplace for both, each should be
charged with only half (or, if more employees share the
accommodation, one-third, one-fourth, etc.) of the total cost.286 For
example, if the purchase of a $12,000 computer system is a reasonable
accommodation of the disabilities of Employees A, B, and C, then each
employee would be seeking a $4,000 accommodation for purposes of
the undue hardship analysis.
Fifth, if an employee is hired in October, should her entitle-
ment to accommodation expenditures be prorated for that year? The
answer must be "no." The employee should be entitled to a set level of
accommodation for each year of employment, irrespective of whether
that year coincides with the calendar year. If the answer to this ques-
tion were "yes," then employees who need 'up-front" accommodations
285. Another answer to this question lies in the rental market. As more and more disabled
employees in need of assistive equipment enter the workforce, more and more such equipment
will become available for rent. Because the annual rental price of an assistive device will
usually be less expensive than its total purchase price, employers who rent such devices will be
less likely to confront the point of undue hardship. For rented equipment, the issue of the
longevity disappears. As long as the employee remains with the company, the employer can
continue renting the equipment. When the employee departs the company, whether it be one or
ten years following initial employment, the rental device can be returned without the employer
suffering a loss. Obviously the rental market will not always solve this problem; some disabili-
ties are so unique that the market will never supply anything but custom-made equipment to
accommodate them. In those instances, as is discussed above, the employer should be entitled
to count the entire cost of the equipment against the employee's entitlement to accommodations
in the year the equipment is provided.
286. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2 at 69 (cited in note 7) (stating that "[alssistive devices
for hearing and visually-impaired persons may be shared by more than one employee so long as
each employee is not denied a meaningful equal employment opportunity caused by limited
access to the needed accommodation").
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like computers or other assistive equipment would be short-changed
by the mere happenstance of being hired late in the calendar year.287
Finally, other subsidiary issues are likely to arise that have
not been addressed here. The goal of this Article is to lay out a basic
model, recognizing that it will have to be sifted through the political
process, and that other concerns will exist that have not been consid-
ered. To the extent that such issues arise, fidelity to the fairness
principle, equalizing principle, and to the overriding goal of putting
people with disabilities to work should direct decisionmakers to the
appropriate answers.
Having fully fleshed out a quantitative methodology for assess-
ing undue hardship under Title I, it is time to analyze whether the
methodology achieves the objectives of optimal precision and func-
tionality.
VI. TESTING THE MODEL FOR PRECISION AND FUNCTIONALITY
A. The "Precision Calculus"
Professor Colon Diver's landmark article, The Optimal
Precision of Administrative Rules,288 provides a useful analytical
framework for determining whether the model of undue hardship
proposed above attains the level of precision necessary to achieve
Title I's objectives. Diver measures precision with three variables:
transparency, accessibility, and congruency. Transparency measures
whether the words employed in the rule at issue have universally
accepted meanings within the regulated community. The more ac-
287. Another consideration which should be addressed is part-time employees. To what
extent should employers be able to claim undue hardship in accommodating employees who
work less than full time? Recall that the per capita profit share denominator is comprised of the
average number of full-time employees. Part-time employees should be included in that figure
in proportion to the percentage of a 40-hour week they work. For instance, two part-time
employees who each work an average of 20 hours per week would account for one full-time
employee in the denominator of the per capita profit share. In view of how part-time employees
affect the per capita profit share, it seems most logical to answer the question posed above as
follows: for part-time employees, both the per capita profit share and applicable floor and
ceiling from Table 1 should be multiplied by the percentage of a full work week the employee
will work on average. A 10-hour/week employee should be entitled to 25% of these figures, and
a 20-hour/week employee should be entitled to 50%. Although at first blush this seems
antithetical to the equalizing principle, that principle focuses solely on full-time employees. See
note 246.
288. Diver, 93 Yale L. J. 65 (cited in note 27). Although the article addresses admin-
istrative rules, it is equally useful in analyzing statutes, particularly statutes which, like the
ADA, spawn extensive regulatory schemes.
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cepted the meaning of the words chosen, the more transparent the
rule; the more ambiguous the meaning of the words chosen, the more
opaque the rule. Accessibility measures the ease with which the rule
can be applied to different circumstances. Accessible rules are easily
applied, whereas inaccessible rules are not. 89 Congruency measures
289. Inaccessibility is the chief problem with two other proposals to increase the precision
of the undue hardship standard. Under the first, undue hardship would be defined as "a sum
total of 'extraordinary expenditures' for a given 'qualified individual requiring accommodation'
exceeding X times customary expenditures for 'like employees,' where X, designated the
'hardship multiple,' is determined by the overall operating costs of the employer, according to
Schedule A." Dolatly, 26 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. at 548 (cited in note 25). The inaccessibility
of this model is illustrated in the example the author provides to demonstrate its operation:
Employee A requires an accommodation .... In determining whether she is
required to grant this accommodation, the employer must calculate the overall operating
costs of the company. She then turns to Schedule A, which indicates a hardship
multiple ("X?) that corresponds to the operating costs, with higher operating costs
resulting in a higher hardship multiple.
Having found X from the table, the employer calculates customary expenditures
for like employees; that is, she determines what she must spend per employee to main-
tain her current staff of employees engaged in the same or similar jobs. The customary
expenditure figure is multiplied by hardship multiple X. The product represents the
maximum financial hardship that the employer must undergo before the accommodation
in question is considered "undue".
Id. at 549 n.152. The second proposal is equally inaccessible:
Step 1: Add the cost of a requested accommodation, A, to the costs of all previous
accommodations made within the year in response to specific accommodation requests
by disabled employees. Is this sum greater than 10% of the employer's net worth? If so,
then A would be an undue hardship per se. If not, then proceed to step 2.
Step 2: Make a chart on which the x axis is the range of salaries from highest to
lowest paid, and on which the y axis ranges from .10 for the highest salary and .50 for
the lowest. For each disabled employee who requires accommodation, determine where
on the y axis the employee's salary falls. Multiply this result by the employee's annual
salary. Call this product, the employee's "cap."
Step 3: Calculate any savings or earnings which one reasonably expects that A
would generate, not counting benefits pertaining directly to disabled employees.
Subtract this amount from A to obtain A1.
Step 4: Calculate the annualized depreciated value of A1, based upon the number
of years during which the requested accommodation would reasonably be expected to
continue benefiting disabled employees. Call this annualized depreciated value A2 .
Step 5: Add together the caps of 'each disabled employee which one reasonably
anticipates would benefit from the requested accommodation within the year. Call this
figure C. Also add to A2 the costs of other accommodations to these employees which
have been implemented within the year. Call this result, A3 .
Step 6: Compare C with A3 . If A3 is larger, than it would be an undue hardship
per se. Otherwise, A3 is not an undue hardship per se, in which case, proceed to step 7.
Step 7: To determine whether A3 is a reasonable accommodation or an undue
hardship, balance the four factors listed in the ADA, section 101(10)(B). The closer the
value of A3 to C, the more the weights assigned to the factors should favor finding A3 to
be an undue hardship. The closer the value of A3 to zero, the more the weights assigned
to the factors should favor finding A3 unreasonable.
Stuhlbarg, 59 U. Cin. L. Rev. at 1346 (cited in note 26). This proposal also tramples on the
equalizing principle, by making the employee's salary the central criterion upon which undue
hardship determinations are made, and accepts the notion of cumulative undue hardship,
despite the countervailing legislative history.
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whether the rule as written will produce the desired effect.
Congruent rules will; incongruent rules will not.290
Diver measures the costs and benefits of increased rule preci-
sion along four axes: (1) rate of compliance; (2) over- and under-inclu-
siveness; (3) costs of rulemaking; and (4) costs of rule application.291
Regarding the rate of compliance, increased transparency will likely
increase compliance and decrease evasion by: (1) reducing the costs to
the regulated community of determining how the rule will apply to
intended conduct; and (2) facilitating regulatory enforcement in polic-
ing prospective violators.292 Unfortunately, increasing transparency
may result in casting the regulatory net too wide or not wide
enough-the problem of over- and under-inclusiveness. 'The rule-
maker may be unable to predict every consequence of applying the
rule or to foresee all of the circumstances to which it may apply."2 93
Nonetheless, a more opaque rule can be equally incongruent
"because its vagueness invites misinterpretation."294 Greater initial
precision can reduce future rulemaking costs by leaving fewer policy
questions open for case-by-case determinations. However, greater
transparency also can increase rulemaking costs "since objective regu-
latory line-drawing increases the risk of misspecification and sharp-
ens the focus of value conflicts."295 A rule that is over- or under-
inclusive will likely require revision resulting in increased regulatory
costs. Finally, the costs of rule application to both the regulators and
the regulated community increases as the rule's opacity or inaccessi-
bility increases. 'Transparent and accessible rules can reduce the
number of disputes that arise and simplify their resolution by causing
the parties' predictions of the outcome to converge."29 6
Diver recognized that "[t]hese principles frequently work at
cross-purposes,"2 7 and therefore suggested that the importance of
each will vary depending on the type of rule to be formulated. Certain
types of rules should be highly transparent and highly accessible.
These include: (1) rules regulating socially harmful conduct, because
the rate of compliance with such rules is critically important;2 8 (2)
rules designed to govern a large volume of disputes, particularly if the
290. Diver, 93 Yale L. J. at 67-70 (cited in note 27).
291. Id. at 73-74.




296. Id. at 74.
297. Id. at 71.
298. Id. at 74.
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agency at issue has a crowded enforcement docket, where "bright-
lines" can minimize rule application costs;299 and (3) rules establishing
liability, which require interpretation by both the regulated com-
munity and the rule's enforcers.300 Concerns over the breadth of the
regulatory net, on the other hand, are most salient "when errors of
misclassification are particularly costly," such as regulation on
speech, death penalty statutes, and pollution standards.301
With Diver's "precision calculus"302 in hand, we now possess
the analytical tools to compare the precision of the current undue
hardship standard with the model proposed in Part IV.C. To facili-
tate the comparison, both standards are summarized below:
Current: Financial undue hardship exists when an
accommodation is significantly expensive in light of its nature
and cost, financial resources of the employer, and the effect of
the accommodation on such resources, and the number of people
employed by the business. 30 3
Proposed: Financial undue hardship exists when the
accommodation's net cost to the employer exceeds:
employer's annual net income
50% X
average number of full-time employees
However, if the figure derived falls below the applicable
minimum from Table 1, undue hardship exists if the minimum
is exceeded; if the figure derived falls above the applicable
maximum from Table 1, undue hardship exists if the maximum
is exceeded.
There can be little disagreement that the proposed rule is more
transparent than the current rule. Indeed, the proposed rule is
analogous to Diver's prototypical transparent rule: 'No person may
299. Id. at 75.
300. Id. at 78.
301. Id. at 74-75.
302. Id. at 80.
303. This paraphrase of 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) and 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p)(2) omits reference
to factors related solely to administrative undue hardship, which is beyond the scope of this
Article, and factors related to the nexus between the "covered entity" and the "facility" in




pilot a commercial airplane after his sixtieth birthday.' '304 Both the
commercial pilot rule and the proposed undue hardship standard
draw critical distinctions based on mathematical figures; there can be
no disagreement as to the meaning and significance of numbers. In
contrast, the current undue hardship standard mirrors Diver's model
of opacity: "No person may pilot a commercial airplane if he poses an
unreasonable risk of an accident."35  Both "unreasonable" and
"significant" are "susceptible to widely varying interpretations."306
Although the question is somewhat closer, the proposed rule is
also more accessible. The current rule may be "shorter and more
memorable,"'3 7 but it relies on a set of ill-defined factors which in the
end are much more difficult for the regulated community to apply
than the explicit mathematical equation and table which embody the
proposed standard. To apply the proposed rule, all the employer must
do is plug its net income, number of employees, and net working capi-
tal into the equation and Table 1. That task will be decidedly simpler
than attempting to squeeze tangible meaning from the word
"significant."
A comparison of the actual congruence of the two standards is
not possible due to the lack of data with which to analyze either. The
current standard has been in effect only a short time; the proposed
standard never has. Nevertheless, we can hypothesize about the way
each standard will play out. To do so, we must first determine the
objective that the undue hardship standard attempts to achieve.
Fortunately, we have already done that in Part V.A. The central goal
304. Diver, 93 Yale L. J. at 69 (cited in note 27).
305. Id. The current standard is also similar to the bank chartering rule Diver used to
illustrate opacity. That rule:
enumerate[s] four "banking factors" ("income and expenses," '"management," "stock dis-
tribution," and "capital'), five "market factors" ("economic condition and growth poten-
tial," "primary service area," "location," "population," and "financial institutions), and
several "other factors" to be considered in evaluating an application. Although the
guidelines included a few objective tests for stock distribution and adequacy of capital,
most of the relevant factors were expressed in highly conclusory terms with no indica-
tion of their relative weights.
Id. at 85. The same statement can be made regarding the five ADA undue hardship factors.
306. Id. at 69. One commentator has proposed an undue hardship standard which would
provide that "an accommodation imposes an undue hardship if its cost would either (a) substan-
tially impair the ability of the employer to produce goods or provide services, or (b) impose such
a high cost that the employer would be forced to compensate by reducing the overall workforce."
Cooper, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1454-55 (cited in note 26) (emphasis added). This proposal suffers
from the same opacity problem as the current standard in that the word "substantial" is the
twin sibling of the word "significant." Moreover, it will take quite a hefty accommodation
expense to result in an employer being forced to reduce its workforce. Setting the undue
hardship standard so high would trample on the fairness principle.
307. Diver, 93 Yale L. J. at 69 (cited in note 27).
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of the undue hardship standard is to ensure that employers, while
asked to do their fair share to accommodate employees with
disabilities, are not asked to do too much. Under the current
standard, however, the only guidance supplied to the decisionmaker
in determining "how much is too much" is the word "significant." It is
implausible that this vague guidance will enable decisionmakers to
achieve results which are congruent with Congress' purpose in
creating the undue hardship standard. In contrast, the express
purpose of the proposed rule's reliance on the per capita profit share
and Table 1 is to ensure that employers are not asked to do too
much.308 Hence, it is plausible to suggest that the proposed undue
hardship standard would be more congruent than the current
standard.
In summary, we have concluded that the quantitative model of
undue hardship proposed in this Article is significantly more trans-
parent than the current standard, at least somewhat more accessible,
and is likely to be more congruent. We must next weigh the costs and
benefits of this increased transparency, accessibility, and congruency.
The first axis of analysis is the rate of compliance. Will the overall
rate of compliance with Title I's reasonable accommodation mandate
depend on how the undue hardship standard is interpreted? Most
definitely. If employers believe they can label trivial expenses as
undue hardships, then they will do so, and compliance with the rea-
sonable accommodation mandate will be minimal. Conversely, if
employers know that a certain level of accommodation will be re-
quired and enforced, compliance will be greatly increased. The impor-
tance of compliance with Title I, therefore, weighs heavily in favor of
the highly transparent proposed standard.309
The next axis of costs and benefits is whether the greater
transparency of the proposed rule increases "the variance between
intended and actual outcomes.310 We have already concluded, how-
ever tentatively, that the variance between intended and actual out-
308. Moreover, the undue hardship determinations compiled in Table 2 demonstrate con-
gruency between Congress' goal and the results achieved.
309. In contrast, an opaque standard is most useful in a regulatory scheme where compli-
ance is "largely irrelevant." Diver, 93 Yale L. J. at 86 (cited in note 27). Recall that Diver
illustrated an opaque standard with the bank chartering rule. Despite the bank chartering
standard's opacity, Diver concluded that "a substantial increase in charter rule precision would
probably not produce benefits justifying its cost." Id. at 88. He reached this conclusion in large
part because "[eIncouraging compliance . . . seems largely irrelevant here. Chartering
standards are not aimed at modifying behavior. Their sole function is to guide the selection of
applicants who are qualified to be admitted to the banking industry." Id. at 86.
310. Id. at 73.
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comes is likely to be greater under the current standard than under
the one proposed. This is principally because the vagueness of the
current standard "invites misinterpretation." 1"
Comparing the costs of rulemaking of the current and proposed
standards, we are left with something resembling a draw. On the one
hand, the increased transparency of the proposed standard would
reduce the costs associated with the current standard in future rule-
making necessitated by case-specific determinations. On the other
hand, the objective line-drawing utilized by the proposed standard
"increases the risk of misspecification and sharpens the focus of value
conflicts.312
The rule application costs at stake, however, weigh heavily in
favor of the proposed standard because its superior transparency and
accessibility: (1) permit less costly application and enforcement; and
(2) will reduce the number of disputes which will require regulatory
or judicial resolution.313
Finally, the undue hardship standard is of the type which
Diver suggested requires a highly transparent and highly accessible
formulation: (1) It ultimately regulates socially harmful conduct,
311. Id. Even if the proposed standard were inferior to the current standard in this regard,
it would not justify abandoning the more transparent model because over- and under-inclusive-
ness is not a major concern in determining undue hardship. The issue of undue hardship is
quite dissimilar in this respect to the issue of bank chartering. As Diver noted in justifying the
opacity of the bank chartering rule, the costs of an incongruent rule would be very high, threat-
ening public confidence in the banking system by increasing the risk of failures. Id. at 86. The
same cannot be said of a rule created to determine undue hardship, which, at worst, would
require employers to spend too little or too much on reasonable accommodation measures.
Consequently, to the extent over- or under-inclusiveness is a problem with the proposed model,
it is not a problem significant enough to outweigh the benefits of its transparency, which
ensures compliance and minimal application costs.
312. Id. at 73. One such value conflict is between employing the greatest number of
employees with disabilities and employing the most severely disabled citizens who need the
most expensive accommodations. The bright line of the proposed model values the former goal
at the expense of the latter, in large part because Congress's central goal in Title I seemed to be
to pull the greatest number of disabled citizens possible into the labor force. The current
standard of undue hardship would leave decisionmakers with more give and take in employing
individuals needing the most expensive accommodations.
313. The currently opaque undue hardship standard would be a more sensible approach
only if the costs of rule application were expected to be minimal. In fact, Diver justified the
opacity of the bank chartering standard on this ground noting that there are minimal costs in
applying that rule because the Comptroller of Currency handles only about 120 applications per
year. Id. at 87. On the other hand, Diver embraced the mechanical rules utilized by the Social
Security Disability Insurance Program to determine disability benefits because of the tremen-
dous transaction costs associated with such determinations. Id. at 89-90. The undue hardship
determination, in this regard, is more analogous to the disability determinations made by the
SSA than the chartering determinations made by the Comptroller: many thousands of such
determinations will be made by employers, administrators, and judges every year. To limit
these transaction costs as much as possible, a transparent rule like the social security disability
grid is optimal. See id.
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namely, discrimination against people with disabilities; 14 (2) it will be
applied to a large volume of disputes by an agency with an overloaded
enforcement docket, namely the EEOC;' 15 and (3) it will be utilized to
establish the liability of employers who illegitimately claim an undue
hardship.3 16 "[E]rrors of misclassification!' regarding undue hardship
determinations are not particularly costly, as they are with
regulations on speech, death penalty statutes, and pollution
standards.31 7 At worst such errors would require employers to expend
too little or too much on reasonable accommodations, a result that
could be corrected without the significant harm associated with poorly
drafted speech, death penalty, or pollution standards.
In conclusion, a rule which will be employed by hundreds of
thousands of employers, millions of employees, the EEOC, and the
courts to distinguish between legally mandated reasonable accommo-
dations and accommodations which need not be made due to excessive
cost, should be highly transparent and highly accessible, like the
proposed standard of undue hardship. An opaque and inaccessible
standard like "significant difficulty or expense" will ultimately
frustrate the goal of putting millions of unemployed people with
disabilities to work.
We now have established that the standard constructed in Part
V.C is transparent and accessible, and therefore superior in those
314. Id. at 74.
315. Id. at 75. As of September 1994, the EEOC had a backlog of 92,396 charges of dis-
crimination awaiting investigation. Even if the EEOC ceased accepting new charges, it would
take 17.9 months to eliminate this backlog. EEOC News Release, EEOC's Pending Inventory
Grows to Over 92,000 Charges, 1994 WL 485550 (located in E.E.O.C. database), *1 (Sept. 9,
1994).
316. Diver, 93 Yale L. J. at 78. As we have already discussed, Diver suggests that liability
rules should be highly transparent. However, "drafters of sanctioning rules will be less willing
to compromise congruence to attain transparency and accessibility." Id. at 78. This is because
"[t]he same act, committed by different actors under different circumstances, may warrant
widely divergent sanctions. Any transparent rule, therefore, is likely to produce both
underdeterrence (by generating too low a penalty in many cases) and overdeterrence (by
generating too high a penalty in others)." Id. Title I of the ADA turns Diver's analysis on its
head. For as we discussed in note 229 and accompanying text, the penalty for violating Title I
in terms of both compensatory and punitive damages is spelled out very transparently in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. Employers know their maximum exposure to such sanctions to the
dollar, regardless of the circumstances which give rise to them. In contrast, the key provision of
the ADA which will be used to determine liability for a failure to reasonably
accommodate-undue hardship-is a model of opacity. The proposed standard would convert
the liability rule from opaque to transparent, and the Equal Remedies Act, see note 237, would
convert the sanctioning rule from transparent to opaque; the result would be a
liability/sanctioning model consistent with Diver's precision analysis.
317. Id. at 74-75.
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respects to the current standard. Before we conclude, however, we
must ask a very important question: will it work?
B. The Real World
To ensure that the methodology proposed will work in the real
world, let us examine some readily available corporate data from ten
randomly selected American corporations to analyze: (1) how difficult
the proposed standard is to apply; and (2) whether the burden the
proposed standard would place on these employers is fair and just.
Because the only data readily available to the public involves corpora-
tions whose stock is traded on a public exchange, we are not able to
study these questions regarding private businesses. Nonetheless, if
we leave this section convinced that the proposed methodology will be
adequate for public corporations, it is plausible that this type of
methodology will be useful for determining undue hardship for pri-
vate business entities as well.318
We will start small and work our way up. The first corpora-
tion we will examine is Cellular Products, Inc., which manufactures
blood products. Its most recent financial report indicated a net loss of
$1,395,629 with 28 employees.319 The same report showed net work-
ing capital of $236,704,320 thereby establishing reasonable accommo-
dation range (RAR") of $400 to $4,000, according to Table 1. Because
Cellular Products has a negative net income, its point of undue hard-
ship ("PUHf") for any accommodation proposed in the current year
equals the minimum level of accommodation in the applicable RAR,
$400. An enterprise of slightly larger size is Carbon Fiber Products,
Inc., a company that manufactures carbon fiber golf club shafts. The
company's net working capital, according to its most recent annual
report, was $971,900,321 thereby establishing a RAR of $800 to $8,000
for the current year. Carbon Fiber's annual report also revealed a net
income of $77,126, which it earned with 38 employees.3 22 These
318. As was mentioned in note 282, smaller business entities may produce less reliable and
less accurate data than larger ones. In contrast, because the public corporations analyzed above
are all regulated by the Securities Exchange Commission, the data we will use to determine
their undue hardship levels are quite reliable. As was discussed earlier, because of this
disparity, adjustments may need to be made to ensure that something resembling the proposed
methodology will work equally well for smaller, privately held companies.
319. Cellular Products, Inc., Auditor's Report, available in LEXIS, Company Library,
USCO File (Dec. 31, 1994).
320. Id.
321. Carbon Fiber Products, Inc., Auditor's Report, available in LEXIS, Company Library,




figures yield a per capita profit share ("PCPS") of $2,030, and a PUH
of $1,015. Because this figure is within the applicable range, $1,015
is Carbon Fiber's point of undue hardship.
Moving now to three slightly larger companies, Security
Environmental Systems, Inc., is a waste management company em-
ploying 62 people.32s Its most recent annual report revealed a net
working capital of $4,588,571,324 thus creating a RAR of $1,600 to
$16,000. The same report showed a net income of $3,075,943325 which
computes to a PCPS of $49,612. Because 50% of $49,612 is larger
than the maximum level of accommodation required by its RAR,
Security Environmental Systems' PUH is $16,000. Koll Management
Services, Inc., a real estate management firm, reported $6,516,000 in
net working capital and $2,987,000 in net income in its most recent
annual report.326  Its RAR is also $1,600 to $16,000. With 1,500
employees,327 Koll's PCPS was $1,992, thereby establishing a PUH of
$1,600, the applicable minimum. Sandy Corporation is a company
that designs various training programs for its customers. Its most
recent annual report indicated that Sandy's 129 employees produced
$1,322,229 in net income on a net working capital of just over
$9,038,694.328 It too has a RAR of $1600 to $16,000. Its PCPS is
calculated at $10,250, thereby yielding a PUH of $5,125.
Wendy's International, Inc., is a worldwide and familiar fast-
food establishment. Its most recent annual report revealed
$35,438,000 in net working capital,3 29 establishing an RAR of $2,400
to $24,000. With net income of $79,267,000 and 43,000 employees,330
Wendy's PCPS is $1,844, thereby requiring Wendy's to accommodate
at the minimum level established by its RAR, $2,400. Callaway Golf
Company manufactures and distributes golf equipment. In its most
recent annual report, Callaway reported that its 1,071 employees
323. Security Environmental Systems, Inc., Auditor's Report, available in LEXIS, Company
Library, USCO File (June 30, 1993).
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Koll Management Services, Inc., Auditor's Report, available in LEXIS, Company
Library, USCO File (March 31, 1994).
327. Id.
328. Sandy Corporation, Auditor's Report, available in LEXIS, Company Library, USCO
File (Aug. 31, 1993).
329. Wendy's International, Inc., Auditor's Report, available in LEXIS, Company Library,
USCO File (Jan. 2, 1994).
330. Id. The report does not indicate whether Wendy's employed an average of 43,000 full-
time employees or 43,000 full- and part-time employees. The Author assumes the former; if,




helped the company earn $42,862,000, and that it had $83,683,000 in
net working capital." 1 Callaway's net working capital puts it in the
$3,600 to $36,000 RAR. Its PCPS was $40,020, thereby establishing a
PUH of $20,010. The Washington Post Corporation distributes the
world-renowned Washington Post. This 6,600-employee company re-
cently reported net income of $165,417,000, and $367,041,000 in net
working capital.32 Its RAR is $5,400 to $54,000. Doing the appropr-
iate math, we learn that the Washington Post's PUH for the current
year is $12,532.
Finally, let us look at two giant businesses, Kmart
Corporation, the discount retail chain, and Microsoft Corporation, the
nation's leading maker of computer software. Kmart's most recent
annual report revealed over $4,000,000,000 in net working capital, 3
whereas Microsoft's most recent report showed nearly $2,300,000,000
in net working capital.33 Both companies must accommodate within
the highest RAR, $8,100 to $81,000. Kmart lost $974,000,000 during
this period,33 5 with 358,000 employees;3 6  Microsoft earned
$953,000,000 with 14,430 employees.37  Performing the required
calculations, Kmart's PUH is the minimum $8,100 and Microsoft's is
$33,021, half of its $66,042 PCPS.
Table 2 below summarizes the data we have just compiled in
the first five columns. To help us further explore the implications of
the proposed model, three additional columns of data are added. The
sixth column contains figures representing each employer's potential
aggregate reasonable accommodation obligation if: (1) 15% of its
workforce is comprised of disabled employees; (2) 50% of those
disabled employees are entitled to reasonable accommodations; and
(3) 100% of those employees entitled to accommodations require the
employer to expend funds on those accommodations up to the point of
undue hardship. 3 8 The seventh and eighth columns contain figures
331. Callaway Golf Co., Auditor's Report, available in LEXIS, Company Library, USCO File
(Dec. 31, 1993).
332. Washington Post Co., Auditor's Report, available in LEXIS, Company Library, USCO
File (Jan. 2, 1993).
333. Kmart Corp., Auditor's Report, available in LEXIS, Company Library, USCO File
(Jan. 26, 1994).
334. Microsoft Corp., Auditor's Report, available in LEXIS, Company Library, USCO File
(June, 30, 1993).
335. Kmart Corp., Auditor's Report (cited in note 333).
336. Standard Corporate Descriptions 2518 (Standard & Poors, Feb. 1994). Again, the
Author cannot be sure that the 358,000 figure does not include part-time employees.
337. Microsoft Corp., Auditor's Report (cited in note 334).
338. See notes 271-75. To reiterate our earlier discussion, these assumptions in all
likelihood greatly exaggerate the potential aggregate responsibility of each employer because:
(1) only 13.4% of the current workforce is disabled; (2) past studies demonstrated that only 35%
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representing the percentage of each company's net working capital




Company PUH NWC (milL) Net Inc. (mill). Employees Aggregate 33 9 %ofNWC % of Net
Inc.
Cellular Products $ 800 $ 0.2 ($ 1.4) 28 $ 1,600 0.68 NA
Carbon Fiber $ 1,015 $ 1.0 $ .08 38 $ 3,045 0.31 3.9
Koll Mgmt. $ 1,600 $ 6.5 $ 3.0 1,500 $ 180,000 2.8 6.1
Wendy's Int'l $ 2,400 $ 35.4 $ 79.3 43,000 $ 7,740,000 21.8 9.8
Sandy Corp. $ 5,125 $ 9.0 $ 1.3 129 $ 51,250 0.57 3.9
Kmnart $ 8,100 $4123.0 ($974) 358,000 $ 217,485,000 5.3 NA
Washington Poet $12,532 $ 367.0 $155.4 6,600 $ 6,203,340 1.7 3.8
Security Environ $16,000 $ 4.6 $ 3.1 62 $ 80,000 1.7 2.6
Calaway Golf $20,010 $ 83.7 $ 42.9 1,071 $ 1,600,800 1.9 3.7
Microsoft $33,021 $2287.0 $953.0 14,430 $ 35,728,722 1.6 3.7
What we come away with from an analysis of Table 2 is a keen appre-
ciation for the interrelationship between the three variables utilized
to derive the precise point of undue hardship: net working capital,
net income, and number of employees. The two companies on our list
with the greatest net working capital-Kmart and Microsoft-do not,
as might be expected, also have the highest PUHs. Rather,
Microsoft's economic success, coupled with Kmart's economic decline,
results in Microsoft being required to spend up to four times as much
as Kmart to accommodate individual employees with disabilities.
Moreover, the company with the third smallest net working capi-
of those employees require any accommodations; and (3) recent data reveal that only 9% of
accommodations currently being made cost between $1,001 and $2,000, only 8% cost between
$2,001 and $5,000, and only 4% cost more than $5,000. See notes 7, 11, 179, and 185.
Moreover, these figures do not account for tax breaks and other assistance employers may
receive to reduce their financial obligation to accommodate disabled employees. See note 48 and
accompanying text. Consequently, as we move down list of businesses in Table 2, the
percentage of employees in each employer's workforce who will actually need accommodations
requiring employer expenditures as high as the PUH should dwindle to an almost imperceptible
percentage. This is particularly so for Sandy, Kmart, the Washington Post, Security
Environmental, Callaway, and Microsoft, who will likely have few, if any (in Microsoft's case)
employees needing accommodations as expensive as their PUHs.
339. In creating these potential aggregate figures, the number of employees was multiplied
by 7.5 percent (representing the average maximum percentage of the workforce that will require
accommodations). The product was then rounded up to make an even number of employees
needing accommodations. Because the product was rounded off, the maximum percentage of
net income that some of these companies would need to set aside for reasonable
accommodations deviated slightly from the 3.75 percent figure established in note 275.
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tal-Security Environmental Systems-has the third greatest PUH,
due to its relatively high net income and relatively small number of
employees. The two companies with the smallest net working capi-
tal-Cellular Products and Carbon Fiber-also have, as expected, the
lowest PUHs. It is noteworthy, though, that Wendy's, which gener-
ated over seventy times the income of Sandy Corporation and has
nearly four times Sandy's net working capital, has less than half of
Sandy's financial obligation to accommodate employees with
disabilities, due to the comparatively large size of its workforce.
Turning to the aggregate figures, the four businesses with the
greatest individual PUHs have very similar potential aggregate obli-
gations: each has a potential aggregate exposure of 1.6 to 1.9 percent
of its net working capital and 2.6 to 3.8 percent of its net income.
Bearing in mind that even these small percentages greatly exaggerate
these companies' potential aggregate exposure,30 these numbers seem
appropriately respectful of the fairness principle. Meanwhile,
Cellular Products, Carbon Fiber, and Sandy all have potential aggre-
gate responsibilities of less than one percent of their net working
capital, a result that surely comports with the fairness principle.
Similarly, Koll Management's potential aggregate obligation of 2.8
percent of its net working capital appears reasonable.
That leaves Wendy's and Kmart, the two corporations sur-
veyed with the largest labor forces. Our assumption that 7.5 percent
of the employees of each company will require accommodations yields
projected totals of 3,125 of Wendy's employees and 26,850 of Kmart's
employees who will need accommodations. Even though both compa-
nies' PUHs are set at the minimum on the applicable RAR, accommo-
dating 3,125 employees to the full extent of Wendy's PUH will result
in it expending 21.8 percent of its net working capital and 9.8 percent
of its net income on accommodations. Due to Kmart's relatively mas-
sive net working capital of over $4 billion, it can accommodate 26,850
employees at $8,100 each with just 5.3 percent of its net working capi-
tal.
Although Wendy's and Kmart have significantly larger poten-
tial aggregate obligations than the other eight enterprises surveyed,
their obligations are not so large as to impinge upon the fairness
principle. After all, even after accommodating 3,125 employees with
$2,400 expenditures each, Wendy's would still retain 90.2 percent of
its net income from the previous year-hardly a scenario which will
threaten Wendy's ability to generate and maximize profit. Since
340. See note 338.
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Kmart operated at a loss during the year surveyed, the fairness prin-
ciple requires that its remaining resources not be unduly diminished
with reasonable accommodation expenditures. Even if Kmart were
required to spend $8,100 each on 26,850 employees, it would still
retain 94.7 percent of its net working capital. Moreover, with the
most recent data available showing that only five percent of
accommodations cost more than $5,000,m' Kmart will, in all
likelihood, retain significantly more than 95 percent of its net working
capital, even after all 26,850 employees are fully accommodated. This
result seems reasonably fair.
In summary, having put the proposed methodology to the test
of real-world data, we can confidently conclude that it is superior to
the vague standard with which the likes of Cellular Products,
Callaway, and Kmart must currently grapple. The proposed
methodology allows employers and employees alike to know where
they stand, to the dollar. Employers can plan appropriately;
employees can negotiate for their accommodations intelligently.
Neither will have to resort to costly litigation to determine the
parameters of a vague and unhelpful standard. At the same time, the
proposed standard recognizes the importance of allowing employers to
maximize profit, and permitting the lowest-paid employees to compete
equally for accommodations with higher-paid employees. The
proposed standard will truly facilitate the full employment of people
with disabilities and their incorporation into the economic
mainstream.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is time to return to the point at which this Article began,
with Acme Products' sales manager poised to make an offer to a tal-
ented, yet disabled, applicant. How would the proposed undue
hardship standard alter the predicament faced by the sales manager,
job applicant, and legal department? Suppose that Acme has
$275,000 in net working capital and that, in the previous year, it
earned a net income of $200,000 with fifty employees. Upon the sales
manager's telephone call to the legal department it would be quickly
established that Acme's obligation to accommodate this applicant
extends to only $2,000 of the $5,000 in annual accommodation costs
which she would require. The sales manager could then work
341. See note 11.
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together with the applicant to garner the remaining $3,000 from tax
benefits and grants from vocational rehabilitation agencies. To the
extent these efforts fall short, the applicant could pay for the
remainder of her reasonable accommodation needs from her own
funds. Unnecessary acrimony and potential litigation would be
avoided, and a well-qualified person with a disability would be put to
work. This result is exactly what Title I was intended to achieve.
The fundamental shortcomings of the currently vague undue
hardship standard will have to be addressed, if not by Congress or the
EEOC, then by the courts. The issue, however, is too significant to be
left to piecemeal, case-by-case judicial development. Rather, Congress
or the EEOC should move swiftly and aggressively to create a highly
transparent and highly accessible standard which recognizes the vital
importance of allowing businesses to maximize profit while at the
same time empowering citizens with disabilities to secure quality
jobs. The fate of forty-nine million Americans with disabilities and
666,000 private employers hangs in the balance.
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